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1Introduction
In 1890, Wilford Woodruff, president, prophet, seer, and revelator of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(LDS), also known as the Mormons, gathered members of 
the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles around him. Along with 
the First Presidency, consisting of Woodruff and his two coun-
selors, the apostles constituted the governing body of the 
church, responsible for the spiritual welfare of its members. 
Yet on this day, Woodruff had temporal matters on his mind. 
He had called the apostles together to send some of them on 
missions to raise money for the Utah Sugar Company, a fl edg-
ling enterprise that had approached the church for fi nancial 
help. LDS authorities, including Heber J. Grant and Joseph 
F. Smith, accepted Woodruff’s call and spent the next sev-
eral weeks approaching Utah businessmen for money, rais-
ing a considerable sum. In addition to these funds, Woodruff 
pledged LDS resources to the company. Why was the prophet 
so intent on involving the church in this business? As he later 
related, “The inspiration of the Lord to me is to build this fac-
tory. Every time I think of abandoning it, there is darkness; 
and every time I think of building it, there is light.”1
Although some might question the veracity of a claim to 
divine revelation on behalf of sugar beets, Woodruff’s actions 
1. As cited by Heber J. Grant in Eighty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1919), 8–9.
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were not surprising. Since the early 1850s, Latter-day Saints, 
including Brigham Young and John Taylor, Woodruff’s pre-
decessors as presidents of the church, had attempted to 
manufacture sugar, albeit unsuccessfully. Neither Young nor 
Taylor had ever evidenced a divine commission to establish 
the sugar industry, however, which perhaps was the reason 
for their failure. Now that Woodruff insisted that the Lord 
had revealed his will in the matter, success was all but assured. 
With the help of God and the fi nancial backing of the church, 
Woodruff would triumph where Young and Taylor had not.
Nearly twenty years later, church-supported sugar com-
panies dotted Utah and Idaho. In 1907, three of the larg-
est—the Western, the Idaho, and the Utah sugar compa-
nies—merged to form a $13 million corporation known as 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. For the next seven decades, 
this corporation, together with the Amalgamated Sugar Com-
pany, another church-supported fi rm, dominated the sugar 
industry in the Intermountain West. So engrained did beets 
become in Utah that high schools even used names such as 
“Beetdiggers” for their mascots. The production of beet sugar 
was a large-scale enterprise in twentieth-century Utah, gener-
ating millions of dollars for investors and providing high cash 
returns for farmers, who, for many years, generally drew their 
main source of cash income from sugar beets. In the second 
decade of the twentieth century, nearly one-third of Utah 
farmers grew sugar beets. By 1920, 93,603 acres of sugar 
beets were growing in the state and factories there produced 
$28 million worth of beet sugar, making the crop “the secur-
est portion of the agricultural picture” for Utah’s farmers.2
During those years, the LDS church retained a fi rm interest 
in the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. Church presidents served 
simultaneously as presidents of Utah-Idaho Sugar, and mem-
bers of the First Presidency, Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, 
2. Quotation in Thomas G. Alexander, “The Burgeoning of Utah’s Economy: 
1910–18,” in A Dependent Commonwealth: Utah’s Economy from Statehood to the Great 
Depression, Dean L. May, ed., Charles Redd Monographs in Western History No. 
4 (Provo, Utah, 1974), 37–39; see also Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the 
West: A History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1891–1966 (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1966), 201.
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and Presiding Bishopric (the leadership entity responsible 
for the church’s temporal affairs) sat on the corporation’s 
board of directors. Apparently, God, in his determination to 
see the beet sugar industry succeed, wanted his spiritual lead-
ers to oversee the business.
But in 1890, few could have foreseen the economic impact 
that beet sugar would have on the Intermountain West. 
Indeed, for the fi rst thirty years of its existence, the Utah 
Sugar Company and its offspring, Utah-Idaho, faced a rocky 
path to success. These years—roughly 1890 to 1920—cor-
responded to a social, political, and economic transitional 
period in Utah history. Because of increased pressure from 
Map of cities containing Utah-Idaho Sugar Company factories 
in the fi rst half of the twentieth century.
Adapted from Leonard J. Arrington, Beet
Sugar in the West, 181.
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the federal government, and in an effort to gain statehood 
for Utah Territory, Latter-day Saints were forced to abandon 
polygamy, a main tenet of their religion, in 1890. At the same 
time, church leaders asked them to split their allegiance 
between the Republican and Democratic parties instead of 
voting as a religious bloc.
Having met these conditions, Congress granted Utah state-
hood in 1896. This event precipitated a transformation of 
Utah’s economy, where it became not only more commercial-
ized than in the past, but also more national in scope and in 
market. This occurred not just because of statehood, but also 
because of a growing migration to Utah of non-Mormons and 
an increasing urbanization of northern Utah settlements.3
Facing these realities, and understanding that the United 
States at large did not regard church infl uence in economic 
affairs as conducive to democracy and freedom, LDS leaders 
sought, at least in some ways, to reduce the religion’s role in 
economic activities in order to ensure that all Utahns, Mor-
mon or non-Mormon, had the same economic opportunities. 
But these changes did not come easy. “For men and women 
with identities so tightly entwined with their faith, this was 
more than politics,” historian Elliott West noted. “Changing 
the orientation of the Church required them to shift the very 
sense of who they were.”4
Numerous scholars have explored the church’s abandon-
ment of polygamy and the political pluralization of Utah; this 
book does not attempt to address those issues. Instead, this 
study examines a fi eld less thoroughly explored, at least in its 
specifi cs—that of economic change between 1896 and 1930.
Historians have generally divided Utah’s economic history 
up to the Second World War into three different periods. The 
fi rst, lasting until 1869, was characterized by isolation and 
self-suffi ciency, and consisted of economic affairs largely pro-
moted by the LDS church. The second—from 1869 to 1896
(beginning with the coming of the transcontinental railroad 
to Utah and ending with statehood)—saw the growth of two 
3. Ethan R. Yorgason, Transformation of the Mormon Culture Region (Urbana, Ill., 
2003), 82–83.
4. Elliott West, “Becoming Mormon,” Journal of Mormon History 28 (Spring 2002): 50.
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different economies, one consisting of Mormon cooperative 
endeavors and the other of non-Mormon mining and spec-
ulation.5 The third, lasting from 1896 to the beginning of 
the Second World War, saw the end of Mormon cooperation 
and dominance, the merging of Mormon and non-Mormon 
efforts, and the integration of the state’s economic practices 
into the national economy.6 Historians, most notably Leonard 
Arrington, have exhaustively studied the fi rst two periods of 
Mormon economic history, although recent examinations 
indicate that new schools of thought have much to offer to 
our fi nancial understanding of those years.7 Yet scholars have 
largely ignored the third period, which, in some ways, is the 
most pivotal one of all, as it deals with how an economy large-
ly regional in nature became more national in scope.8
The founding of the Utah Sugar Company in 1889 coin-
cided with the fading of cooperation and self-suffi ciency from 
the LDS economy, two activities that had dominated Mormon 
economics almost since the arrival of the Latter-day Saints in 
the Great Basin in 1847, and arguably even before. Joseph 
Smith, founder of the church, preached that the ultimate 
divine society would live the Law of Consecration, whereby 
members would relinquish all of their property and goods to 
the church and receive a stewardship in return, eliminating 
classes and disparities of wealth. Members attempted to live 
this law for a time in the 1830s, but abandoned it after only a 
few years. Brigham Young, Smith’s successor who led the Saints 
to Utah, advocated a more practical form of the Law of Con-
secration. First, he counseled Saints to boycott non-Mormon 
5. For more information about cooperatives and the United Order, see Leonard 
J. Arrington, Feramorz Y. Fox, and Dean L. May, Building the City of God: Com-
munity and Cooperation Among the Mormons (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1976).
6. See Leonard J. Arrington, “The Commercialization of Utah’s Economy: Trends 
and Developments from Statehood to 1910,” in A Dependent Commonwealth, 3–4.
7. See, for example, Christopher J. Garrett, “The Defense of Deseret: An 
Examination of LDS Church Trade Politics and Development Efforts in the 
American West,” Utah Historical Quarterly 73 (Fall 2005): 365–86.
8. Exceptions to this are the works of Thomas G. Alexander, especially Mormonism 
in Transition: A History of the Latter-day Saints, 1890–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1986),
and Yorgason’s Transformation of the Mormon Culture Region, although this work 
focuses more on the cultural changes of the economic transition, rather than 
its effects on business itself.
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merchants and traders. Second, he advocated the creation 
of cooperatives in LDS communities, where members would 
pool their means to produce a product that would replace 
goods sold by non-Mormons or imported from the eastern 
United States. These, in turn, would promote the region’s self-
suffi ciency. In some instances, cooperatives morphed into the 
communalist United Order, communities of Saints in which 
property was centralized and members labored according to 
their talents for the prosperity of all. All of these endeavors 
had one thing in common: they interposed the church as the 
central organization of economic activity.
When Young died in 1877, many of his economic ideas 
died with him. John Taylor, the next Mormon president, was 
more liberal in his beliefs. Taylor abandoned cooperatives 
and the United Order in favor of boards of trade, organiza-
tions that maintained the church’s dominant economic posi-
tion while also allowing for more expansion of the regional 
economy. The boards of trade consisted of a central organiza-
tion—Zion’s Central Board of Trade—as well as community 
organizations centered in Mormon stakes. Prominent Mor-
mon businessmen and ecclesiastical leaders governed these 
boards, which functioned to establish uniform prices for 
products and to market goods outside of the Wasatch Front. 
Essentially, Taylor foresaw the boards as a way to expand pri-
vate production and employment and to regulate competi-
tion in Utah’s economy. Yet these boards lasted only until 
1884, when they abruptly died out, leading to several years 
where the church did not play as large a role in the econo-
my.9 The abandonment of the boards of trade and the result-
ing de-emphasis on church economic control came at least 
partly from necessity; during Taylor’s presidency, the federal 
government attempted to eradicate polygamy from Utah by 
confi scating church property and resources and by attempt-
ing to arrest prominent Latter-day Saints. Such actions forced 
leaders such as Taylor underground to avoid arrest. In that 
environment, the church did not have the means to act as the 
central economic authority.
9. Arrington, Fox, and May, Building the City of God, 311–35.
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By the time Wilford Woodruff assumed the presidency in 
1889, the fi ght over polygamy, including government confi s-
cation of church properties and resources, had intensifi ed. 
Woodruff eliminated much of the contention by issuing the 
Manifesto in 1890, declaring that the LDS church would no 
longer practice polygamy. This was a signifi cant step in order 
for Utah Territory to achieve statehood (which occurred in 
1896), and it enabled the church to begin to regain some of 
its property. Yet the LDS church still faced a huge indebted-
ness in the late 1800s and early 1900s because of the polyg-
amy fi ght and the nationwide Panic of 1893, leaving it help-
less to do much on the economic front. Woodruff invested 
in several enterprises, including sugar, in order to get these 
industries off the ground, but the church’s infl uence was not 
as pronounced during the 1890s as it had been in the 1860s
and 1870s, especially since many of these businesses had to 
turn to outside capital for help. Indeed, the church would 
not be able to lift itself out of debt until Lorenzo Snow, who 
succeeded Woodruff, emphasized in 1899 the importance of 
church members paying a tithe of 10 percent of their incomes. 
Even then, it took several years for the LDS church to pay off 
its obligations and become fi nancially sound.10 Mormons no 
longer had as many qualms about patronizing non-Mormon 
businesses, at least in Salt Lake City, and by the mid-1910s,
observers were noting that non-Mormons controlled a major-
ity of banks and department stores in Salt Lake City. In those 
industries where the church retained a presence, LDS leaders 
sometimes took pains to ensure that the enterprises did not 
unduly restrain competition.11
But in the sugar industry, the LDS role remained strong 
throughout the 1900s; Mormon leaders were not afraid to 
exercise infl uence on the industry’s behalf. Although the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company turned to eastern interests for 
10. Leonard J. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History of the Latter-
day Saints, 1830–1900 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958; reprint, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1993), 386 [references are to the reprint edition]; E. Jay Bell, “The Windows of 
Heaven Revisited: President Lorenzo Snow’s Revelation in St. George and the 
1899 Tithing Reformation,” 2–7, copy in the possession of the author.
11. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 75–76.
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fi nancial support in the early 1900s, the LDS church bought 
out those investors in 1914 and cemented its control of the 
enterprise. High church authorities sat on the governing 
board of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company throughout this 
period; members of the church’s First Presidency, Quorum of 
the Twelve Apostles, and Presiding Bishopric still made pub-
lic requests for fi nancial support; and lower leaders, such as 
stake presidents (who governed local Mormon organizations 
that corresponded roughly to dioceses) and bishops (which 
led the wards, or congregations, that composed the stakes) 
made similar pronouncements. Accordingly, members took 
the advice (or were they commandments?) of their spiritual 
guides by purchasing beet sugar and growing beets solely for 
Utah-Idaho Sugar.
Given these circumstances, this book seeks to answer sev-
eral questions revolving around the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany and its operations from 1890 to 1920. First, why did 
LDS church leaders use ecclesiastical infl uence in behalf of 
sugar at a time when they were trying to maintain competi-
tion in other industries, and what forms did this infl uence 
take? Second, what ramifi cations did this have for the church 
and for Utah-Idaho Sugar? Third, how did the integration 
of Utah’s economy into the national scene affect Utah-Idaho 
Sugar, and how did the LDS infl uence either help or hinder 
that assimilation?
It is important to note that sugar was not the only indus-
try in which the LDS church retained a presence during 
this time. Salt, insurance, and entertainment industries also 
benefi ted from continued church involvement, as did Zion’s 
Cooperative Mercantile Institute (ZCMI), a merchandising 
fi rm originally begun as part of the cooperative movement 
in the nineteenth century.12 But there are several reasons why 
answering questions about LDS infl uence in the sugar beet 
industry is both important and necessary. For one thing, beet 
sugar—through the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company and its sis-
ter corporation, Amalgamated Sugar—was one of the most 
12. See Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 74–92; Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom,
386–409.
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signifi cant, if not the most signifi cant agricultural industry in 
the Intermountain West in this time period, when agricul-
ture still dominated that region’s economy. It represented 
the increasing industrialization of agriculture in the area, as 
factories sprang up across the Intermountain West to extract 
sugar from beets. It also embodied the commercialization of 
Utah’s economy in the years following statehood: Utah-Idaho 
Sugar relied on eastern capital for funding, marketed its prod-
uct outside of the Intermountain West, and focused on profi t-
ability rather than self-suffi ciency. In addition, it showed how 
agriculture in the American West could be a “big business,” 
just as the notorious Standard Oil Company or U.S. Steel, 
and how such businesses could take advantage of national 
trends in their policies.
On a national level, Utah-Idaho Sugar was part of an indus-
try that, to many Americans between 1890 and 1920, seemed 
to personify the evils of capitalism and the corporate world. 
Many sugar concerns combined themselves horizontally 
into trusts that monopolized business and prevented com-
petition. The Sugar Trust, for example, had formed in the 
1880s through a combination of eastern sugar corporations, 
but had been abolished by the federal government as an ille-
gal trust under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The corporation 
merely reformed as the American Sugar Refi ning Company 
in 1891 and continued the same practices, leading to further 
indictments under the Sherman Act of 1890.13 In so doing, 
American Sugar prevented others from gaining a foot in the 
industry and forced consumers to accept prices and wages 
that it dictated, not those based on competition.
But the lust for sugar was an ancient thing. A Hindu legend 
explained that sugar cane had fi rst entered the world as part 
of an earthly paradise created by deity for an Indian prince. 
Whatever its origins, it fi rst became popular as a luxury item 
for royalty and the rich in the Middle East, and by the 1300s,
it had invaded Europe. When Europeans fi rst began explor-
ing the North and South American continents, they brought 
13. Alfred S. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly: Sugar Refi ning as a Case Study
(Baltimore, Md., 1969), 179–87, 300–304.
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sugar cultivation with them. At this time, crop production 
was based on slave labor, something that continued as planta-
tions became established in the Caribbean. Indeed, the sugar 
industry became noted for its exploitation of workers, even as 
it became more popular among lower classes in North Ameri-
ca. By the time of the Civil War, it was grown in Louisiana and 
other locations in the United States, making it more readily 
available to average consumers.14
With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery 
was outlawed in the United States, but Louisiana cane grow-
ers continued to use African Americans in conditions that, 
in many ways, were no different from slavery.15 Likewise, by 
the 1910s, Japanese and Mexican laborers were largely per-
forming the arduous tasks of planting and harvesting sugar 
beets in the United States, although many Mormon families 
relied on their own toil and sweat, rather than that of others. 
Regardless, even communities in Idaho and Utah saw increas-
ing use of Japanese and Mexicans workers by the late 1910s,
and, as with other sugar-growing operations, these laborers 
suffered from low pay and poor working conditions.16
Moreover, some charged that the sugar industry—espe-
cially beet sugar—acted as a parasite on the national econ-
omy, existing only because of federal support in the form of 
subsidies and tariffs. There was much truth to this view. The 
United States fi rst placed a tariff on sugar in 1789 under the 
presidency of George Washington. Until 1890, this duty, typi-
cally two cents a pound, acted more as a revenue-raiser for 
14. See Fred G. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar: Being a Story of the Romance and Development 
of Beet Sugar in the Rocky Mountain West (Salt Lake City, 1944), 1–22.
15. For an excellent discussion of the transformation of labor on Louisiana sugar 
plantations in the late 1800s and early 1900s, see Richard Follett and Rick 
Halpern, “From Slavery to Freedom in Louisiana’s Sugar Country: Changing 
Labor Systems and Workers’ Power, 1861–1913,” in Sugar, Slavery, and Society: 
Perspectives on the Caribbean, India, the Mascarenes, and the United States, Bernard 
Moitt, ed. (Gainesville, Fla., 2004), 135–56. For a more general discussion 
of how the western sugar industry was built on the foundation of slavery and 
exploitation, see Stuart B. Schwartz, “Introduction,” in Tropical Babylons: Sugar 
and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450–1680, Stuart B. Schwartz, ed. (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 2004), 6.
16. See Paul S. Taylor, “Hand Laborers in the Western Sugar Beet Industry,” 
Agricultural History 41 (Winter 1967): 23.
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the federal government rather than as a protector of Ameri-
can sugar. It generated nearly $50 million a year by 1890. Not 
until the late 1800s was there any kind of real domestic indus-
try to protect; although Louisiana had manufactured cane 
sugar for a number of years, most United States sugar was 
imported. Yet Louisiana producers still benefi ted from the 
sugar tariff throughout the 1800s, as it granted some protec-
tion to the industry by preventing the importation of cheaper 
cane sugar. After the United States entered a reciprocal trade 
treaty with Hawaii in 1876, Hawaiian sugar also received tariff 
protection.17
Conditions changed in 1890 under the Republican admin-
istration of Benjamin Harrison. That year, Republicans, 
aware of the “overfl owing Federal Treasury” that “minimized 
the need for revenue,” decided to eliminate the sugar tariff. 
To compensate Louisiana sugar producers and an increas-
ing number of beet growers, Congress voted to pay produc-
ers a bounty of two cents for every pound of sugar manufac-
tured in the United States. This bounty meant that “the sugar 
industry, previously taxed for revenue, became the recipient 
of a direct subsidy.” After imported sugar fl ooded the Unit-
ed States, Congress replaced the bounty with another tariff 
in 1894, this time imposing a 40 percent duty on imported 
sugars.18
From the 1890s forward, sugar producers regarded boun-
ties and duties as essential to the protection of the industry 
from cheaper foreign sugars from Cuba and Indonesia. Sugar 
advocates claimed that because of less favorable physical con-
ditions in Louisiana, the cost of labor in beet sugar, and the 
infancy of the industry in America, it could not survive with-
out the tariff. But domestic producers were not the only ones 
who benefi ted from the tariff; refi ners such as the American 
17. John E. Dalton, Sugar: A Case Study of Government Control (New York, 1937),
20–21; F. W. Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1915), 53–55; F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 5th ed. 
(New York, 1910), 14–15.
18. Quotations in Dalton, Sugar, 22–23; see also Andrew Schmitz and Douglas 
Christian, “The Economics and Politics of U.S. Sugar Policy,” in The Economics 
and Politics of World Sugar Policies, Stephen V. Marks and Keith E. Maskus, eds. 
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1993), 50.
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Sugar Refi ning Company also profi ted. Although they paid a 
tariff on raw sugar entering the United States, refi ners were 
protected by the tariff differential, whereby imported refi ned 
sugar was subject to a duty of one cent a pound. Therefore, 
it was unprofi table for most foreign countries to export any 
refi ned sugar to the United States, and domestic refi ners 
had a virtual monopoly over the production of refi ned cane 
sugar.19 These conditions led Henry W. Havemeyer of Ameri-
can Sugar to declare in 1899 that the tariff—and not his com-
pany—was “the mother of all trusts” because it prevented any 
outside competition.20 They also made the sugar industry 
“arguably the most criticized of all U.S. farm programs.”21
Between 1890 and 1920, the United States saw a growing 
movement in favor of federal regulation of big business and 
the corporate world, including the sugar industry, for the 
good of consumers and industry players alike. In this “Pro-
gressive Era,”22 many citizens held the view that any kind of 
unfair business practice was both illegal and morally wrong. 
Industrialization had created a “distended society” where 
corporations eradicated the rights and freedoms of average 
Americans, creating confusion and disorder. In an effort to 
bring order to this world, and to the entities that had upset 
19. Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, 101–4.
20. As cited in Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 95–96.
21. Schmitz and Christian, “The Economics and Politics of U.S. Sugar Policy,” 49.
22. Scholars have traditionally called the period between 1890 and 1920 the 
“Progressive Era,” but they have also vigorously debated whether or not this 
term and the label “Progressivism” are really appropriate to describe these 
years. One of the biggest problems is determining whether or not there was 
a cohesive “Progressive” movement. Peter Filene, for example, argued that 
a movement consists of people combining and acting together in deliberate, 
self-conscious ways, and claimed that the Progressive Era saw no such cohesive 
organization. Instead, reformers came from all classes and had disparate goals. 
“An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement,’” American Quarterly 22 (Spring 
1970): 20–22. Other scholars believed that Filene defi ned Progressivism too 
narrowly. Daniel Rodgers agreed that different Progressives desired different 
reforms, but he declared that Progressives as a whole were united around a 
central belief: the effectiveness of weak-party, issue-focused politics, something 
that Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick also argued. Rodgers, “In 
Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982):
114–15; Link and McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1983),
55–56. Other historians believe that using the term “Progressivism” implies that 
progress occurred during the era, but disagree that race or gender relations 
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the balance, middle-class America looked to the federal gov-
ernment for help.23
Accordingly, in the late 1800s, Congress began passing laws 
geared towards keeping big business in check. In 1890, for 
example, it enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, the fi rst law 
that specifi cally attempted to regulate commerce and elimi-
nate trusts in the United States. When Theodore Roosevelt 
became president of the United States in 1901, the move for 
antitrust measures became more pronounced, as Roosevelt 
pledged to rid the nation of those big businesses that were 
harming its economy. The president oversaw the creation of 
the Bureau of Corporations in 1903, an agency that had the 
authority to investigate and publicize unfair business prac-
tices but could not enforce regulatory laws. Because of Roos-
evelt’s efforts, and because of a growing belief that business 
was exerting undue infl uence on politicians, “the regulatory 
revolution” exploded during Roosevelt’s presidency.24
President Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, extended this 
revolution. Strongly believing in the necessity of regulating 
during the early twentieth century were ever advanced. Link and McCormick, 
Progressivism, 2–3. Still other scholars recognize that the arguments against 
the use of “Progressivism” have some validity, but still use the term “because 
historians routinely use this label and readers recognize it more readily than 
any other.” Steven J. Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era
(New York, 1998), 13. I will follow the example of this latter group. For a full 
argument about the debate over Progressivism, see Richard L. McCormick, The
Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progres-
sive Era (New York, 1986), 263–88.
23. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York, 1967), 42–43,
181; see also Steven J. Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era
(New York, 1998), 12, 46. Scholars have produced many reasons for the rise of 
regulation during the Progressive Era. Arthur Link and Richard L. McCormick 
held that most of the reasons fall into three distinct categories: “the ‘public 
interest’ interpretation, the ‘capture’ thesis, and the ‘pluralist’ model.” The 
public interest interpretation declared that reformers advocated change 
out of an interest in preserving the rights and freedoms of Americans. The 
capture thesis held that “the regulated businesses themselves were the main 
benefi ciaries of government regulation” and were thus behind the push for 
federal control. The pluralist model, meanwhile, took the middle ground and 
asserted that “diverse competing interests . . . all had a hand in shaping the 
details of regulation.” Link and McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, 
Ill., 1983), 63–66.
24. Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from 
the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York, 1986), 319; Lewis L. Gould, 
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businesses that hurt the American people, Wilson oversaw 
the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which gave 
teeth to the Sherman Act by prohibiting business practices 
such as price discrimination and combinations and estab-
lished actual penalties for these practices. Wilson also helped 
promote the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which 
established the Federal Trade Commission as a more power-
ful replacement of Roosevelt’s Bureau of Corporations.25
Between 1907 and 1921, the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
with its LDS leaders, collided with these federal regulatory 
forces at a frequent rate, a consequence both of its partic-
ipation in the national economy and of continued church 
involvement in the industry. This, in essence, is the core sig-
nifi cance of this study—the examination of how both LDS 
involvement and national integration pushed Utah-Idaho 
Sugar into positions where, in the name of profi tability, it 
attempted to destroy competitors and to enact policies that 
would keep it afl oat in the cutthroat world of sugar. Because 
one of the central doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints is honesty and integrity in human inter-
actions, the fact that between 1907 and 1920, the corpora-
tion—still dominated by LDS authorities—was investigated 
by the House of Representatives, the U.S. Department of 
Labor, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade 
Commission for unfair trade practices, seems surprising, if 
not illogical.26
Yet, as this study will show, it is precisely because of LDS 
involvement, and not in spite of it, that Utah-Idaho Sugar 
faced so many legal diffi culties. Had Wilford Woodruff never 
Reform and Regulation: American Politics from Roosevelt to Wilson, 2nd ed. (New 
York, 1986), 172.
25. Diner, A Very Different Age, 224; Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A 
Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 137, 147–48;
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955),
249–50.
26. One of the church’s “Articles of Faith,” for example (written by Joseph Smith), 
states, “We believe in being honest, true, chaste, benevolent, virtuous, and in 
doing good to all men,” while ecclesiastical leaders ask Mormon members 
specifi cally about honesty in their dealings to help determine whether someone 
is worthy to enter LDS temples (the most sacred places for Latter-day Saints).
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pledged church support to the Utah Sugar Company in 1889,
or had the church downplayed its infl uence in the industry in 
the early 1900s, as it did with other endeavors, it is unlikely 
that so many investigations would have occurred. The Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company would not have had the tremendous 
ecclesiastical infl uence that enabled it to promote its interests 
above all others, nor would it have had the means to become 
a national player. Certainly, Utah-Idaho Sugar leaders could 
have found other investors, but it is unlikely that the industry 
would have achieved the peculiar dominance that it asserted 
between 1890 and 1920 without church involvement. Like-
wise, because church leaders and the church itself made great 
fi nancial sacrifi ces in the industry’s early years, Mormon lead-
ers made profi tability a high priority. In doing so, it placed 
Utah-Idaho Sugar on a path that inevitably led to clashes with 
federal regulation.
When Wilford Woodruff sent high-ranking LDS leaders 
to collect money for the Utah Sugar Company in 1889, he 
could not have foreseen the consequences that would follow. 
Woodruff claimed that the industry would provide employ-
ment for the LDS people and a cash crop for Mormon farm-
ers. Nowhere did he state that beet sugar would enrich the 
LDS church and its leaders. But as Utah’s economy changed 
between 1896 and 1920, and as Mormon participation contin-
ued, that is precisely what happened. The following chapters 
detail the interesting story of how and why the LDS church 
helped to start the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, how that cor-
poration’s integration into the national economy affected its 
business policies, why Mormon leaders continued their heavy 
involvement when other businesses saw less direct church par-
ticipation, and how these features ultimately resulted in regu-
latory investigations by the federal government. In doing so, 
this book provides a glimpse into how a regional concern in 
the American West became affected by national market forces 
in the early 1900s and offers insights into the role that the 
LDS church played in economic affairs in the Intermountain 
West during the early twentieth century.
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The Establishment of the Sugar 
Industry in Utah and Idaho,
1851–1907
”[N]ow the inspiration of the Lord to me is to build this 
factory. Every time I think of abandoning it, there is 
darkness; and every time I think of building it, there is 
light. We will build the factory if it bursts the Church.”
—Wilford Woodruff, 1891
“But for the inspiration of the Lord to Wilford Woodruff I 
doubt if we would have any sugar business in this state or 
in Idaho, today, that would amount to very much.”
—Heber J. Grant, 1919
In 1889, the Utah Sugar Company—a predecessor to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company—incorporated in Utah, 
becoming one of the fi rst successful beet sugar manufacturers 
in the United States. The organization of Utah Sugar was 
the culmination of several years of trial and error by Utah 
entrepreneurs, including Brigham Young and John Taylor, 
prominent Mormon leaders. Beginning with Young’s efforts 
to produce sugar in the 1850s and ending with Wilford 
Chapter Two
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Woodruff pronouncing that God himself wanted Mormons 
to produce beet sugar, LDS leaders were key players in 
the industry’s growth. Birthed in this LDS cradle, church 
authorities took it upon themselves to ensure that the Utah 
Sugar Company was a success. Church capital could only go 
so far, however, and in 1902, the corporation sold 50 percent 
of its stock to the American Sugar Refi ning Company, an 
eastern concern known as the Sugar Trust. With the capital 
that this provided, the company expanded into Idaho, 
eventually merging several different corporations into the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in 1907. This formative period 
of the corporation—which infl uenced both the way that the 
nation at large perceived the company and future corporation 
policies—highlighted why the church became involved in 
the industry and what Woodruff and other leaders hoped to 
accomplish with the business.
North Americans had produced sugar as early as colonial 
times. The fi rst sugar refi nery was established on Manhattan 
Island in 1730, and others were developed in Boston, 
Philadelphia, and Providence, Rhode Island. Most of these 
factories refi ned raw cane sugar imported from the West 
Indies. Reliance on cane sugar continued throughout the 
nineteenth century; entrepreneurs such as Robert L. and 
Alexander Stuart advanced the industry by developing new 
manufacturing techniques such as using steam to refi ne the 
product. In the 1850s, the number of cane refi neries increased 
substantially, in part because burgeoning railroad networks in 
America allowed manufacturers to sell their product across 
wider markets. However, the industry encountered problems 
in the 1860s with the outbreak of the Civil War. Because of the 
confl ict, the supply of Louisiana cane sugar disappeared and 
eastern refi neries were forced to rely on imports from Cuba. In 
addition, the Union Congress doubled the tariff on raw sugar 
to three cents a pound in order to raise money.1 When the war 
1. A revenue-producing tariff had existed on sugar since the 1790s and had in-
creased to thirteen cents a pound by 1816. However, thereafter it decreased 
considerably until the Civil War forced it upwards again. Alfred S. Eichner, The
Emergence of Oligopoly: Sugar Refi ning as a Case Study (Baltimore, Md., 1969),
95–96.
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ended, the industry thrived once again, and numerous sugar 
refi neries dotted the eastern United States by the 1870s.2
Competition between corporations meant that the price 
of sugar depended on whoever was willing to sell their supply 
the cheapest. The lowest rates were usually established by 
“marginal enterprises seeking to retain their foothold in 
the industry.” Thus, in 1880, several sugar fi rms decided to 
enter into agreements with each other to limit production 
and control prices. This established the base for further 
cooperation, and in 1887, these eastern refi neries, led by 
John Searles, “duplicate[d] in sugar refi ning what John D. 
Rockefeller had so recently accomplished in the petroleum 
industry” by creating a trust. Although some of the larger 
corporations, such as Havemeyer and Elder, were wary 
of yielding control of their fi rms to the trust, Searles soon 
persuaded most of the eastern companies to unite. By October 
1887, the trust had formed, thereby enabling sugar producers 
to sell their commodity at set prices and to manipulate the 
distribution of their product in order to raise rates. This was 
a true monopoly, as it supplied approximately 84 percent 
of the nation’s refi ned sugar from the eastern shores to the 
Rocky Mountains.3
After the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 and a 
decision by the New York Supreme Court that the combination 
was illegal, the Sugar Trust realized that it had to change its 
organization in order to continue its operations. In 1891,
it followed the lead of the American Cotton Oil Company 
and reconstituted itself under the liberal corporation laws 
of New Jersey. According to historian Alfred Eichner, these 
laws stated that “a company chartered under the state’s 
general laws” could “hold stock in another corporation” 
and even “purchase property outside the state with stock 
specially issued for that purpose.” On January 10, 1891, the 
Sugar Trust became the American Sugar Refi ning Company 
under a charter received from New Jersey. “Except for its new 
legal form,” Eichner explained, “the combination of sugar 
2. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 26–43.
3. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 63, 70, 84.
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refi neries remained unchanged” and eastern corporations, 
which mainly processed imported cane sugar, continued to 
control most of America’s sugar market.4
At the same time, several individuals, mostly in the American 
West, were working on manufacturing sugar from beets instead 
of cane, a technique common in several European nations, 
including France and Prussia. German chemist Andreas 
Maggraf successfully demonstrated that sucrose stored in 
the beet root could be extracted in 1747, but it was not until 
the 1780s that his student Franz Karl Achard planted beets 
extensively and obtained large amounts of sugar from them. 
Recognizing this success, Frederick William II, King of Prussia, 
funded the world’s fi rst beet sugar factory in 1802, located at 
Cunern, Silesia. The French corresponded with Achard and 
on March 25, 1811, Napoleon Bonaparte issued a decree 
setting aside beet farmland, establishing schools to teach 
beet cultivation, and providing bounties for beet growers. 
This effectively established the world’s beet sugar industry.5
Although the French enterprise collapsed after Napoleon 
was defeated, government controls and encouragement 
reestablished it later. By the 1850s, both Prussia and France 
exported large amounts of beet sugar to the world.6
But the process of converting beets into sugar was a 
complicated, enigmatic, thirty-six-hour procedure. As one 
factory worker reminisced, “The whole process of beet 
sugar making was considered a mystery. Each operator was 
instructed only in the part he was to do.”7 The beets were fi rst 
4. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 149–51.
5. Leonard J. Arrington, “Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic 
Development: The Western Beet Sugar Industry,” Agricultural History 41
(Winter 1967): 1–2.
6. United States Beet Sugar Association [USBSA], The Beet Sugar Story, 3 ed. 
(Washington, D.C., 1959), 8–13 (this book was originally published by the 
Association in 1936 under the title The Silver Wedge). See also Fred G. Taylor, A
Saga of Sugar: Being a Story of the Romance and Development of Beet Sugar in the Rocky 
Mountain West (Salt Lake City, 1944), 19–21.
7. “Walter L. Webb’s Memoirs,” 16, copy in Leonard J. Arrington Papers, 
Manuscript Series [MSS] 1, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 
8, folder 3, The Leonard J. Arrington Historical Archives, Special Collections 
and Archives, Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, Utah (hereafter 
cited as Arrington Papers).
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transported into a factory by a wooden fl ume full of warm 
water. They were then conveyed into a washer by a large 
beet wheel. After being washed, the beets were transported 
to a cutter where they were sliced into long slivers, known 
as “cossettes.” A revolving chute dropped the cossettes into 
several diffusers that used hot water to cook the sliced beets 
in order to extract the sugar. As historian Leonard Arrington 
described it, “This was a continuous process of fi lling the cells 
[with water] and pumping out the sugar-exhausted pulp.” 
After the diffusers had extracted all of the raw beet juice 
containing the sugar, the liquid was pumped to carbonators 
where milk of lime and carbon dioxide fi ltered out impurities. 
The juice then arrived at an evaporator that extricated any 
excess water, leaving a type of molasses behind. Sulphur 
gas clarifi ed the molasses and the substance entered a huge 
vacuum pan where centrifuges separated the molasses from 
the crystals. The molasses was boiled further to create brown 
sugar, while the crystals were packed into hand-sewn bags and 
prepared for shipment.8
In the early 1800s, many American entrepreneurs spent 
considerable time in France and Germany observing these 
operations, and some decided to try their hand at the industry 
in the United States. James Ronaldson undertook the fi rst 
signifi cant effort in Philadelphia in 1830. Serving as the fi rst 
president of the Franklin Institute, Ronaldson organized the 
Beet Sugar Society with some acquaintances and sent James 
Pedders to Europe to study the industry. Pedders reported 
that America was well suited for the growing of beets, but the 
crop the society planted failed to produce any sugar.9 Edward 
8. Quotation in Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West: A History of the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company, 1891–1966 (Seattle, 1966), 28–31; see also Richard S. 
Van Wagoner, “The Lehi Sugar Factory—100 Years in Retrospect,” Utah Histori-
cal Quarterly 59 (Spring 1991): 197–199; Charles L. Schmalz, “The Failure of 
Utah’s First Sugar Factory,” Utah Historical Quarterly 56 (Winter 1988): 50–52;
“Walter L. Webb’s Memoirs,” 17. Arrington stated that a vacuum pan was neces-
sary for crystallization because “if syrup is boiled in the open air it will burn, 
rather than produce sugar. . . . When placed in a vacuum, the syrup can be 
boiled at a low temperature until it is heavy enough for crystals to form.”
9. USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 15; George M. Rolph, Something About Sugar: Its 
History, Growth, Manufacture and Distribution (San Francisco, 1917), 148.
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Church and David Lee Child of Northampton, Massachusetts, 
made the next attempt. Church and Child, both of whom 
had studied at beet sugar factories in France for a year and a 
half, produced 1,300 pounds of sugar in 1838, but a dearth 
of skill doomed their attempt.10
Undaunted by these failures, Brigham Young, president of 
the Mormon church, decided in the 1850s that the church 
needed to establish a beet sugar enterprise in the Great Basin 
in order to make his people more self-suffi cient. Mormons had 
moved into the region that became Utah Territory in 1847
after being driven out of other locations in New York, Ohio, 
Missouri, and Illinois. In order to maintain necessary food 
supplies in this remote location, the organization encouraged 
its people to grow or produce foodstuffs and resources. The 
only way the community could get sugar was by importing it 
from the Missouri River Valley by team, an operation that cost 
Utah consumers between forty cents and a dollar a pound. 
Such prices convinced Young that Mormons must develop their 
own sweeteners, and he began asking prospective emigrants 
to Salt Lake City to bring sugar beet seed with them.11
In December 1850, Young contacted John Taylor, one of the 
church’s governing Twelve Apostles who was serving a mission 
in France, and told him to fi nd enterprises in Europe that could 
be exported to Utah. Taylor subsequently journeyed to Arras, 
France, accompanied by Philip De LaMare, a blacksmith and 
builder who had recently converted to Mormonism, to study 
France’s beet sugar industry. After consulting with experts in 
10. USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 15; Rolph, Something About Sugar, 148; “The Beet 
Sugar Industry and the Church: Excerpts from the 51st Anniversary Report 
of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company,” copy in Arrington Papers, Series 12: The 
Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 8, folder 1.
11. Schmalz, “The Failure of Utah’s First Sugar Factory,” 36–37; Fred G. Taylor, 
“Notes on the Development of the Beet Sugar Industry in Utah,” in Utah: A 
Centennial History, ed. Wain Sutton (New York, 1949), 2:917; “Testimony 
of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, House Special Committee on the 
Investigation of the American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others, Hearings Held 
Before the Special Committee on the Investigation of the American Sugar Refi ning Co. 
and Others, 62 Cong., 1st sess., 1911, 1071 (hereafter referred to as American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings); Mary Jane Woodger, “Bittersweet: John 
Taylor’s Introduction of the Sugar Beet Industry in Deseret,” Utah Historical 
Quarterly 69 (Summer 2001): 248.
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Arras, Taylor and De LaMare decided that Utah was an ideal 
location for the growing of sugar beets, and they organized the 
Deseret Manufacturing Company (DMC) to establish the beet 
sugar industry in Utah. With fi nancing from the company, 
Taylor and De LaMare, assisted by Elias Morris, a mechanic 
from England, ordered equipment and seed and shipped 
it back to Utah. Along the way, they encountered several 
problems. First, when the equipment landed at New Orleans, 
Morris was informed that he owed a $4,056 duty on it. Not 
having the money personally, he had to use church funds for 
the payment. Second, when De LaMare and Joseph Russell, 
the majority stockholder in the DMC, loaded the machinery 
onto fi fty-two wagons to transport it from Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, to Salt Lake City, they discovered that the transports 
were not sturdy enough to convey the equipment, forcing 
them to buy forty Santa Fe prairie schooners. In addition, 
since the expedition did not leave Fort Leavenworth until 
July 1852, it got caught in heavy snows near the Sweetwater 
River, two hundred miles east of Salt Lake. When the group 
fi nally began moving again, it had to abandon some of the 
heavier pieces of equipment, such as the vacuum pan, near 
the Bear River because they could not be transported over 
the mountains. After fi nally reaching the Salt Lake Valley and 
proceeding with the establishment of the factory, the DMC 
had no more money. Such tribulations convinced some that 
DMC must stand for “Damn Miserable Company.”12
Because of such diffi culties, Brigham Young decided to take 
over the enterprise himself on behalf of the church. Part of 
the problem, he declared, was that Taylor was not much of a 
businessman; the apostle was “as wild in [his] calculations as a 
man can be” and “knew nothing about transacting business.” 
Although Young admitted that he had no knowledge of the 
sugar industry himself, he decided that his own business 
acumen, initiative, hard work, and faith in God would enable 
12. Woodger, “Bittersweet,” 249–55; Leonard J. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: 
An Economic History of the Latter-day Saints, 1830–1900 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958;
reprint, Salt Lake City, 1993), 116–18 (page references are to the reprint edi-
tion); Schmalz, “The Failure of Utah’s First Sugar Factory,” 37–40; Taylor, 
“Notes on the Development of the Beet Sugar Industry in Utah,” 2:920–24.
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him to succeed where Taylor had not.13 Unfortunately, his 
predictions were premature, and several obstacles arose 
which prevented the production of beet sugar at this time. 
Vacuum strike pan, used in the making of beet sugar
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections
and Archives, Utah State University
13. Quotations in “Meeting of the Sugar Co. in the Lower Room of the Council 
House, March 17, 1853, 10 A.M.,” Arrington Papers, Series 9: Mormon History 
Topics, box 12, folder 7; see also Woodger, “Bittersweet,” 256–58.
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One problem was the Mormons’ complete lack of knowledge 
about sugar making and the construction of sugar factories; 
another was the fact that the vacuum pan, a necessary piece 
of equipment, was still by the Bear River. When the church 
fi nally retrieved the pan in 1854, its employees were unable to 
get it to work properly.14 Because of this, according to Thomas 
R. Cutler, a later player in the establishment of Utah’s beet 
sugar industry, the church could only produce an inedible 
“mascuite” which “would take the end of your tongue off.”15
So the Mormons abandoned their efforts at producing beet 
sugar for the next thirty years.
Other Americans continued to try to perfect the commodity. 
According to one account, entrepreneurs constructed 
fourteen beet sugar factories in the United States between 
1838 and 1879, but all fourteen, scattered throughout Maine, 
Massachusetts, Delaware, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, Wisconsin, and California, failed, mostly because of a 
lack of technical knowledge.16 A breakthrough fi nally came in 
1879 when E. H. Dyer, operating under the auspices of the 
Standard Sugar Refi ning Company, took over a factory at 
Alvarado, California. After making an intensive study of the 
industry in France and Germany, Dyer and his son, Edward 
F., installed new equipment in the factory and subsequently 
produced1,574,233 pounds of sugar in 1880. More importantly, 
with the exception of one year, the company continued its 
production for the next thirty-fi ve years, making it “the fi rst 
solid demonstration in the United States that sugar could be 
extracted from beets successfully and profi tably.”17
Two other endeavors were equally as important in the 
history of the industry before 1890. Claus Spreckels, a 
14. Schmalz, “The Failure of Utah’s First Sugar Factory,” 41.
15. “Testimony of  Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar 
Refi ning Company Hearings, 767. See also Schmalz, “The Failure of  Utah’s 
First Sugar Factory,” 52; Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 118; Taylor, “Notes 
on the Development of  the Beet Sugar Industry in Utah,” 925–27.
16. USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 16; Rolph, Something About Sugar, 149–50; Arrington, 
“Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” 3.
17. Quotation in USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 16–17; see also Arrington, “Science, 
Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” 4; Rolph, Something
About Sugar, 150–52.
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German immigrant who had been involved in Hawaiian sugar 
refi ning since 1863, decided that beet sugar had a great future 
in California after he witnessed the success of the Dyers’ 
Alvarado factory. In 1888, Spreckels constructed a $400,000
factory at Watsonville, California, which became America’s 
second prosperous beet sugar factory. In 1898, Spreckels built 
another huge plant at Salinas, fi fteen miles from Watsonville, 
and continued his sugar operations there.18
Meanwhile, the Oxnard brothers—Robert, Benjamin, 
Henry T., and James G.—who had previously operated cane 
sugar refi neries in New York and Louisiana for the Sugar 
Trust, decided to enter the beet sugar trade, in part because 
E. H. Dyer, one of the pioneers of the beet 
sugar industry in the United States
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
18. Arrington, “Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” 
5–6; Rolph, Something About Sugar, 154; USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 17.
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they believed “it was both a profi table and patriotic thing” to 
do. “I saw that every year [America] was sending away a lot of 
money to buy something which we could just as well produce 
at home,” Henry Oxnard later recollected.19 Henry traveled to 
France, from where his family had immigrated, to consult with 
producers, purchase machinery, and induce laborers to work 
in America. He and his brothers then organized the Oxnard 
Beet Sugar Company and established factories at Grand Island 
and Norfolk, Nebraska, and at Chino, California. In the years 
that followed, the three factories acted as manufacturing 
schools for those who were interested in the beet trade. By 
the 1900s, according to one scholar, “there was hardly a beet 
sugar factory in America that did not employ operators who 
had been trained in the ‘Oxnard school.’”20
By 1890, then, a few beet sugar fabrications were operating 
successfully in the American West. Although Utah had failed 
in its initial beet sugar attempt, the quest to develop edible 
sweeteners had continued in the territory. Arthur Stayner, 
a Utah horticulturist from England, made several attempts 
in the 1870s and 1880s to produce sugar from sorghum 
cane, sugar cane, and beets. In 1887, Utah’s territorial 
legislature even granted him a $5,000 bounty, payable upon 
the production of 7,000 pounds of marketable sugar. Stayner 
realized, however, that he did not have suffi cient funding 
to carry out the necessary research or to buy the essential 
equipment, so he approached leaders of the LDS church and 
asked for their fi nancial help.21
To Stayner’s good fortune, Wilford Woodruff, who 
succeeded John Taylor as president of the church, quickly 
19. “Testimony of Henry Oxnard,” June 16, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Com-
pany Hearings, 382.
20. Arrington, “Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” 
6–7; USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 17; Rolph, Something About Sugar, 154–56.
21. Leonard J. Arrington, “Utah’s Pioneer Beet Sugar Plant: The Lehi Factory of 
the Utah Sugar Company,” Utah Historical Quarterly 34 (Spring 1966): 96. See 
also Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 6; Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 386–87;
Arrington, “Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” 
7; Jesse Robinson Smith, Thomas Robinson Cutler: Pioneer Sugarman Churchman
(Washington, D.C., 1985), 88–89; Van Wagoner, “The Lehi Sugar Factory,” 
190; Hamilton Gardner, History of Lehi Including a Biographical Section (Salt Lake 
City, 1913), 260.
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became convinced that beet sugar was an important industry 
for Utah and the Latter-day Saints. Woodruff, who was born in 
1807 in Connecticut, had joined the church in 1832 and had 
become an apostle in 1838. He was noted for his success in 
bringing people into the church, and had also served in Utah’s 
territorial legislature.22 Stayner had originally approached 
Woodruff about fi nancing in 1887, but the church’s poor 
fi nancial condition at that time, coupled with a negative report 
on the industry from a committee of businessmen affi liated 
with Zion’s Cooperative Mercantile Institute, a church-run 
enterprise, made him reluctant to grant fi nancial aid. In 1888
and 1889, however, Woodruff seemed to reconsider, allowing 
Stayner and Elias Morris, one of the original participants 
in the DMC, to speak at priesthood meetings about the 
establishment of the beet sugar industry. According to several 
of his close associates, including Heber J. Grant, one of the 
Twelve Apostles who would later become president of the 
church, the change of heart came after Woodruff obtained 
a revelation from God telling him to establish the beet sugar 
industry in Utah. As Grant related, Woodruff told church 
leaders “that the Lord would like the great business of 
manufacturing sugar established in our midst.” He therefore 
reconsidered his earlier reluctance, discounting the opinion 
of Mormon businessmen and the negative attitudes of Francis 
M. Lyman, John Henry Smith, and Moses Thatcher, members 
of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, in the process. “Never 
mind the report[s],” Woodruff told Grant. “The inspiration 
to me is to establish the sugar industry.”23
Upon Woodruff’s insistence, the First Presidency and 
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles published a circular in the 
spring of 1889 announcing the “feasibility and practicability of 
establishing the industry of making sugar in this Territory” and 
calling on Mormon businessmen to support the enterprise. If 
22. For more information about Woodruff, see Thomas G. Alexander, Things in 
Heaven and Earth: The Life and Times of Wilford Woodruff, a Mormon Prophet (Salt 
Lake City, Utah: Signature Books, 1991).
23. As quoted by Grant in Eighty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1919), 8; see also Alexander, 
Things in Heaven and Earth, 284.
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the industry could be made viable, the circular stated, church 
members could stop paying high prices for imported sugar and 
could become more independent and self-suffi cient. The First 
Presidency and Twelve Apostles also foresaw the industry as 
supplying jobs for incoming immigrants to Utah, especially since 
the territory was running out of land for these newcomers.24
At this time, the LDS people were just emerging from a 
period of over twenty years when church authorities had 
preached the importance of cooperation among themselves 
in order to increase self-suffi ciency and to maintain money 
supplies in Utah. This move to cooperation had begun in 
the late 1850s and early 1860s when Brigham Young began 
disparaging non-Mormon merchants as trying to gouge the 
LDS people. In 1866, he even counseled church members 
to boycott “gentile” businesses. As the transcontinental 
railroad edged closer to Utah in the late 1860s, Young took 
this boycott a step further and advocated the establishment 
of community cooperatives in Utah, as well as a central 
cooperative in Salt Lake City—known as Zion’s Cooperative 
Mercantile Institution (ZCMI)—which would sell goods to 
the Mormons at reasonable prices. For the next several years, 
Latter-day Saints pooled together their resources to produce 
needed manufactured goods, be it lumber or textiles, rather 
than purchasing those items. In the 1870s, some of these 
cooperatives morphed into full-fl edged communes known as 
the United Order, again at the encouragement of Young, who 
was applying his interpretation of the Law of Consecration 
advocated as a heavenly doctrine by Joseph Smith in the 1830s.
As Apostle George A. Smith counseled one congregation, “I 
advise the Saints to form cooperative societies and associations 
all over the Territory, . . . and not to pay their money to men 
who use it to buy bayonets to slay them with, and to stir up the 
indignation of our fellow men against us.”25
24. As cited in Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 387; see also Leonard J. Arrington, 
“Development of Manufacturing: Sugar,” Arrington Papers, Series 12: The 
Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 8, folder 2.
25. Leonard J. Arrington, Feramorz Y. Fox, and Dean L. May, Building the City of 
God: Community & Cooperation Among the Mormons (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret 
Book Company, 1976), 79–110 (George A. Smith quotation on p. 90).
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After Young died in 1877, John Taylor assumed the 
presidency. Taylor was not as enthusiastic about cooperatives 
and the United Order, but he still believed that Latter-day 
Saints needed to support each other in their economic 
endeavors. He gradually moved Latter-day Saints away from 
cooperatives through means of boards of trade, organized 
in each Mormon stake to centralize the marketing of LDS 
goods, with Zion’s Central Board of Trade in Salt Lake City 
serving as the governing entity. Those who ran the boards of 
trade, Taylor explained, deserved LDS support as they were 
Mormon business leaders who “acted honorably in their 
dealing, paid their tithing and donations, were willing to be 
Wilford Woodruff
Special Collections and Archives,
Utah State University
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counseled and advised, and had at heart the interest of the 
work of God.”26
When the federal government heightened its efforts to 
prosecute Mormon polygamists in 1884, however, Taylor and 
other LDS leaders were forced underground and the boards 
of trade died out. After the passage of the Edmunds Act in 
1887, the federal government had the power to confi scate 
church property, leaving the church without a fi nancial base 
and hindering the organization from acting as the central 
economic authority in Utah. Yet the church was still enmeshed 
fi nancially in numerous industries by the time Wilford 
Woodruff assumed the presidency in 1889, including ZCMI, 
Zion’s Saving Bank and Trust Company, Consolidated Wagon 
and Machine, the Templeton Hotel, the Bullion, Beck, and 
Champion Mining Company, and several newspapers such 
as the Deseret News, the Salt Lake Herald, and the Salt Lake 
Times. Under Woodruff’s presidency, the church would 
aid several other endeavors as well, including the Inland 
Crystal Salt Company, the Saltair Beach Company, the Salt 
Lake & Los Angeles Railway Company, and the Union Light 
& Power Company. In many ways the church’s justifi cation 
for its involvement in these industries was no different from 
its reasoning to begin cooperatives in the 1860s and 1870s:
to provide more economic opportunities and employment 
to its members and to reduce the price of goods to Utah 
consumers. This was especially important because Utah’s 
land base was slowly shrinking as more and more people 
immigrated to the area, and the territory was undergoing 
increased urbanization. Although agriculture would continue 
to dominate Utah’s economy, fewer people could gain the 
land necessary to begin such enterprises, meaning that other 
economic avenues were necessary.27
Such reasons probably helped convince Woodruff that 
God wanted Mormons to grow sugar beets. Because Woodruff 
believed that it was a directive from the Lord, it is not 
surprising that the First Presidency and the Quorum of the 
26. As cited in Arrington, Fox, and May, Building the City of God, 104–5.
27. See Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 386, 391–400; Alexander, Things in Heaven 
and Earth, 285.
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Twelve Apostles asked for fi nancial support for the beet sugar 
industry and framed these requests as a type of ecclesiastical 
responsibility. Because of Woodruff and other church 
leaders’ efforts, Stayner and his fl edgling company obtained 
$15,000 in capital stock, enough to incorporate itself on 
September 4, 1889, as the Utah Sugar Company. Elias Morris 
was elected president and Stayner was appointed secretary 
and general manager. Woodruff and George Q. Cannon, one 
of Woodruff’s counselors in the First Presidency, purchased 
signifi cant amounts of stock in the company, although the 
church itself took no actual stock at that time.28
When the Utah Sugar Company was formed, its stockholders 
believed it would be more profi table to produce sugar from 
sorghum cane than from beets. The subscribers established a 
committee, consisting of Morris, Stayner, Francis Armstrong, 
Amos Howe, and George W. Thatcher, to investigate the 
manufacture of sugar from sorghum cane at Fort Scott, 
Kansas. In Kansas, the committee members discovered that 
the sorghum factory was failing because of several factors, 
including adverse weather, convincing them that beets would 
work better than sorghum for sugar production.29
The Utah Sugar Company’s board of directors accepted 
the committee’s fi ndings and decided to focus completely on 
the production of sugar from beets. Therefore, in 1890, it 
issued a call for bids to build a factory. On November 5, 1890,
the board awarded a contract to E. H. Dyer and Company, 
a corporation operating out of Cleveland, Ohio, which had 
submitted a proposal of $400,000. In order to obtain the 
money, the company increased its capital stock to $1 million 
and placed an issue of $400,000 on the market. Although 
the company failed to sell the issue, a group of investors in 
Lehi, Utah, a small community approximately thirty miles 
south of Salt Lake City, provided a substantial amount of 
28. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 387; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 6–7;
Arrington, “Utah’s Pioneer Beet Sugar Plant,” 96–97.
29. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 768. According to Arrington, Stayner had previously visited 
the Fort Scott factory before advocating the establishment of the company. 
Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 6.
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funding. This, coupled with the fact that the Lehi community 
offered a bounty of $7,000 to the corporation to construct 
the factory there, convinced the Utah Sugar Company to 
establish its enterprise in Lehi. On December 26, 1890,
Wilford Woodruff dedicated the cornerstone of the factory 
before two thousand people.30
Soon after, the enterprise encountered fi nancial diffi culty, 
paving the way for the LDS church to become more directly 
involved in the corporation. Several $50,000 payments to the 
Dyer Company became due, but Utah Sugar did not have 
enough money to pay the installments. According to Thomas 
Cutler, who had taken over as general manager of the 
corporation after Arthur Stayner resigned to take a position 
elsewhere, many of the stockholders had run into monetary 
problems of their own and were unable to make their stock 
The Utah Sugar Company factory in Lehi, Utah, 1895
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
30. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 768; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 9–10; Gardner, His-
tory of Lehi Including a Biographical Section, 261; Taylor, “Notes on the Develop-
ment of the Beet Sugar Industry in Utah,” 2:930.
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payments. In order to keep the corporation afl oat, seventeen 
Utah businessmen, Cutler included, formed an unlimited 
liability company to back up Utah Sugar. Unfortunately, eight 
of the seventeen went bankrupt soon after, forcing the others 
to sell their securities at half of their value. Just when Utah 
Sugar seemed in danger of going under, Cutler appealed to 
Wilford Woodruff.31
Enthusiastic about the jobs and economic benefi ts that 
Utah Sugar could provide to Utah’s citizens, Woodruff took 
several measures.32 First, he and his two counselors in the First 
Presidency—Cannon and Joseph F. Smith—sent a letter to all 
stake presidents and bishops in Utah, asking them to support 
the Utah Sugar Company and explaining that the sugar 
industry would be “a great benefi t to our Territory.” The letter 
noted that “we are very desirous to have this enterprise meet 
with the success which it deserves,” and the First Presidency 
expressed “no doubt” that its appeal “will be met by a cordial 
response from yourselves and the people.”33 In addition, 
Woodruff told Smith, Grant, and other high-ranking church 
leaders to encourage members to provide their support when 
they visited stakes and wards throughout Utah. Following this 
counsel, apostle Francis M. Lyman told a congregation in 
Salt Lake City that the Utah Sugar Company was “the greatest 
material enterprise ever undertaken . . . and will be the means 
whereby a vast amount of money will be saved annually to 
31. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi n-
ing Company Hearings, 768–69; “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27,
1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1031.
32. Joseph F. Smith, one of the LDS church’s Twelve Apostles who would later 
become president of both the religion and the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
stated in 1893 that one of the reasons the church became involved in the sugar 
industry was “because when we came to refl ect about it we saw that we had 
reached a point in our history where there was not a single enterprise of a public 
character that was calculated to give employment to our people. . . . We began 
to feel that there was a responsibility resting upon us which required something 
to be done, in a small way at least, in the direction of giving employment to 
our people.” Smith, “True Economy,” Deseret Evening News, December 16, 1893.
See also “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar 
Refi ning Company Hearings, 1068–69.
33. Wilford Woodruff, George A. Cannon, and Joseph F. Smith to the Presidency 
of the several Stakes and the Bishops and Counselors of the different Wards, 
November 14, 1890, in Taylor, A Saga of Sugar, 78–79.
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the people of this Territory.” Likewise, Marriner W. Merrill, 
another apostle, was instructed to travel throughout Cache 
Valley in northern Utah on behalf of the corporation.34
Woodruff also told Utah Sugar’s directors that the church 
would underwrite the fi rst $50,000 payment to the Dyer 
Company. According to one of Cutler’s sons, Woodruff then 
sent Cutler to New York City in order to secure the necessary 
bank note. Several days later, Cutler telegrammed Woodruff, 
stating he was leaving for Utah on the next train. Woodruff 
was mystifi ed as to what was going on, for he had received no 
draft of the note and had no idea whether Cutler had been 
Thomas R. Cutler
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
34. Arrington, “Development of Manufacturing: Sugar.”
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successful in the endeavor. When Woodruff and a couple of 
other church leaders met Cutler at the train station, however, 
Cutler informed them that he had the money in his traveling 
case. Dumbfounded, they
all went to the station rest room, put a chair against 
the door and [John Henry Smith] sat on the chair 
while they dumped [Cutler’s] traveling bag in the 
middle of the fl oor and counted the money. . . . Presi-
dent Woodruff asked, ‘What were you thinking of, 
coming from Chicago in these perilous times with 
this money in your bag?’ [Cutler] answered, ‘What 
good would a draft have been? If I had sent it, we 
couldn’t have cashed it in all the banks in Utah, and 
we need the money.’35
After Cutler presented the money, Woodruff informed him 
that the church would call apostle Heber J. Grant on a mission 
as a fi nancial agent to raise additional funds. Grant, along 
with Cutler, subsequently contacted banks and businessmen 
in Salt Lake City, Chicago, New York, and Boston, and fi nally 
obtained $200,000 from Utah citizens and $150,000 from 
Salt Lake City banks (on an endorsement from the church), 
to go along with an additional $180,000 provided by the 
church.36
Yet in order to pay all of the bills, an additional $100,000
was needed. Grant thus contacted Wells, Fargo and Company 
in San Francisco, but was told “that it would be impossible 
to lend money, a thousand miles away, on local security.” 
Grant, who had managed the Wells-Fargo Salt Lake City 
branch earlier in his life, told the head of the bank that if 
35. “Life Sketch of Joseph Albert Cutler as Told to R. Dilworth Rust,” 2–3, copy in 
Arrington Papers, Series 9: Mormon History Topics, box 87, folder 10. See also 
Jesse R. Smith to Dr. Leonard Arrington, July 31, 1979, ibid. Because this story 
has no corroboration, it is diffi cult to determine whether or not it is true.
36. Arrington, “Utah’s Pioneer Beet Sugar Plant,” 101–2; Arrington, Great Basin 
Kingdom, 390; Van Wagoner, “The Lehi Sugar Factory,” 192. Joseph F. Smith 
also claimed that he had been sent out by Woodruff to try and get Mormons 
“to subscribe their money to the building of [the Lehi] factory.” “Testimony 
of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company 
Hearings, 1057.
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the manager would write down the names of twenty-fi ve of 
the strongest Mormon businessmen in Utah, Grant would get 
twenty of them to guarantee the church’s promissory notes. 
Not believing him, the manager wrote down thirty names, 
and Grant returned to Salt Lake City where he successfully 
obtained twenty-fi ve signatures, including that of David 
Eccles, a Mormon lumberman and banker, who told him that 
“it would be a pleasure to endorse the Church’s notes.” With 
such backing, the loan was secured and construction of the 
factory continued.37 As Cutler later declared, the church had 
“rescued” the Utah Sugar Company.38
To many, these fundraising efforts constituted divine 
intervention, further proof that God really was behind the 
formation of the Utah Sugar Company. George Q. Cannon, 
for example, relayed to church members that a mysterious 
man approached him one day, asking him if he needed any 
money. The man then gave Cannon $25,000, which was 
exactly the amount that the Utah Sugar Company needed to 
keep it afl oat. Certainly, Cannon concluded, God’s hand was 
in the sugar works.39
In October 1891, the outlook for Utah Sugar improved 
further. Having completed the erection of the factory, the 
time had come to discover whether the company could 
really manufacture sugar successfully, something that neither 
Brigham Young nor John Taylor had been able to do. A crowd 
gathered in Lehi on October 15, 1891, to observe the initial 
efforts. When the amazed onlookers saw the fi rst batch of 
beets transform into white sugar, they shouted out “hurrahs” 
and “hosannahs.” By the next morning, twenty thousand 
pounds of beet sugar lay in a railroad car and forty years of 
effort had fi nally paid off.40
37. Quotations in Heber J. Grant, The Strength of the Mormon Church (Salt Lake City, 
1921), 16–20; see also “The Beet Sugar Industry and the Church: Excerpts 
from the 51st Anniversary Report of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company”; Ar-
rington, Beet Sugar in the West, 11–12; Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 388.
38. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 769.
39. Arrington, “Development of Manufacturing: Sugar.”
40. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 13; Smith, Thomas Robinson Cutler, 96; Van 
Wagoner, “The Lehi Sugar Factory,” 193.
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Indeed, it was no small thing that the factory had 
succeeded, for raising beets in the arid land of Utah was still 
a shaky proposition. Although farmers could use irrigation to 
compensate for the lack of natural water in the Great Basin 
region, as they did with most of their crops, it was unclear 
whether irrigated lands could produce healthy sugar beets. 
In California, the only place where beets had successfully 
been grown for a number of years before 1890, irrigation was 
not necessary. According to this “California method,” beets 
needed less water at the beginning of the growing season 
to ensure the development of a suffi ciently long taproot. 
Farmers should also use less water at the end of the season, 
the California method stated, in order to secure a high 
sugar content in the beet. Utah farmers, however, had been 
raised on the counsel that frequent irrigation of all crops 
was a necessity and thus “did not give too much heed” to 
the California method. Although many observers predicted 
disaster, Utah agriculturists soon proved that its method 
not only worked, but in many ways bettered the California 
approach.41 As a U.S. Department of Agriculture report later 
declared, “methods of cultivation, irrigation, drainage, and 
fertilization were superior” in Utah “to those prevailing in 
ordinary farm districts in other parts of the country,” and 
Utah eventually became “the ideal beet-sugar state.”42
But, as farmers soon discovered, raising beets required a 
great deal of intensive labor. First, seeds had to be planted 
in rows twenty inches apart. Because the seeds were 
multigerm, and because beets would not mature if they were 
too close together, farmers had to thin out the plants once 
they sprouted until only one remained in each seed area. 
In order to do this, Utah agriculturists typically employed 
“beet gangs” consisting of two groups of young males. The 
fi rst group, usually young men over the age of fi fteen known 
41. Walter L. Webb, untitled manuscript, 2–3, in Arrington Papers, Series 12: The 
Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 8, folder 3. Webb was the editor of the 
Lehi Banner when the Lehi beet sugar enterprise started and later became an 
agriculturist with the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company.
42. U. S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], Progress of the Beet-Sugar Industry in the 
United States in 1909 (Washington, D.C., 1910), 37.
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as “thinners,” would block the beets off, and the second, 
consisting of younger boys known as “crawlers,” would thin 
each block into one plant. As one observer recalled, every 
crawler dreamed about becoming a thinner because “the 
hoers [sic] job is more dignifi ed.” Most of the thinning took 
place over a ten-hour day, and the boys typically received fi fty 
cents per day for their work.43
After thinning, the most arduous job was harvesting the 
plant, something that typically occurred in late September 
or early October. A plow fi rst loosened the beets and then a 
worker would “top” the beets by lifting them out of the soil 
and “clipping off the crown and leaves with a long knife.” 
The beets were then thrown into piles and transported to 
the factory by wagon. Harvesters and elevators signifi cantly 
reduced the amount of labor used in the harvest, but not 
until the turn of the century.44 Because of the intensity of the 
labor requirements, most sugar beet growers in the American 
West used hired help, mainly from Mexico or Japan, since few 
white workers would accept that type of employment. But in 
Utah, “the members of farm and village families capable of 
working in the fi elds were more numerous,” and families or 
the aforementioned groups of young men performed most 
of the labor, at least until the 1910s and 1920s.45
After the beets arrived at the factory, they were stored in 
sheds to prevent freezing. Then the complicated procedure 
of converting the vegetable into sugar began. When all 
of these processes fi nally produced sugar in October 1891,
it is no wonder that those present shouted for joy. As the 
amount of beet sugar it produced increased, the Utah Sugar 
Company slowly began to work its way out of debt, largely 
because of the fi nancial backing of the LDS church, the state 
government (which provided a one-cent per pound bounty 
for sugar production), and the federal government (which 
43. Webb, untitled manuscript, 3.
44. USDA, Progress of the Beet-Sugar Industry in the United States in 1909, 14.
45. Quotation in Paul S. Taylor, “Hand Laborers in the Western Sugar Beet 
Industry,” Agricultural History 41 (Winter 1967): 23; “Testimony of Mr. Joseph 
F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1054;
Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 23.
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gave a two-cent per pound bounty under the 1890 Dingley 
Tariff). However, fi nancial diffi culties continued to plague 
the corporation throughout the 1890s.
In 1893, an economic depression hit the United States, 
adversely affecting businesses across the country, including 
the Utah Sugar Company. Because the depression made it 
expensive for the corporation to renew its many loans, Utah 
Sugar tried to fund its debt through the issuance of $400,000
in fi rst mortgage bonds. When these bonds failed to sell, the 
LDS church—despite its own fi nancial problems stemming 
from the 1893 panic—decided to purchase and resell them 
at a discounted price to Joseph Banigan, a Rhode Island 
businessman who had liked the “integrity, industry, and 
thrift” that he saw in the Mormon people. The church took 
a loss on the deal, but the Utah Sugar Company benefi ted 
greatly from it. Finally out of debt, the corporation was able 
to pay its fi rst cash dividend in January 1896. Reeling from its 
own fi nancial problems, the LDS church continued to make 
it a priority to support Utah Sugar, as Woodruff directed the 
organization to purchase 8,520 shares of stock, an investment 
totaling $85,200.46
In addition, church leaders continued to brainstorm for the 
Utah Sugar Company. Aware that many Mormons themselves 
faced fi nancial setbacks from the Panic of 1893, church leaders 
still emphasized the necessity of supporting Utah Sugar. Several 
talks in the church’s October 1893 general conference, for 
example, addressed the sugar industry, with President George 
Q. Cannon relating that the First Presidency and the Quorum 
of the Twelve Apostles had assumed “very heavy burdens in 
order to carry this project out.” The only reason why they 
subjected themselves to such loads, Cannon continued, was 
because of “the manifestations of the Spirit of God through 
our President and to each one of us” that the Lord wanted the 
sugar industry established.47 Cannon elaborated at another 
LDS gathering, telling members that “some of the Twelve 
46. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 390–91; Van Wagoner, “The Lehi Sugar Fac-
tory,” 196. Banigan was apparently the only individual the church could fi nd 
who would purchase the bonds.
47. Deseret Evening News, October 21, 1893.
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were doubtful about” the industry’s success, until they “met 
together, . . . prayed and sought to know the mind of the Lord 
about it.” According to Cannon, “the Lord revealed in great 
plainness that it was our duty to say to the Latter-day Saints, 
‘Go to work and build up a sugar factory, and seek to produce 
sugar in the land.’”48 Woodruff was no less effusive, telling 
the church that he was willing to stand before God after he 
died “to bear my part of the responsibility” for establishing 
the beet sugar industry because “if there is anything on earth 
that I was ever moved upon by the Spirit to do it was to unite 
in that enterprise with my brethren.”49
Joseph F. Smith even went further. He criticized Latter-day 
Saints for not supporting Utah Sugar, stating that members 
frequently purchased imported sugar above “Lehi sugar” 
because importers “cut down the price, in order to undersell 
the home product.” Smith shamed any Latter-day Saint that 
did not buy Lehi sugar, saying that whoever refused the 
product might be a Mormon, but was not a Latter-day Saint. 
“We ask the people to patronize home industries—patronize 
the Lehi sugar factory . . . [in] a spirit of patriotism, a spirit of 
home interest, and of wisdom,” he concluded. Accordingly, 
after Smith’s address, leaders of wards in Utah had their 
members pass resolutions stating that they would “sustain the 
Utah sugar factory by demanding Utah sugar as long as the 
supply lasted.”50
As the 1890s came to a close, then, the Utah Sugar 
Company found itself on fi rmer fi nancial ground and blessed 
by church authorities who continually informed members that 
the industry was in divine hands and deserved their support. 
With this fi nancial and ecclesiastical backing, the Lehi factory 
processed more and more beets, going through 36,000 tons 
in 1899. Because of the increased production and because 
it now had the money to do so, the Utah Sugar Company 
expanded the Lehi factory in 1899 and 1900, enabling it to 
process a thousand tons of beets per day.51
48. Deseret Evening News, August 26, 1893.
49. Millennial Star 61 (1894): 227.
50. All citations in Arrington, “Development of Manufacturing: Sugar.”
51. Van Wagoner, “The Lehi Sugar Factory,” 200.
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With the success of the Lehi plant, farmers across Utah 
began petitioning the Utah Sugar Company to build factories 
in other areas.52 At the same time, sugar company offi cials 
tried to convince farmers of the benefi ts of growing beets, 
and Thomas Cutler even served as a “sugar beet missionary” 
to various parts of Utah for that purpose. On a request from 
George Q. Cannon, Cutler, carrying a blackboard, showed 
“the farmers how to raise beets, and what profi ts there would 
be in them.”53 Since the cultivation of sugar beets required 
so much work, Cutler had to convince farmers of the value 
of growing beets in order to ensure that agriculturists would 
continue to raise the product. Cutler thus focused on the 
numerous benefi ts that beet cultivation provided, following 
the example of the United States Beet Sugar Association. 
One of this organization’s publications, for example, stated 
that if farmers grew sugar beets, they would discover that the 
product promoted “soil fertility and sound farming practices.” 
Because the beet’s root system extended six or seven feet 
below the ground, it was a good plant to use in a crop rotation 
system, as it could reach nutrients that other crops could not. 
In addition, after the beet had been harvested, most of the 
root system remained in the ground where it served as “green 
manure” and increased the fertility of the soil.54
Beet sugar companies claimed that the beet was “literally 
two crops in one.” Not only did it produce sugar for human 
consumption, but its byproducts, such as the tops, pulp, and 
molasses, were “highly nutritious feeds for livestock, and thus 
provide[d] additional food and fi ber for human beings as 
meat, milk and wool.” Combined with grain and alfalfa hay, the 
beet’s byproducts could “produce beef and mutton or lamb at 
lower cost than any other ration available in the United States.” 
Farmers could not only grow beets for sale to a factory, but 
could also use them to feed their livestock. However, according 
to most beet sugar publications, the greatest reason for farmers 
52. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 773.
53. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23,1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 829.
54. USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 22–24.
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to grow beets was that it was “a dependable and highly valuable 
cash crop.” Companies could contract with farmers before 
every growing season as to the amount of money they would 
receive for each ton of beets, giving agriculturists “an assured 
market . . . even before the seed [was] in the ground.” Whatever 
income farmers gained from their beets could then be used 
“as a basis for the fi nancial planning of [their] operations.” 
As one publication concluded, “The banker looks with favor 
upon the farmer who grows beets.”55
The information provided by Cutler convinced many 
Utah agriculturists to grow beets. At the same time, the Utah 
Sugar Company’s directors were increasingly convinced 
that the Intermountain West was an ideal place for beet 
sugar production. The soil was rich, the growing season had 
warm days and cool nights, and sunshine and water (from 
irrigation) abounded. Moreover, Mormon families, instilled 
with a strong work ethic, provided a suffi cient labor force 
for the crop.56 Therefore, the Utah Sugar Company, with the 
encouragement of Mormon church leaders, gradually began 
to expand its operations from Lehi into other territories.57
This corresponded to a general trend in Utah’s economy, 
whereby enterprises enlarged their vision from local markets 
to larger territories.58
But funding was necessary for such expansions, and by 
1900, the LDS church was not in a position to provide it. 
When Lorenzo Snow assumed the presidency from Wilford 
Woodruff in 1898, he established a fi nancial committee to 
investigate the church’s economic affairs. The report was 
disquieting. The church had faced a diffi cult time trying to 
regain its property and assets confi scated in the late 1880s
55. Quotations in USBSA, The Beet Sugar Story, 25, 30; see also “Testimony of Mr. 
Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 
1042.
56. Leonard J. Arrington, “Launching Idaho’s Sugar Beet Industry,” Idaho Yesterdays
9 (Fall 1965): 18.
57. Lorenzo Snow, the fi fth president of the LDS church, became the fi rst president 
to also serve as president of the Utah Sugar Company. After George Q. Cannon, 
one of his counselors who was president of the corporation from 1898 to 1901,
died in 1901, Snow assumed leadership of the corporation. Snow himself died 
on October 10, 1901. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 177.
58. Arrington, “The Commercialization of Utah’s Economy,” 6–7.
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by the federal government, and Woodruff’s investments in 
various enterprises, as well as in educational pursuits, had 
further drained church coffers, as had loans provided to high-
ranking church leaders who suffered setbacks in the Panic 
of 1893. Because of this situation, the church was perilously 
close to bankruptcy in 1898. To correct the situation, Snow 
proclaimed the necessity of curbing church expenditures and 
of increasing church members’ dedication to the principle 
of tithing (a donation of 10 percent of a person’s annual 
increase). Clearly, the church had little means to support the 
industries in which it had invested.59
Therefore, in the early 1900s, many Utah corporations 
looked to outside capital for funding.60 Sugar was no different; 
the Utah Sugar Company and its leaders turned to Henry 
O. Havemeyer, president of the American Sugar Refi ning 
Company, which, as we have seen, was an eastern cane sugar 
manufacturer known as the “Sugar Trust” for its monopolistic 
practices, for the capital necessary to enlarge its territory. Not 
all LDS authorities were comfortable with this development. 
Apostle Anthon H. Lund, who would become a member of 
the First Presidency in 1902, told Utah Sugar leaders that he 
considered it “so much better for us if we could continue as 
we are and build up this industry with home capital.”61 He was 
especially worried about giving up control of the corporation to 
outside interests. Regardless of Lund’s reservations, Havemeyer 
purchased 50 percent of the Utah Sugar Company’s stock in 
1902. According to Cutler, the directors were willing to sell 
to Havemeyer because they “wanted capital,” and Havemeyer 
promised that he would supply them “with one-half the capital 
that [they] required at any time.”62
59. E. Jay Bell, “The Windows of Heaven Revisited: President Lorenzo Snow’s Rev-
elation in St. George and the 1899 Tithing Reformation,” 2–9, copy in posses-
sion of the author.
60. Arrington, “The Commercialization of Utah’s Economy,” 4, 7.
61. Anthon H. Lund Diary, November 22, 1901, excerpt in Kenney Collection, box 
3, folder 6.
62. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 774. The following chapter will analyze more fully the 
reasons for American Sugar’s interest in Utah-Idaho Sugar and the effects that 
this had on the company.
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With Havemeyer’s fi nancial backing and leadership, 
the Utah Sugar Company enlarged its operations at the 
same time that the beet sugar industry was exploding 
throughout America. From 1898 to 1903, over forty new 
factories were built in the United States, representing an 
investment of about $80 million, and Utah Sugar rode this 
wave of expansion.63 In 1903, for example, the corporation 
constructed a facility at Garland, Utah, a small town about 
ninety miles north of Lehi, with the capacity to process six 
hundred tons of beets per day.64 That same year, members 
of the board of the Utah Sugar Company formed the Idaho 
Sugar Company in order to begin construction of factories in 
Idaho. According to Cutler, the Utah Sugar Company created 
a new corporation so that “the people [of both Utah and 
Idaho] could speculate a little on the stock.” No one wanted 
stock in the Utah company, Cutler claimed, because it used 
“an old factory.” Yet people were enthusiastic about climbing 
aboard a new enterprise, so the Idaho Sugar Company was 
formed on January 23, 1903. Havemeyer claimed half of the 
stock of the company and provided half of the capital for the 
building of the corporation’s fi rst factory at Lincoln, Idaho, 
which was near Idaho Falls, while the LDS church took 5,625
of the 75,000 shares.65 Aside from the fact that the principal 
stockholders and offi cers were the same in the Utah Sugar 
Company and the Idaho Sugar Company, other similarities 
existed as well. For one thing, the Idaho Legislature passed a 
law on March 11, 1903, stating that it would provide a bounty 
of one cent on each pound of sugar manufactured in 1903.66
Unfortunately, unlike Utah, the legislature never actually paid 
63. Arrington, “Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” 
10.
64. Taylor, “Notes on the Development of the Beet Sugar Industry in Utah,” 
2:938.
65. Quotations in “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 771–72; see also Arrington, Beet Sugar in the 
West, 56–58.
66. “An Act to Provide for the Encouragement of the Manufacturing of Beet 
Sugar Within the State of Idaho,” March 11, 1903, House Bill No. 117, copy 
in Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 9,
folder 4.
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the bounty because the law was ruled unconstitutional.67 In 
addition, several Utah Sugar employees were transferred to 
the Idaho plants to ensure the success of the new enterprise. 
For example, Thomas Cutler sent Walter L. Webb, a chemist 
at the Lehi factory, to Idaho “to assist in building the factory 
and operating it.” The Dyer Company also constructed the 
Idaho mill, as it had the Lehi facility.68 Built under the auspices 
of the Idaho Sugar Company, the Idaho factory was really just 
an extension of the Utah Sugar Company.
Eight months after the formation of Idaho Sugar, its board 
of directors decided that a second factory was needed in 
Idaho. However, because the fi rst plant had not yet succeeded 
fi nancially, the company did not have the necessary capital 
for expansion. Therefore, the directors created a third 
corporation, the Fremont County Sugar Company. As with 
the other two fi rms, Fremont County had the same directors 
and management and also was capitalized with 75,000 shares 
of stock, of which Havemeyer owned half and LDS church 
authorities owned 18 percent. The company again employed 
E. H. Dyer and Company to construct a factory, located at Sugar 
City, roughly twenty miles north of Lincoln, and technical 
leaders from Lehi served as the main consultants for the initial 
sugar production. Because of the similarities between the Idaho 
and the Fremont companies, they merged in 1905 after the 
Fremont’s fi rst campaign, and the new company—The Idaho 
Sugar Company—increased its capital stock to $5 million.69
At the same time, Idaho Sugar bought out an independent 
enterprise, the Snake River Valley Sugar Company, which 
operated a factory in Blackfoot, Idaho. Later in the year, the 
Idaho Sugar Company discovered that representatives of W. D. 
Hoover, a Colorado businessman who had constructed a sugar 
mill at Eaton, Colorado, had contacted farmers in western 
Idaho and offered to build factories at Nampa and Payette. 
67. Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Beet Sugar Industry in the United States
(Washington, D. C., 1917), x, 14; Arrington, “Launching Idaho’s Sugar Beet 
Industry,” 20–21.
68. “Walter L. Webb Memoirs,” 5.
69. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 824.
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Concerned about the arrival of another independent fi rm, 
Idaho Sugar’s directors, upon approval of Henry Havemeyer, 
agreed to form yet another corporation, the Western Idaho 
Sugar Company, which would then construct facilities at both 
Nampa and Payette.70 Western Idaho Sugar again had the 
same offi cers and leaders, but because it had to fi nance the 
construction of two factories, it was capitalized at $2 million 
and issued 200,000 shares of stock.71 Havemeyer again took 
half, with Joseph F. Smith (who had become president of 
both the LDS church and the Utah Sugar Company in 1901)
and Thomas Cutler also purchasing shares. Thus, by the close 
of 1905, the Utah Sugar Company dominated most of Utah’s 
sugar industry, while the Idaho Sugar Company and the 
Western Idaho Sugar Company controlled Idaho’s production. 
Because the same offi cers and virtually the same stockholders 
formed each company, Utah Sugar and its leaders, many of 
whom were high-ranking church authorities, essentially had 
a monopoly over both states’ sugar production.72
In1906, Cutler and other directors decided that because of the 
similarities between the three companies, amalgamating them 
might prove benefi cial. For one thing, it would bring “greater 
economy in operation,” as it would save on directors’ fees and 
the salaries of the president and the general manager, who 
70. Cutler later insisted before a House of Representatives committee that the only 
reason why the company was formed at this time was that after fi ve years of 
investigation, the Idaho sugar men fi nally decided that the area could support 
the growing of sugar beets. However, because it prevented Hoover from operat-
ing his enterprise, it seems that Cutler was not as forthcoming as he pretended. 
“Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 780.
71. Because of unfavorable conditions, Western Idaho Sugar later decided to build 
only one factory, located at Nampa. It thus reduced its capitalization to $1
million. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar 
Refi ning Company Hearings, 781.
72. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 777–80; Arrington, “Launching Idaho’s Sugar Beet 
Industry,” 24–26. In 1905, the Utah Sugar Company had some competition 
from two other beet sugar corporations, the Amalgamated Sugar Company, with 
factories in Ogden and Logan, and the Lewiston Sugar Company, which operated 
a factory in Lewiston, roughly twenty-fi ve miles north of Logan. However, both 
of these companies had leaders of the LDS church on their boards of directors, 
assuring that little real competition existed between the three.
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were all receiving three different wages from the three different 
corporations. In addition, a combination of the companies 
would lead to greater stock stability. Moreover, consolidating 
the corporations would make it easier to borrow money for 
sugar production. “The Utah Sugar Co. was known, but the 
other companies, having been organized of recent date, they 
did not have the credit that the original Utah Sugar Co. had,” 
Cutler stated, “and I found it very diffi cult to borrow money in 
the fi nancial world.” In a similar way, consolidating the fi rms 
would increase their technical effi ciency, as duplicate pieces of 
equipment could be stored at a general warehouse for later use. 
Finally, if the companies were combined, the board of directors 
would hear less criticism from stockholders in one corporation 
complaining that one fi rm was being promoted above their own. 
Armed with these reasons, Cutler approached Havemeyer about 
a combination. After “a great deal of argument,” Havemeyer 
fi nally agreed to the merger in June 1907.73
Cutler then presented the proposal to the stockholders 
of the different corporations, as two-thirds had to offer 
approval before the merger could occur. Some were 
unenthusiastic about the combination, especially those 
holding stock in the Western Idaho Sugar Company. Western 
Idaho had experienced an excellent campaign in 1906,
and its stockholders believed that their stock was worth 
more than Idaho Sugar or Utah Sugar shares. To alleviate 
these concerns, Cutler declared that holders of Western 
Idaho stock would receive a 25 percent premium on their 
new certifi cates, while holders of Idaho stock would only 
receive a 10 percent premium. This convinced the necessary 
proportion of stockholders, and on July 31, 1907, the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company was offi cially incorporated under the 
laws of Utah.74
73. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 782–84, 831–33.
74. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 782–84; “Minutes of the Utah Sugar Company, March 5,
1907, May 21, 1907, July 3, 1907, July 18, 1907,” Arrington Papers, Series 12:
The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 1; Arrington, Beet Sugar in 
the West, 71–72.
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Utah-Idaho’s initial authorized capitalization was $13
million, with $10 million in preferred stock and $3 million 
in common stock, and it had control of six factories, two in 
Utah and four in Idaho. Although it did not approach the 
size of many eastern businesses, it was still a large beet sugar 
enterprise. The Great Western Sugar Company (located in 
Colorado) and the American Beet Sugar Company (formed 
by the Oxnard brothers), for example, were two of the biggest 
beet corporations in the United States, and their capitalization 
exceeded Utah-Idaho’s only by $7 million.75 Joseph F. Smith 
continued as president of the new corporation, with Thomas 
R. Cutler serving as vice president and general manager and 
Horace G. Whitney appointed as secretary and treasurer.76
As with the other companies, Henry Havemeyer held half 
of the corporation’s stock, and the LDS church, because of 
the consolidation of the stock held in the other fi rms, held 
49,815 shares worth roughly $500,000, constituting one of 
the church’s largest business investments.77
At the time of the consolidation, there was a sneaking 
suspicion among many observers that, despite its fi nancial 
setbacks and the growing infl uence of non-Mormons in Salt 
Lake City’s economy, the LDS church was still dominating 
Utah’s economic affairs. When Reed Smoot, a Mormon 
apostle, was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1902, for example, 
hearings were held before that body to determine whether 
or not he was fi t to serve as senator. The investigation was 
sometimes less about Smoot and more about the Mormon 
church, as the religion’s teachings and practices came under 
intense scrutiny. Joseph F. Smith, president of the church, 
testifi ed at the hearings, as did other leaders. One of the 
charges leveled against Smith was that the church maintained 
economic control over its members and forced them to 
support church-sanctioned enterprises. Smith’s testimony of 
75. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 241, 244.
76. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 782; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 71, 178.
77. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1032, 1039. Smith claimed that the dividends on this stock 
were used “for the interest of the church . . . in a religious way.”
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all the corporations in which he served either on the board 
or as president seemed to produce the necessary proof of this 
accusation.78
But church authorities contended that there was nothing 
unseemly in their involvement in Utah industries. Heber 
J. Grant told a Mr. Albert Wilson in 1905 that “while the 
Church is interested in its members and oftimes has used 
Church funds to aid their frontier settlements in establishing 
industries, never has it interfered with the individual.” Grant 
admitted that the church had taken a large interest in the 
sugar industry, but he made no apologies for it. “I have no 
hesitancy in saying that this, the greatest of all the industrial 
businesses in Utah, would never have been established but 
for the fi nancial aid of the Church,” he related, “and the 
active labors of the leading Church Offi cials in soliciting 
subscriptions.”79
Grant was probably correct in his assertions, but what 
he and other leaders failed to perceive was that church 
involvement in Utah-Idaho Sugar, a company whose whole 
purpose was to provide dividends to their stockholders and 
profi ts to their offi cers, would create problems for both 
the corporation and the church. In times when Utah was 
largely segregated economically from the rest of the nation, 
and when some central authority was essential to promote 
the developing economy, church economic domination was 
both accepted and necessary. Now that industries such as 
beet sugar were becoming more integrated into the larger 
national economy and capitalistic ideas had largely replaced 
those of cooperation and self-suffi ciency, Mormon infl uence 
would not be tolerated.
Yet Smith, Grant, and others were reluctant to give up 
their control of the beet sugar industry. They and the church 
itself had provided fi nancial support at great sacrifi ce in the 
1890s, and had also invested time and energy into promoting 
78. Kathleen Flake, The Politics of American Religious Identity: The Seating of Senator 
Reed Smoot, Mormon Apostle (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004), 61–62; Milton R. Merrill, 
Reed Smoot: Apostle in Politics (Logan, Utah, 1990), 79–80, 96–97.
79. Heber J. Grant to Mr. Albert E. Wilson, n.d. [ca. October 1905], Kenney 
Collection, box 12, folder 22.
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the industry. Now that the initial painful growing years 
had come to an end and Utah-Idaho Sugar was becoming 
profi table, they and the church could fi nally reap some 
benefi ts for their sacrifi ces. Besides, God had never told 
Smith that he was satisfi ed with the church’s efforts, so the 
divine requirement to promote the industry still remained. 
Unfortunately for both the church and Utah-Idaho Sugar, a 
nation convinced that big business—and especially the sugar 
industry—was inherently evil and that LDS leaders exercised 
unfair ecclesiastical infl uence in Utah was watching. A clash 
seemed inevitable.
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Chapter Three
Before the Hardwick Committee of 
the House of Representatives
Nibley and his friends are not the robbers but only their 
agents. Their souls are in pawn to the Havemeyers so that 
Utah sugar must go on in the sickening game of greed or 
go out of the sugar business. These benevolent gentlemen 
cannot stop the monstrous injustice; they can only fatten 
on it. They can only make a weak defense of it and hypo-
critical pretensions of love for us, its victims.
—Kane County News (Utah), July 8, 1916
My opinion was, and is now, that Mr. Havemeyer was 
the greatest friend to the beet-sugar industry that we ever 
had.
—Thomas R. Cutler to the Hardwick Committee, 1911
In 1911, the Democrat-dominated House of Representa-tives created a special committee to conduct hearings into 
the affairs of the American Sugar Refi ning Company, com-
monly known as the Sugar Trust, and to determine whether 
or not that corporation had violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890. As part of the investigation, the committee 
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examined the relationship between American Sugar and the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. Joseph F. Smith, president of 
Utah-Idaho Sugar, and Thomas R. Cutler, Utah-Idaho’s vice 
president and general manager, were called to testify at the 
hearings. Because the committee’s purpose was to discover 
any improprieties in the alliance between the two corpora-
tions, the testimony focused on American Sugar’s holding 
of nearly half the stock of Utah-Idaho Sugar. Yet a central 
part of the examination also focused on the LDS church’s 
role in the industry, including unseemly conduct by Utah-
Idaho leaders, such as stock watering, price hikes for Utah 
consumers, and actions to discourage independent sugar 
concerns. At the conclusion of the hearings, the committee 
declared American Sugar’s relationship with Utah-Idaho to 
be improper, and they also castigated Utah-Idaho leaders for 
their business practices. This led the Salt Lake Tribune and 
other observers to rejoice that Utah-Idaho’s vile ways had 
fi nally been unmasked.
When the House of Representatives decided to inquire 
into the affairs of the American Sugar Refi ning Company, 
that corporation was no stranger to government investiga-
tions. As we have already seen, American Sugar was formed 
in 1891 after the federal government had declared the 
Sugar Trust to be an illegal combination of sugar refi ners. 
Because of permissive laws in New Jersey, where the new fi rm 
incorporated itself, American Sugar was basically the same 
entity as the defunct Sugar Trust. For the next two decades, 
the company engaged in several practices that made it the 
target of governmental inquiries. In 1892, the government 
fi led a suit alleging that the corporation’s absorption of 
four Pennsylvania refi neries violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, but the Supreme Court dismissed the case, stating that 
the manufacture of sugar was not interstate commerce and 
therefore not under the purview of the Sherman Act. In July 
1909, American Sugar’s directors were indicted for trying 
to obtain control of the Pennsylvania Sugar Refi ning Com-
pany, and in 1911, that suit was still pending. Still pend-
ing, too, was a case that began in November 1910 when 
the government initiated litigation against American Sugar 
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because its holdings in various corporations, including beet 
sugar factories, constituted “a conspiracy to monopolize 
interstate trade in violation of the Sherman law.”1
Even though the government had investigated American 
Sugar a number of times, the company had never been pun-
ished for its actions and it still existed in 1911 in the same 
form as when it was incorporated in 1891. Many members of 
Congress were upset at the corporation’s fl agrant violations 
of the Sherman Act and the government’s inability to penal-
ize the company. At the same time, the American public was 
experiencing a rise in the cost of living and most Democratic 
politicians, muckraking journalists, and reformers believed 
that business practices were contributing to the increases. 
Likewise, they disparaged the sugar tariff as a direct subsidy 
for the sugar industry that elevated prices. Some citizens also 
believed that the Taft Administration was deliberately drag-
ging its feet in carrying out lawsuits against various compa-
nies, including American Sugar. The Democrats, known at 
the time for their opposition to big business, had made appre-
ciable gains in the House of Representatives in the November 
1910 elections.2
All of these factors led Representative Thomas W. Hardwick 
from Georgia to propose an investigation of American Sugar. 
On May 9, 1911, the Committee on Rules presented House 
Resolution 157 to the House for debate. This resolution, 
authored by Hardwick, proposed the establishment of a nine-
member committee to investigate the American Sugar Refi n-
ing Company to discover “whether or not there have been 
violations of the antitrust act of July 2, 1890.” The resolution 
1. House, American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others, 62d Cong., 2d sess., 1912, H. 
Rept. 331, serial 6135, 2. See also United States v. American Sugar Refi ning Co., 
et al., original petition, 118–28, copy in Leonard J. Arrington Papers, MSS 1,
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 3, The Leonard 
J. Arrington Historical Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Merrill Li-
brary, Utah State University, Logan, Utah (hereafter referred to as Arrington 
Papers); Alfred S. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly: Sugar Refi ning as a Case 
Study (Baltimore, Md., 1969), 179–87, 300–304.
2. Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 47, pt. 1:881; Robert H. Wiebe, 
Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 
1962), 95, 121; Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 308; “Attack Made Upon 
Trusts of All Kinds,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 4, 1911.
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suggested that the committee have authorization to inves-
tigate any other sugar fi rm and its relations with American 
Sugar. In this way, the committee could ascertain whether or 
not American Sugar or other concerns had restricted compe-
tition “among manufacturers or refi ners of sugar,” increased 
the price of sugar for the consumer, or decreased the rate 
that farmers received for their sugar beets and cane.3
Before the committee was even selected, some Demo-
crats had already formed conclusions as to what the inquiry 
would reveal. “Any intelligent committee that investigates 
this subject,” Hardwick asserted, “is bound to discover . . . 
that this American Sugar Refi ning Co. and its associated and 
affi liated corporations, directly controls more than 50 per 
cent” of the sugar output of the United States. The inves-
tigation would also show that American Sugar, which hid 
“behind the protective-tariff wall,” had “fastened [its] grip 
upon the throats of the American people,” producing high 
sugar prices by destroying real competition. Although Hard-
wick claimed that nearly everyone knew of American Sugar’s 
crooked ways, he argued that the investigation was still nec-
essary to show the American people that the corporation 
was responsible for “this enormous increase in the cost of 
living.”4
Some Republicans questioned Hardwick’s motives in 
proposing the inquiry; many of them believed that his real 
intentions were “to prove that [the tariff] is wrong.” They 
declared that unless committee members could set aside 
their personal prejudices against American Sugar and the 
tariff system, the investigation would have no benefi t what-
soever.5 These protests notwithstanding, most Republicans 
supported the investigation, believing that it would show 
the House whether or not additional laws were necessary 
to strengthen the Sherman Act, and the resolution easily 
passed by a vote of 92 to 28. A few days later, the Ways and 
Means Committee submitted the names of fi ve Democrats 
3. Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 47, pt. 2:143.
4. Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 47, pt. 2:1144.
5. See, for example, Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 47, pt. 
2:1145.
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and four Republicans as the committee: Thomas W. Hard-
wick (D-Georgia); Finis James Garrett (D-Tennessee); Wil-
liam Sulzer (D-New Jersey); John E. Raker (D-California); 
Henderson Madison Jacoway, Jr. (D-Arkansas); George 
Roland Malby (R-New York); Joseph Warren Fordney (R-
Michigan); Edward Haggard Madison (R-Kansas); and 
Asher Crosby Hinds (R-Maine). Hardwick would chair the 
investigation.6 Seven of the nine were lawyers, Hinds was a 
journalist, and Fordney was a businessman. None of the del-
egates had any background in the sugar industry, although 
most came from states where sugar production, either cane 
or beet, was important. Signifi cantly, Louisiana, Colorado, 
Utah, and Idaho, four states that thrived on sugar produc-
tion, had no committee representation.7
After its formation, the committee faced a problem: 
the federal government was already prosecuting its 1910
suit against the American Sugar Refi ning Company in the 
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New 
York. Because of this trial, members of the House of Repre-
sentatives became concerned that sugar leaders might not 
willingly appear before the committee unless they could 
claim immunity from prosecution, something Congress 
would not offer. As one newspaper reported, “It is no secret 
. . . that a majority of the committee—in fact, all of the 
Democrats—are convinced that no sugar trust offi cial can 
legally claim immunity from civil or criminal prosecution 
. . . by reason of anything he may say before the commit-
tee.”8 In order to dissuade any sugar leader from spurning 
the investigation, the House declared that it had “ample 
authority under existing laws to prosecute for a misdemean-
or any witness who refuses to appear” before the commit-
tee.9 After the House issued its ultimatum, the Salt Lake Tri-
bune, a fi rm opponent of the LDS church and Utah-Idaho 
Sugar, announced that it eagerly awaited the “exceedingly 
6. Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 47, pt. 2:1254.
7. Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress, 1774–1971 (Washington, D. C., 
1971), 959, 988–89, 1068, 1122, 1180–81, 1325, 1330, 1581, 1775.
8. “Joseph F. Smith To Appear as Witness,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 10, 1911.
9. Congressional Record, 62 Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 47, pt. 2:1147.
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embarrassing questions” that the sugar authorities would 
have to answer.10
On June 12, 1911, the Tribune got its wish when the fi rst wit-
nesses were called before the Hardwick Committee. For the 
fi rst few days, the group heard testimony from eastern men 
describing American Sugar’s involvement in the cane sugar 
industry. Some of the testimony focused on the corporation’s 
attempts to control the beet sugar industry, a subject that the 
committee wanted to explore in detail. Indeed, a main catalyst 
for the inquiry was a muckraking article written by Judson C. 
Welliver that appeared in Hampton’s Magazine in January 1910
and alleged wrongdoing in the sugar industry. The major focus 
of the essay was the connection between American Sugar and 
the Mormon church, but the article also asserted that in the 
fall of 1901, Henry Havemeyer, president of American Sugar, 
had forced western beet sugar interests to sell out to his corpo-
ration by fl ooding the Missouri River market with cane sugar 
at the same time that beet sugar had appeared. According to 
Welliver, Havemeyer sold his sugar for a cent a pound less 
than the beet sugar, meaning that relatively few people actu-
ally purchased the beet commodity. Because of Havemeyer’s 
actions, the beet sugar industry, unable to match the prices, 
crashed, forcing several fi rms into bankruptcy. Havemeyer 
then purchased majority interests in the failed companies. 
Since 1901, Welliver charged, “beet sugar has been the vassal, 
the slave, the tool, of the Sugar Trust.”11
Welliver’s accusations led the Hardwick Committee to 
explore how Havemeyer became interested in the beet sugar 
industry and just how extensive his holdings were, even 
though Havemeyer himself had died on November 28, 1907.
It questioned several former American Sugar personnel about 
these issues, including Lowell M. Palmer, a director in the 
corporation from 1899 to 1905. According to Palmer, Have-
meyer’s foray into beet sugar was not as devious as Welliver 
had described, at least not in the case of the Utah Sugar Com-
pany. Palmer claimed that in October 1901, Wallace Willett, 
10. “Joseph F. Smith To Appear as Witness,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 10, 1911.
11. Judson C. Welliver, “The Mormon Church and the Sugar Trust,” Hampton’s
Magazine 29 (January 1910): 88–90.
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a sugar statistician, approached him and told him that beet 
sugar companies in the American West manufactured sugar 
at a lower cost than American Sugar believed. “[I]t would be 
a wise thing,” Willett advised, “for [American Sugar] to have 
an investment in those companies.” Acting upon Willett’s 
advice, American Sugar’s board of directors passed a reso-
lution that a committee of four, including Havemeyer and 
Palmer, investigate how the company could best “acquire and 
manage the beet-sugar companies.”12
This committee decided that the best regions for the com-
pany’s initial involvement in beet sugar were in Michigan and 
Colorado. But Palmer argued that because Michigan farm-
ers “could raise a diversity of crops,” Michigan companies 
might have a diffi cult time convincing agriculturists to grow 
sugar beets. Instead, he counseled, American Sugar should 
approach the Mormons in Utah because “the Mormon 
Church, in a measure, controlled its people” and American 
Sugar “would be more liable to get beet sugars from that con-
cern than from any other.”13
The conception that the LDS church still exercised eco-
nomic control in Utah in the twentieth century, notwithstand-
ing the fi nancial diffi culties that the organization had under-
gone in the late 1800s, was a common view. The Smoot hear-
ings, for example, largely dealt with the perception “that the 
Church hierarchy, of which Reed Smoot was a member, con-
trolled and directed both temporal and religious matters.”14
Although Smoot was eventually allowed to retain his senate 
seat, allegations of the church’s meddling in Utah politics 
and business had reached a national audience, and muckrak-
ers in the 1910s quickly exploited those charges. In the same 
article that “uncovered” the plot of American Sugar against 
America’s beet refi ners, Welliver also asserted that “there is 
12. “Testimony of Lowell M. Palmer,” June 15, 1911, House Special Committee on 
the Investigation of the American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others, Hearings Held 
Before the Special Committee on the Investigation of the American Sugar Refi ning Co. 
and Others, 62d Cong., 1 sess., 1911, 328–29 (hereafter referred to as American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings).
13. “Testimony of Lowell M. Palmer,” June 15, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 329.
14. Milton R. Merrill, Reed Smoot: Apostle in Politics (Logan, Utah, 1990), 30.
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no body of people in America so perfectly organized, so com-
pletely controlled politically and in business matters, as the 
Mormons. . . . They vote, they conduct their business, they 
make investments, as the church bosses direct.”15
The problem, according to several essayists, was that the 
church preached strict, unquestioning obedience to the dic-
tates of its leaders, implying that if an offi cial told the mem-
bership to go into a certain business and to leave another 
alone, the people had to follow. Richard Barry, in an article 
for Pearson’s Magazine, charged that because of the authority 
that Mormon offi cials exercised over their members, “it is dif-
fi cult to fi nd a Mormon who questions the fi nancial integrity 
of his church leader.”16 Likewise, Charles G. Patterson, a Mor-
mon himself who lived in Utah, scolded his fellow saints for 
not realizing that big businessmen regarded LDS leaders “as 
being exceedingly fortunate in presiding over a people who 
have been schooled in obedience.”17 Although church lead-
ers such as Heber J. Grant denied such control, LDS involve-
ment in the beet sugar industry proved different. As we have 
already seen, LDS leaders frequently told members that God 
wanted the industry established and that because of personal 
sacrifi ces that both the church and its authorities had made, 
good Mormons should support the Utah Sugar Company 
and its descendants. Although these actions were not as con-
niving and heartless as Welliver and others depicted, they still 
manifested a pattern of control that church leaders tried to 
maintain over Utah sugar.
To Lowell Palmer, LDS involvement in the Utah beet sugar 
industry made the Utah Sugar Company a desirable invest-
ment. He convinced Havemeyer, and Havemeyer accordingly 
entered into negotiations with Thomas R. Cutler to gain an 
interest in the Utah Sugar Company. Thereafter, Palmer 
declared, American Sugar concluded deals with Colorado 
and Michigan sugar interests, with the Oxnard brothers who 
15. Welliver, “The Mormon Church and the Sugar Trust,” 86–87.
16. Richard Barry, “The Mormon Method in Business,” Pearson’s Magazine 15
(November 1910): 576.
17. C. G. Patterson, Business, Politics and Religion in Utah, 3rd ed. (Salt Lake City, 
1916), 16.
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headed the American Beet Sugar Company, and with Claus 
Spreckels, the sugar magnate of California. Palmer insisted 
that American Sugar did not conduct a price war against beet 
sugar interests, but instead acquired its holdings through 
mutually desirable business deals.18
With the background that Palmer and other former direc-
tors of American Sugar provided, the Hardwick Committee 
explored in detail the corporation’s dealings with beet sugar 
fi rms in the American West. Because of Utah-Idaho Sugar’s 
connections with American Sugar, and because Welliver’s 
article and the 1910 government lawsuit both alleged that 
the Mormon church worked with American Sugar to restrain 
competition, the committee examined with great care the 
relationship between Havemeyer and Utah-Idaho. It called 
Thomas R. Cutler, Joseph F. Smith, president of both the LDS 
church and Utah-Idaho Sugar, and Charles W. Nibley, presid-
ing bishop of the Mormons and a director in the sugar fi rm, 
before the committee.
Cutler and Nibley willingly appeared before the body, but 
the committee had to compel Smith to come. During the 
Smoot hearings in 1904, Smith had spent three days before 
the Senate’s Committee on Privileges and Elections, answer-
ing questions about his family, the church’s involvement in 
politics, and his role as leader of the LDS church.19 That 
experience made Smith reluctant to face another grilling 
at the hands of Congress, especially since he regarded the 
18. “Testimony of Lowell M. Palmer,” June 15, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 329–31. Alfred Eichner, an economic historian who wrote 
an excellent history of the American Sugar Refi ning Company, claimed that 
the price war to which Welliver referred occurred only after the American Beet 
Sugar Company, owned by the Oxnard brothers, began dumping its excess 
sugar in the Missouri River Valley, which to that point had been “an important 
market for the American Sugar Refi ning Company’s own products.” Enraged, 
Havemeyer placed his own refi ned sugar on the market in the late summer 
of 1901 and sold it for a cent less than the American Beet Sugar Company’s 
product. According to Eichner, Havemeyer did not conduct the war to gain 
control of western beet sugar industries, but to exact revenge from a competi-
tor. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 244–46.
19. See Kathleen Flake, The Politics of American Religious Identity: The Seating of 
Senator Reed Smoot, Mormon Apostle (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004), 56–81; Merrill, 
Reed Smoot, 47–48.
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investigation as “a bit of political advertising and boasting 
before the next campaign, merely campaign thunder.” He 
also insisted that his appointment as president of Utah-Idaho 
Sugar was nothing more than a title, and that he would not 
be able to offer any new insights. Cutler, who engaged in the 
day-to-day handling of the business, knew more about the 
sugar business than he did, Smith asserted. “[I] am not pre-
pared to furnish [the committee] any information that they 
will not obtain from others who are more closely connected 
with the sugar business and understand the details,” he told 
one acquaintance. Besides, Smith claimed, he was suffering 
from rheumatism, which a train ride to Washington would 
only aggravate.20 Anthon H. Lund, one of Smith’s counselors 
in the First Presidency, claimed that the health issue was the 
deciding factor, confi ding in his journal that Smith had “sci-
atic rheumatism” and that his doctor had counseled him “not 
to risk going” unless he was subpoenaed.21
But the Salt Lake Tribune scoffed at Smith’s explanations. In 
truth, the newspaper declared, he was probably too embar-
rassed to testify because of “the incongruity of the head of a 
great religious sect being mixed up with an unlawful trust.” 
The Tribune insisted that Smith take the stand because he was 
“the head of this local trust [the Utah-Idaho], and therefore 
the link that connect[ed] the local trust with the big trust.”22
Regardless of the Tribune’s sneering, Smith had Cutler tele-
gram Smoot to see if the senator could persuade Representa-
tive Hardwick to excuse the president from testifying. Smoot 
discussed it with Hardwick, but Hardwick told him that he 
opposed excusing Smith.23 He hoped Smith would come will-
ingly, without being subpoenaed. Smith, however, telegrammed 
Hardwick that he would not testify without “legal notice,” and 
20. Quotations in Joseph F. Smith to Elder Preston D. Richards, June 15, 1911,
Kenney Collection, box 6, folder 3; see also “Smith Must Be Witness,” Salt
Lake Tribune, June 17, 1911; Harvard S. Heath, ed. In the World: The Diaries of 
Reed Smoot, (Salt Lake City, 1997), 105; Jesse Robinson Smith, Thomas Robinson 
Cutler: Pioneer Sugarman Churchman (Washington, D. C., 1985), 150.
21. Anthon H. Lund Diary, June 17, 1911, Kenney Collection, box 3, folder 10.
22. “The Sugar Trust Inquiry,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 1911.
23. Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 105; see also Anthon H. Lund 
Diary, June 19, 1911, Kenney Collection, box 3, folder 10.
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the committee was forced to issue a summons directing him to 
come to Washington. He made the trip reluctantly, remarking 
to Nibley and Lund that he felt Hardwick “had not answered 
him” and had “treated him disrespectfully.”24
Cutler’s, Smith’s, and Nibley’s testimony revolved around 
four basic issues: Henry Havemeyer’s involvement in beet 
sugar, the formation of Utah-Idaho Sugar, where Utah-Idaho 
24. Quotation in Anthon H. Lund Diary, June 20, 1911, Kenney Collection, box 3,
folder 10; see also “Smith Must Be Witness,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 17, 1911;
“President Smith Must Make Trip,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 1911; “House to 
Hale Smith Before Investigators,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 19, 1911; “Say Presi-
dent Smith Must Go To Washington,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 21, 1911; “Colo-
rado Man Explains Deal in That State,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25, 1911.
 Joseph F. Smith, president of the Utah-Idaho
 Sugar Company, 1907–1918
Special Collections and Archives,
Utah State University
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sold its sugar and how it set its prices, and why and how 
the LDS church entered the sugar business. The commit-
tee fi rst explored Henry Havemeyer’s acquisition of stock 
in the Utah Sugar Company. Cutler, who conducted most of 
the negotiations with Havemeyer, agreed with Palmer that 
Havemeyer’s stock purchase did not come about because 
of a Missouri River price war in 1901; the Utah Sugar Com-
pany did not market any of its sugar in the region at that 
time. Instead, Cutler stated, Wallace Willett came to Utah 
in September 1901 at the request of Havemeyer to discuss 
an employment offer. Willett informed Cutler that Have-
meyer wished to interview him in order to engage his “per-
sonal services to help build up the beet industry.” Because 
Cutler was “a man who had had some experience” in beet 
sugar, Havemeyer wanted him to take a position with Ameri-
can Sugar as a consultant. Cutler told Willett that he had 
no desire to change his present employment. Willett then 
stated that if an arrangement could be made, Havemeyer 
and American Sugar wished “to purchase an amount of 
stock up to one half” of the Utah Sugar Company’s hold-
ings, which would make Havemeyer the largest stockholder 
in the corporation. Cutler replied that Willett could present 
the matter before Utah Sugar’s board of directors to learn 
what its position was.25
Accordingly, in November 1901, Willett made a twenty-
minute presentation to the board. Although a few direc-
tors were uneasy with the proposal, the majority gave their 
approval for Cutler to travel to New York to negotiate with 
Havemeyer. One who was reluctant to endorse the plan was 
Anthon H. Lund, counselor in the LDS First Presidency. 
He related in his journal that Willet had represented to the 
group that American Sugar could “control prices in the mar-
ket,” as well as manipulate the railroads, which would benefi t 
Utah Sugar. Lund, however, believed that involving eastern 
interests in the venture would precipitate a loss of control 
for Utah Sugar leaders and the LDS church. “It would be so 
25. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 788, 799–-800, 819–21. See also “Testimony of Mr. Thomas 
R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings.
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much better for us if we could continue as we are and build 
up this industry with home capital,” he stated.26
Regardless of Lund’s misgivings, Cutler traveled to 
New York and met with Havemeyer. At this conference, 
Havemeyer again extended an offer to work for the Ameri-
can Sugar Refi ning Company at a salary substantially higher 
than his earnings at Utah Sugar. “We have heard of you, Mr. 
Cutler,” he declared, “and have heard, also, that you have 
been fairly successful in building up the beet-sugar indus-
try in Utah, and I have sent for you to know if you would 
. . . help us establish the industry in any good location in 
the United States.” Cutler again refused, stating that he 
was more than happy in his current position. However, he 
informed Havemeyer that
I wanted capital, my company wanted capital, and if 
he would entertain a proposation [sic] to supply us 
with one-half the capital that we required at any time, 
I would then agree to act in concert with him, and 
we would provide one-half the capital—that is, the 
people of Utah and Idaho—and he should provide 
the other half, in any good locations that we could 
actually agree upon.27
Cutler was extremely interested in obtaining Havemeyer’s 
fi nancial assistance because in 1901 the Utah Sugar Compa-
ny operated only one factory. Although individuals in both 
Utah and Idaho “were continually desiring [the corporation] 
to build factories,” Utah Sugar did not have suffi cient capi-
tal at the time to extend its operations. Cutler claimed that 
he had frequently traveled to New York to obtain additional 
capital, but had not been able to acquire a suffi cient amount. 
26. Quotation in Anthon H. Lund Diary, November 22, 1901, Kenney Collection, 
box 3, folder 6; see also “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911,
American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1058–59; Smith, Thomas Robin-
son Cutler, 115–16.
27. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 774; Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 235; Smith, Thomas
Robinson Cutler, 116–17.
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Because of the ready supply of money that Havemeyer could 
provide, Cutler considered his offer a godsend.28
Other Utah Sugar stockholders were less certain about 
Havemeyer’s proposal. Barlow Ferguson, the company’s 
attorney, agreed with Lund that Havemeyer only wanted to 
purchase stock in order to control the corporation, and a 
third of the stockholders shared Ferguson’s apprehensions. 
To quell these fears, Cutler and Smith had Ferguson draw up 
an agreement for Havemeyer to sign, stating that the board 
of directors be elected for fi ve years, that the Utah Sugar 
Company name three of the directors, that American Sugar 
name an additional three, and that the six should name the 
seventh together.29 In a letter sent to Joseph F. Smith, who was 
then serving as president of Utah Sugar, Havemeyer agreed 
to these terms.30 As an additional inducement to Utah Sugar, 
Havemeyer followed Cutler’s recommendations for the direc-
tors, which meant that the entire board consisted of Utah 
businessmen.31
Yet Cutler did not relate to the committee an interesting fact 
about this board proposition. According to Heber J. Grant, 
who was named one of the seven directors after Havemeyer’s 
purchase (along with Cutler, Smith, John R. Winder, John 
C. Cutler, John Henry Smith [all Mormons], and William S. 
McCornick [a non-Mormon Salt Lake City businessman]), 
three of these directors would resign “whenever the eastern 
28. Quotation in “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 773; see also “Testimony of Mr. Thomas 
R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 822;
“Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi n-
ing Company Hearings, 1033; Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 234; Smith, 
Thomas Robinson Cutler, 111.
29. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 785; Smith, Thomas Robinson Cutler, 116–19. See also 
“Minutes of the Utah Sugar Company, November 23, 1901, December 16,
1901, December 17, 1901, February 3, 1902,” Arrington Papers, Series 12:
The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 1.
30. Joseph F. Smith testifi ed that he could not remember receiving such a letter, 
but Cutler was confi dent that Smith had. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” 
June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1036–37.
31. Not all of the board was Mormon. William McCornick, a non-LDS Salt Lake 
City banker, for example, was one of the directors.
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people shall require it.” Although Grant did not explain how 
they would be replaced, it is clear that American Sugar inter-
ests exercised more control over the board than Cutler had 
admitted.32
Havemeyer also asked Cutler who he wanted to be presi-
dent of the corporation. Cutler told him that Joseph F. Smith 
should continue as president “as a matter of infl uence” 
because “he has the welfare of the people at heart and is very 
much interested in beet sugar on account of the labor it gives 
to his people.” Cutler insisted to the Hardwick Committee 
that Havemeyer had “never named or suggested to me one 
director.”33
In addition to these concessions, Havemeyer offered to 
purchase the Utah Sugar Company’s stock for $18 a share, 
which was eight dollars over its par value, an offer that the 
corporation could not refuse. Subsequently, Utah Sugar’s 
board of directors and stockholders transferred half of the 
corporation’s stock to Havemeyer, and on March 2, 1902, he 
became the owner of 74,000 shares in the Utah Sugar Com-
pany.34 In order to mask his holdings, Havemeyer insisted 
that Utah Sugar issue the stock in the name of Charles R. 
Heike, his personal secretary, and Arthur Donner, another 
American Sugar employee, and he required that Cutler vote 
his stock in the stockholder meetings.35
In their testimony before the Hardwick Committee, both 
Cutler and Joseph F. Smith claimed that Havemeyer exerted 
32. Diary of Heber J. Grant, April 2, 1902, Kenney Collection, box 3, folder 2.
33. Quotation in “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 785; see also Smith, Thomas Robinson Cutler,
119.
34. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 774–76; Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 235; Smith, 
Thomas Robinson Cutler, 117. Historian Thomas G. Alexander asserted that the 
board of directors decided to negotiate with Havemeyer because he “threatened 
to open a competing company,” but neither Cutler, Smith, nor Nibley ever 
mentioned any coercion in their testimony. Mormonism in Transition: A History 
of the Latter-day Saints, 1890–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1986), 79.
35. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 800; “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27,
1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1042–43. Even though 
Havemeyer had the stock issued to Heike and Donner, the public in general 
realized that the holdings were Havemeyer’s. According to Cutler, soon after 
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little control over Utah Sugar. Although the board of direc-
tors always consulted Havemeyer before building a factory in 
a new area, Cutler carried on an infrequent correspondence 
with him and visited him only four times a year “to report 
personally on what [the company] was doing.” No other 
discussions occurred, outside of technical conferences with 
an American Sugar representative who examined the facto-
ries and tested the quality of the beets.36 Cutler insisted that 
he never asked Havemeyer about selling prices or markets. 
Even when Havemeyer’s advice was sought, Cutler stated, 
he rarely followed it because “Mr. Havemeyer was more or 
less erratic” and was not well posted on the sugar market in 
the intermountain states. As an example, Cutler explained 
that he once wrote to Havemeyer and asked him “what he 
thought of the markets.” The sugar magnate replied that 
because of a banner crop in Europe and Cuba, the price of 
sugar might be higher in America or it might be lower. “Now, 
what can you get out of a letter of that kind?” Cutler asked 
the Hardwick Committee. “Nothing,” he answered, “abso-
lutely nothing.”37
But if Havemeyer did not take an active interest in the 
Utah Sugar Company and its subsidiaries—and the minutes 
of those corporations bear out that assertion—why did he 
provide so much money to the corporation? Cutler himself 
never answered this question, but Charles W. Nibley provid-
ed some insight. Nibley, who had formerly been a director in 
Utah’s other beet sugar enterprise, the Amalgamated Sugar 
Company, had founded his own sugar works in Lewiston, 
Utah, in 1903. Before this factory was built, Nibley traveled 
to New York with Thomas Cutler, where he offered Havemey-
Havemeyer’s purchase of the stock, Salt Lake City newspapers carried reports that 
the sugar giant had bought a large amount of stock. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas 
R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 822.
36. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1061.
37. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 824–826. After hearing Cutler’s statement, Representative 
Madison wryly commented that “one of the decidedly remarkable features of this 
investigation has been the fact that everybody has conceded that Mr. Havemeyer 
was a masterful man, and yet nobody ever followed any of his dicta.”
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er half of the stock of the new enterprise. Havemeyer readily 
agreed and paid Nibley double the amount that the stock 
was worth. After Representative Hinds asked Nibley why he 
thought Havemeyer would pay that much of a bonus, Nibley 
replied,
I do not know what was in Mr. Havemeyer’s mind. He 
is dead now and I can not ask him; but I fancy that 
he thought that the beet-sugar industry was going to 
be very much more extensive than what it will ever 
prove to be.38
Havemeyer presumably believed that Utah’s sugar enter-
prises would make a substantial profi t. Yet a desire to con-
trol western beet sugar companies just as he governed 
most of the cane sugar refi neries probably also infl uenced 
Havemeyer’s purchase. Cutler, for example, testifi ed that 
he assumed Havemeyer took half of the stock in the corpo-
ration because if “any man . . . held half [he] could soon 
get a control by buying one share.”39 If Havemeyer disliked 
the policy that the company was pursuing, he could merely 
purchase one additional share and assume control. In the 
meantime, the government could not charge him with 
improper involvement because he did not hold a majority 
38. Thomas G. Alexander argued that the American Sugar Refi ning Company was 
against the establishment of Nibley’s factory because it considered it to be a 
competitor of the Logan, Utah, factory operated by the Amalgamated Sugar 
Company. Only after LDS church leaders persuaded Nibley to offer some of the 
new company’s stock to American Sugar did the transaction take place. Nibley, 
however, contradicted this assessment in his testimony. He declared that he was 
the instigator of the stock sale, not because he wanted to placate American Sug-
ar, but because he wanted to make money. “Testimony of Charles W. Nibley,” 
June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1079–84; “Testi-
mony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Com-
pany Hearings, 850. In addition, the Utah Sugar Company’s minutes show that 
some Utah Sugar and Amalgamated offi cials were concerned that American 
Sugar leaders might be upset about the factory, but there is no evidence to show 
that they were. “Minutes of the Utah Sugar Company, May 27, 1903, July 10,
1903,” Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 
10, folder 1.
39. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 799.
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of the stock and the board of directors consisted of only 
Utah businessmen.40
Whatever Havemeyer’s reasoning for his interest in the 
Utah Sugar Company, he furnished it with a large amount of 
capital and enabled it to expand its production. Because of 
this, both Cutler and Joseph F. Smith regarded Havemeyer as 
a savior to the sugar industry. Cutler, for example, informed 
the Hardwick Committee that in uniting with the American 
Sugar Refi ning Company, Utah Sugar gained an element of 
security in the industry through “protection that one strong 
man can give to . . . a weaker one.” Not only did Havemeyer 
provide instant capital for any expansion that Utah Sugar 
wanted to undertake, but his name and reputation helped 
the corporation obtain loans. In Cutler’s opinion, “Mr. 
Havemeyer was the greatest friend to the beet-sugar industry 
that we ever had.”41
Smith was just as magnanimous in his praise. After Rep-
resentative Sulzer asked Smith if he thought that the acqui-
sition of Utah stock by Havemeyer restrained trade, Smith, 
misunderstanding the intent of the question, replied that he 
believed that it had facilitated and extended trade. “It gave 
us the means of building half a dozen factories or less in 
Utah that we never could have built without it,” he declared. 
Havemeyer’s purchase thus “enhanced the value of farms to 
a very great extent in Utah and in Idaho,” meaning that the 
business deal was “one of the greatest blessings and benefi ts 
to both the State of Utah and the State of Idaho.” Instead 
of considering Havemeyer an “industrial pirate,” both Smith 
and Cutler regarded him as a “benefactor.”42 The two were 
not alone in these opinions; even Henry Oxnard, who 
40. “Testimony of Charles W. Nibley,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1089.
41. Quotation in “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 783, 844, 852; see also Smith, Thomas
Robinson Cutler, 119–20.
42. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1049, 1075. These statements seem at odds with 
Alexander’s portrayal of LDS church leaders as convinced that Havemeyer’s 
participation in Utah’s beet sugar industry was detrimental to the community. 
Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 79.
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experienced a hostile takeover by Havemeyer in the early 
1900s, told the Hardwick Committee that “if it had not been 
that the trust had gone into the beet sugar industry it would 
not be as prosperous an industry as it is to-day.”43
Unable to extract any statements from Cutler or Smith 
about illegal actions on the part of Havemeyer and American 
Sugar, the Hardwick Committee turned to another matter: 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company itself. One of the main issues 
the committee explored was the creation of the corporation 
and whether or not its formation and its business policies vio-
lated the Sherman Act. Both Cutler and Smith testifi ed that 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company was formed in 1907 after the 
stockholders of the Utah Sugar Company, the Idaho Sugar 
Company, and the Western Idaho Sugar Company agreed to 
merge. To some members of the Hardwick Committee, this 
amalgamation looked no different than the creation of the 
American Sugar Refi ning Company, which had absorbed 
numerous competing sugar refi neries in the East. Cutler and 
Smith argued that there was one distinction: whereas the 
sugar companies amalgamated by American Sugar had been 
competing concerns, the corporations in Utah and Idaho were 
essentially just branches of the same company.
The Utah, the Idaho, and the Western Idaho sugar com-
panies all had essentially the same board of directors and 
offi cers: Smith served as president of all three and Cutler 
operated as the vice president and general manager of each. 
Therefore, according to Smith and Cutler, the combination 
creating the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company occurred not to 
eliminate competition, but to provide greater effi ciency and 
order to the region’s sugar industry.44 Cutler himself declared 
that there were fi ve reasons why the amalgamation occurred: 
“fi rst, greater economy in operation; second, the stock would 
have greater stability; third, we should be entitled to a low 
rate of interest on money we had to borrow to carry sugar.” 
43. “Testimony of Henry T. Oxnard,” June 15, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 408.
44. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 782–84, 791, 810, 831–34; “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. 
Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1074.
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Fourth, Cutler stated, combining the corporations would give 
better technical control to the company, as it would increase 
its effi ciency in operations. Finally, an amalgamation would 
quiet criticism from stockholders of the different fi rms that 
the board of directors favored one corporation above anoth-
er. As Cutler insisted, “It was always intended to amalgamate 
those factories when they got into shape to do it.”45
Even if the formation of the Utah-Idaho was not illegal, 
some of the actions of the company and its predecessors in 
developing sugar factories appeared objectionable. Accord-
ing to the government’s 1910 suit against the American 
Sugar Refi ning Company, for example, the Utah Sugar Com-
pany entered the sugar business in Idaho expressly for the 
purpose of “preventing the erection and operation of a pro-
posed independent beet-sugar factory at Sugar City, Idaho, 
which . . . would have been . . . a competitor of The Utah 
Sugar Company.”46 The government asserted that the board 
of directors of the Utah Sugar Company created the Idaho 
Sugar Company in 1903 in order to stop Soren Hanson, a 
Garland, Utah, egg merchant, from establishing his own cor-
poration. Because of this allegation, the Hardwick Committee 
questioned Cutler about the situation. Cutler answered that 
the government suit had confused some of the facts. For one 
thing, Hanson had not attempted to construct a factory in 
Sugar City, Idaho, but in Blackfoot, Idaho, located some fi fty 
miles south of Sugar City. In addition, Cutler claimed, he had 
actually helped Hanson establish the factory. When Hanson 
fi rst conceived the idea, he approached Cutler and asked him 
if he could study the production of beet sugar at the Utah 
Sugar Company’s factory at Lehi. Cutler agreed, and Hanson 
spent the next few months in Lehi, where “he would stand by 
a piece of machinery sometimes for a whole day and watch it 
work.” After his investigation, Hanson formed a corporation 
and contracted with Dyer and Company, a construction fi rm 
in Cleveland, Ohio, for the purchase of beet sugar machinery. 
45. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 783–84, 832–33; “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” 
June 22, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 772.
46. United States v. American Sugar Refi ning Co., et al., original petition, 121.
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However, the fl edgling corporation soon encountered fi nan-
cial diffi culties, forcing Hanson to ask Cutler if he “would take 
that machinery off his hands.” Cutler purchased the equip-
ment and installed it in the Idaho Sugar Company’s Idaho 
Falls plant, constructed in 1903.47 He told the Hardwick Com-
mittee that he did not see any improprieties in his relation-
ship with or his actions toward Hanson.
As with other matters, Cutler’s testimony was technically cor-
rect. Joseph F. Smith informed Havemeyer in February 1903
that Cutler had aided Hanson in the establishment of the 
Blackfoot factory, but that Hanson had insisted that he, and 
not Cutler, “retain [its] control.” When Hanson realized that 
a Mr. Boettcher was planning on constructing his own factory, 
he “weakened,” and the Utah Sugar Company promptly sent 
Cutler into the area “to have matters reconciled.”48 Yet Cutler 
did not relate that the First Presidency of the church had sent 
letters to prospective farmers in the Rexburg area and to the 
stake presidency in Fremont County, telling them that they 
should only deal with Cutler in regard to sugar beet produc-
tion.49 Such declarations effectively ensured that Hanson or 
any other non-Utah Sugar interest would be unable to com-
pete in the area since a majority of the farmers were Latter-day 
Saints, which, at least, violated the spirit of the Sherman Act. 
The committee brought up other situations in which Cut-
ler, Smith, and other directors in the Utah Sugar Company 
had allegedly engaged in unfair business practices. In 1905,
Utah Sugar had formed the Western Idaho Sugar Company 
in order to construct factories at Nampa and Payette, Idaho. 
The government asserted that this development occurred 
only to prevent W. D. Hoover, a Colorado businessman, 
from establishing his own corporation in the area. Ques-
tioned by Representative Garrett about this situation, Cutler 
47. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 779–80.
48. Joseph F. Smith to H. O. Havemeyer, February 17, 1903, Kenney Collection, 
box 6, folder 1.
49. Quotation in First Presidency to Thomas E. Bassett, Rexburg, January 23, 1903,
Kenney Collection, box 2, folder 8; see also First Presidency to Presidency of 
the Fremont Stake, January 23, 1903, ibid.
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admitted that a Payette man had informed the Utah Sugar 
Company that Hoover had been inspecting the area to assess 
its sugar beet potential. But Cutler insisted that “that is the 
only time I ever heard of anyone looking over the ground, 
and if they did, they were certainly discouraged and left.” 
Instead, Cutler asserted that Colonel Ed Dewey, a Nampa 
man, had approached him in 1900 about establishing the 
industry. Dewey informed Cutler that Nampa “was ready for 
a beet-sugar factory, and he wanted my company to build it.” 
Cutler sent some of his men to investigate the area and they 
reported that the region would not produce enough beets 
to warrant a factory. “For four consecutive years I sent our 
agricultural men down to investigate that country,” Cutler 
declared, “before I decided . . . that it might be a proper 
locality.”50
The sugar beet plant
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
50. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 780–81.
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However, evidence introduced in the government’s suit 
against American Sugar disputed Cutler’s version of the inci-
dent. A letter written by Cutler to Henry Havemeyer in April 
1905 stated that after Cutler had discovered Hoover’s inten-
tions in Payette, he actively worked “to overcome [Hoover’s] 
operations.” “[He] went on to the vicinity of Nampa and 
tried to get in there,” Cutler wrote, “but I forestalled [him].” 
Cutler expressed relief to Havemeyer that Hoover had been 
forced from the area “because these people were offering 
$5.00 for beets and it would have upset our entire Idaho 
operations.”51
This letter showed that Cutler was more aware of Hoover 
than his testimony before the Hardwick Committee acknowl-
edged. As one critic explained, it indicated that Cutler and 
Utah Sugar “not only desired to keep others out for the sake 
of preserving the market for themselves, but they were afraid 
another crowd would pay the farmer a fairer price for his 
beets.”52 Cutler’s evasive answers before the Hardwick Com-
mittee heightened suspicions about the incident.
The committee also explored the Utah Sugar Company’s 
March 1902 purchase of the Bear River Water Company, an 
irrigation enterprise located in Garland, Utah, as well as its 
acquisition of thirty thousand acres of land in the same area. 
The Bear River Water Company had its antecedent in several 
different organizations. In 1888, John R. Bothwell, Alexander 
Toponce, and John W. Kerr, all Utah businessmen, entered 
into an agreement to establish an irrigation endeavor in the 
Bear River Valley in northern Utah. To fi nance this operation, 
the three men, together with Samuel M. Jarvis and Roland R. 
Conklin, formed the Bear Lake and River Water Works and 
Irrigation Company in 1889. This corporation constructed 
a diversion dam on the Bear River and two canals to feed 
water to farmlands in both the northern and southern por-
tions of the valley. Before construction was completed, the 
company ran out of money, and in 1893 it went bankrupt. 
In 1894, bondholders reorganized the fi rm, renaming it the 
51. Thomas R. Cutler to H. O. Havemeyer, Esq., April 11, 1905, copy in Patterson, 
Business, Politics and Religion in Utah, 10–11.
52. Patterson, Business, Politics and Religion in Utah, 10.
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Bear River Irrigation and Ogden Water Works Company. This 
corporation was also unable to meet payments, and in 1894,
parts of the canals were sold to David Evans of Salt Lake City 
and John E. Dooley of Ogden, who formed the Bear River 
Water Company, capitalized at $250,000.53
In 1901, Evans, who had grown up in Lehi, invited Cut-
ler and some of Utah Sugar’s technicians to examine the 
land in the Bear River Valley for its sugar beet potential. 
Cutler favorably reported on the land to Utah Sugar’s board 
of directors, and on April 17, 1901, he received authoriza-
tion to purchase the entire capital stock of the Bear River 
Water Company for $300,000 in order to stimulate sugar 
beet production in the region. Utah Sugar sold water rights 
and some of the property to the farmers, but it retained 
thirty thousand acres of land in case farmers ever refused to 
grow beets.54
The Hardwick Committee alleged that Utah Sugar had 
bought the corporation only after it had discovered that 
“other parties” were negotiating for its purchase. Cutler 
emphatically denied the assertion, stating that if Bear River 
was conferring with other investors at the time, he had “never 
heard of it.”55 However, Utah Sugar’s minutes for April 30,
1901, indicate that when Cutler announced the purchase of 
the water works, the directors declared that “in case [the Utah 
Sugar Company] does not take up the proposition, foreign 
capital will purchase the same, and would be a very undesir-
able competitor.” It is unclear whether this meant that others 
had actually offered to purchase the Bear River Water Com-
pany or whether Utah Sugar’s directors merely feared that 
someone else would eventually buy it. In any case, the board 
declared that “we ought not to allow this water system to go 
into the hands of outside parties, because whoever has it, the 
53. Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West: A History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company, 1891–1966 (Seattle, 1966), 42–45.
54. “Minutes of the Utah Sugar Company, April 30, 1901,” Arrington Papers, 
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 1; Arrington, 
Beet Sugar in the West, 45–46; “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23,
1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 796.
55. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 776.
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settlers would be entirely at their mercy.”56 The Utah Sugar 
Company clearly wanted the area and the irrigation works 
for itself.
According to the Hardwick Committee, other peccadilloes 
were involved in the purchase. Because of Havemeyer’s stock 
acquisitions in Utah Sugar, and because of the corporation’s 
buyout of Bear River, Utah Sugar reorganized itself in Decem-
ber 1902, issuing a capital stock of $6 million. The Hardwick 
Committee failed to understand how the new corporation 
arrived at the $6 million fi gure. When Utah Sugar sold Have-
meyer half of its stock, its total stock amount was roughly 
160,000. Havemeyer purchased approximately 74,000 shares 
for $18 a share, equaling $1.33 million. The other 86,000
shares were worth $10 a share, or $860,000 collectively. Thus, 
at the time of the reorganization, the Utah Sugar Company’s 
stock was worth around $2.19 million. The purchase of the 
Bear River, coupled with expenditures to repair and expand 
the irrigation works, totaled around $1.5 million. The Hard-
wick Committee claimed that the company had placed the 
value of the irrigation enterprise at approximately $3 million 
in order to capitalize the Utah Sugar Company at $6 million. 
Representatives Hardwick and Garrett declared this to be a 
blatant example of stock watering.57
At the time, stock watering was a fairly common practice in 
mergers, although illegal. Promoters often capitalized con-
solidations for much more than their separate worth. This 
was advantageous to the new corporation because it allowed 
it to offer shares at infl ated prices, earning huge profi ts for 
stockholders.58 Opponents of trusts, including the Salt Lake 
Tribune, abhorred the practice. The Tribune editorialized that 
56. “Minutes of the Utah Sugar Company, April 30, 1901,” Arrington Papers, Se-
ries 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 1.
57. “Testimony of Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 776–77; “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27,
1911, American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 1078. The American Beet 
Sugar Company, for example, had around $8 million worth of “water” in its 
stock, according to the Hardwick Committee. “Oxnard Tells Inside Facts of 
Sugar Deal,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 17, 1911.
58. Glenn Porter, The Rise of Big Business, 1860–1920, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, Ill., 1992),
82–83.
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Utah-Idaho stock paid a 7 percent dividend in 1911, “but this 
seven per cent . . . on the stock, as twice or thrice watered, . . 
. would be very much more on the original issue” held mostly 
by Cutler, Smith, and the other directors in the Utah-Idaho.59
Cutler defended the valuation, claiming that the Bear River 
Water Company was worth more than $1.5 million because 
that corporation had originally paid $3.5 million to build the 
canals. Even though the Utah Sugar Company had not spent 
that amount, the irrigation works was still worth $3.5 mil-
lion. “You could not construct it to-day for any less,” Cutler 
insisted.60
Cutler’s protests notwithstanding, the Hardwick Commit-
tee was convinced that Cutler, Havemeyer, and other direc-
tors had watered Utah-Idaho’s stock, both at the time that 
Utah Sugar purchased Bear River and at the formation of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. In order to determine just 
how overvalued the stock was, the committee fi rst inquired 
into how much it cost beet sugar companies to build fac-
tories. Cutler testifi ed that constructing a factory that 
could process a thousand tons of sugar beets a day would 
take $1.2 million even if equipment to recycle waste molas-
ses and refi ne it into sugar were omitted. If the machinery 
was included, the price increased to approximately $1.45
million.61
59. “President Smith’s Testimony,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 29, 1911.
60. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 777.
61. Factories recycled molasses by using either the osmose process or the Steffen 
process. Before the late 1890s, most beet sugar companies had no way of turning 
this waste into sugar, and therefore they either discharged it into nearby creeks 
or “impregnated” it “with potash salts and . . . cinders . . . for use in hard-
surfacing the roads running to the factory yard.” Under the osmose process, 
the company could pass the molasses fi rst through iron and steel presses and 
then through a special kind of parchment paper fi lter in order to eliminate its 
impurities, thereby turning the waste into a good grade of brown sugar. In 1905,
Utah Sugar replaced the osmose process with a system invented by Carl Steffen 
of Vienna, Austria. Although more complicated than the osmose process, the 
Steffen method, which continued to be used by beet sugar companies through 
much of the twentieth century, was more effi cient in reprocessing molasses into 
brown sugar. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 22, 1911, American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 770; see also Arrington, Beet Sugar in the 
West, 31–32.
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Because not every factory processed a thousand tons of 
beets a day, Hardwick calculated that the total number of beets 
that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company used per day was around 
4,500 tons. Using the factory construction fi gures provided by 
Cutler, Hardwick then estimated that Utah-Idaho could not 
have spent more than $6 million to construct all of its facto-
ries. Yet Utah-Idaho’s total capitalization at the time of its for-
mation was about $11 million.62 Cutler insisted that there was 
no discrepancy between expenses and capitalization. Although 
Utah-Idaho’s factories should have a value of only $6 million, 
he explained that the company had more assets than just its 
factories. For example, the company had bought “warehouses, 
tanks to contain molasses, . . . cutting stations,” and even homes 
for some of its Lehi employees. Aside from that, it had the irri-
gation system and lands in the Bear River Valley, which it listed 
in its 1907 incorporation as worth $2 million. Representative 
Hardwick asked how an asset on which the corporation only 
spent $1.5 million could be listed for $2 million. Cutler replied 
that regardless of how much the company paid for it, the irriga-
tion works was worth $2 million. Apparently, Cutler had forgot-
ten that he had earlier testifi ed that the system could not be 
built for a fi gure less than $3.5 million.63
Representative Madison was unimpressed by Cutler’s 
explanation and pursued the matter further with Joseph F. 
Smith. “We have learned somewhat here in the East that the 
consolidation of plants affords splendid opportunity for the 
injection of water into the capitalization,” Madison declared. 
He then directly asked, “Was there any water in that capital-
ization [of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company]?” Smith replied 
that he was not aware of any. Utah-Idaho, he claimed, had 
not been created to make money from overcapitalization, but 
62. At the time of Utah-Idaho Sugar’s creation, its authorized capitalization was 
$13 million, with $10 million in preferred stock and $3 million in common. 
However, only $8.1 million of the preferred stock was issued, meaning that the 
company’s actual capitalization was around $11 million. By 1911, the common 
stock had been retired. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911,
American Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings, 848; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the 
West, 71.
63. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 848–49.
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merely to reduce the expenses of operating three different 
beet sugar corporations. “I think if there is [any water in the 
stock],” he concluded, “it is hardly enough to moisten it.”64
Despite the declarations of Smith and Cutler, the Hard-
wick Committee, as well as several Utah citizens, remained 
convinced that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company was overcapi-
talized, and the numbers produced by the corporation seem 
to justify that perception. Yet it is diffi cult to assess whether 
or not watering had occurred. At the time of the merger, 
minutes of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company listed its assets 
at $16,189,572. This had dipped to $15,834,058 by 1912, a 
minimal loss. The problem, as the Hardwick Committee had 
noted, lay in determining whether or not the assets really 
had that value, or whether the corporation overvalued them. 
Because of a lack of availability of records, that type of recon-
struction cannot be performed.65
Yet it is instructive that several observers, including the
Salt Lake Tribune, were convinced that overcapitalization had 
occurred. The Tribune even insisted that the Hardwick Com-
mittee did not go far enough in its watering inquiry. “What 
the people here would like to know,” the Tribune’s editor 
stated, “is the number of times that the local sugar stock has 
been watered, the amount of that watering, the dividends 
on the original basis and on the watered basis, and things 
of that kind.” The Tribune asserted that it was not Cutler’s 
fault that such facts had not come out, for Cutler’s testimony 
was “undoubtedly meant to be honest and straightforward.” 
Instead, the blame lay with the Hardwick Committee because 
it was not “suffi ciently conversant with the facts to bring out 
the inner details that would be of interest and importance.”66
64. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1074–75, 1078.
65. Figures for 1907 and 1912 are in “Minutes of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
August 13, 1907” and “Minutes of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10,
1912,” Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 
10, folder 2. The LDS Church Archives in Salt Lake City holds the papers of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. However, as of 2005, that collection remained 
unprocessed and unavailable to the public.
66. “Mr. Cutler’s Testimony,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25, 1911. See also “President 
Smith’s Testimony,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 29, 1911.
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The Tribune implied that, as with other matters, Cutler was 
not telling the whole story.
As the hearings continued, the Hardwick Committee con-
tinued to emphasize that Utah-Idaho Sugar was just like any 
other business in the United States, both in its alleged stock-
watering and in its everyday practices. Such reiterations indi-
cated how far the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company had become 
integrated into the national sugar economy. One of the key 
issues on which the committee focused, for example, was 
Utah-Idaho’s sugar prices. Because the corporation sold its 
sugar in Utah at the same rates that it sold it in the Missouri 
River Valley, the Hardwick Committee declared that the 
company defrauded Utah citizens. Cutler explained that the 
cause of that condition was the integration of Utah-Idaho 
Sugar into national, rather than just regional, markets. He 
related that prior to Havemeyer’s stock purchase, Utah 
Sugar was unable to market sugar outside of Utah. After 
Havemeyer became involved, and after the amalgamation 
of the three companies occurred, Utah-Idaho Sugar began 
producing more sugar than could be consumed in the inter-
mountain area, leading it to sell the product in the Missouri 
River Valley. By 1911, Utah-Idaho sold the majority of its 
sugar in Nebraska, Iowa, and along the Missouri River from 
St. Paul, Minnesota, to Oklahoma, marketing only 20 per-
cent in Utah, Idaho, Oregon, Wyoming, and Nevada, where 
California refi neries sold a large amount of cane sugar. Since 
beet sugar was not yet equal in quality with cane, Utah-Idaho 
was forced by national practices to sell its product twenty 
cents per hundred pounds below the price of cane, adding 
a transportation charge to its prices in areas outside of the 
Intermountain West.67
Yet even though Utah-Idaho did not have to pay freight 
rates on sugar sold in Utah and Idaho, it, like other inland 
beet companies, charged intermountain buyers slightly 
67. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 788, 791–93, 800, 830, 842. By storing some sugar in Utah 
warehouses, the corporation could market its sugar in Utah year-round, but it 
shipped its product to the Missouri River region directly after the sugar beet 
harvest in the fall.
Bags of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company sugar, ready for 
transportation to market
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
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more than those in the Missouri River Valley. In 1911, for 
example, Utah-Idaho’s sugar sold for 4.32 cents per pound 
near the Missouri River, while it sold for 5 cents in Utah. 
Since the corporation could manufacture sugar for 3.75
cents per pound, it made most of its profi t in Utah and 
Idaho. This outraged some members of the Hardwick Com-
mittee, who stated that Utah-Idaho Sugar gouged its own cit-
izens in order to increase profi ts. Cutler countered that the 
company had no control over sugar prices because it had to 
follow the rates set on the Pacifi c Coast. “Everything is based 
upon the list price, the prices made on the Pacifi c coast, 
plus the freight less the differential, wherever we go,” Cutler 
claimed. “We can not help that.” If the company did not 
follow this formula and severely undercut the price of cane 
sugar imported into the Intermountain West from Califor-
nia, it would spark tensions with the California corporations 
and possibly incite a price war that the beet sugar company 
could not withstand. If the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company did 
not produce sugar in Utah and Idaho, Cutler argued, Cali-
fornia refi neries, lacking any competition, would sell sugar 
at much higher rates.68
Representative Hardwick contended that Cutler was miss-
ing the point. “The people who are located right at a sugar 
factory door ought not to have the price put up on them as 
high as it is in San Francisco,” he remarked.69 Congressman 
Madison agreed. “In the very towns in which your factories 
are located,” he accused, “you charge the same price that 
you charge for sugar 200 or 300 or 500 miles away. . . . You 
appropriate the freight rate to yourself, although as a mat-
ter of fact the sugar does not travel a mile.”70 Cutler con-
ceded that this was the case, but defended the practice as 
legitimate because “without the higher prices in the interior 
it would be impossible, from my standpoint, to make money 
68. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 798, 805, 834–36.
69. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 834.
70. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 837.
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at the business. . . . Everybody has to do it.” Representative 
Hardwick countered that “that is a matter of opinion.”71
Hardwick believed that since the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany had so many LDS church leaders on its board of direc-
tors, it should act in the best interests of the Mormon people. 
Since a religion was supposed to consider the welfare of its 
adherents, Hardwick could not understand why the corpo-
ration refused to do so. Could Cutler and the rest of the 
directors not see how their actions affected citizens of Utah? 
If so, why did they not take the freight rate off of the sugar 
they sold in the state? Again, Cutler declared that it would be 
impossible for the company to make any money if it did such 
a thing. In addition, if the corporation did not produce sugar, 
the product would cost much more in Utah than it currently 
did. Therefore, Cutler claimed, the Utah-Idaho had actually 
enabled Utahns to save money. Hardwick remained uncon-
vinced. “If you were to shut up every one of your factories 
to-morrow, . . . there would not be any difference in price to 
the people right at your factory door in the sugar they con-
sumed,” he declared. Cutler could only respond that because 
the company supplied Utah citizens with labor, he believed 
that it “equalized” the additional freight expense.72 Joseph F. 
Smith agreed: “the people are not complaining because they 
can get the sugar cheaper [than before 1890], and we feel 
pretty secure because we can produce it at home.”73
Cutler and Smith had an important point. If the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company just manufactured sugar for Utah 
citizens, as the Utah Sugar Company had originally done, 
price issues would not be a problem. The main reason why 
71. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 838. Whether or not everyone had to do it was debatable, 
but certainly, as Cutler stated, almost all sugar companies did add transporta-
tion rates to their sugar prices. According to historian Alfred S. Eichner, every 
beet sugar company determined its price by taking the price of refi ned cane 
sugar and adding to it the cost of transportation. Eichner, The Emergence of Oli-
gopoly, 261.
72. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 839–40, 846.
73. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1056.
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Brigham Young, Wilford Woodruff, and others wanted the 
sugar industry established was so that Utahns, and specifi cally 
Mormons, would not have to pay high prices for the com-
modity. As the company became more integrated into the 
national sugar market in the early 1900s, however, it became 
imperative that prices match what that market set. Utah-Idaho 
could not last in the larger context of American capitalism if 
it established its own rates in confl ict with the greater market. 
Hardwick and other members of the committee (as well as 
Cutler and Smith) failed to understand that the nation’s (and 
Congress’s) insistence that the Mormons become broader in 
its economic focus had undercut the original intention of 
Utah’s sugar industry and had led, in the long run, to higher 
sugar prices for Utah consumers. As Charles W. Nibley stated 
in support of Utah-Idaho’s policy,
They sell their sugar, and they would be foolish if they 
did not, as a farmer would sell his wheat. . . . [The 
farmer] does not say: ‘If you were not there to buy my 
wheat I would have to sell it out here at the Missouri 
River, and therefore I will sell it to you just at the price 
I would sell it for at the river.’ The farmer does not 
do that, and you would not do it. No sensible man 
would. He sells it for what he can get, just like you 
would a pair of shoes, or socks, or a cheese, or butter, 
or anything else.74
Still, the notion that Utah-Idaho Sugar added a freight cost 
in Utah and Idaho infuriated some consumers, who, like the 
Hardwick Committee, did not understand or refused to accept 
the larger forces at work. For example, fi ve years after Cutler, 
Smith, and Nibley had presented their testimony, Charles 
Patterson, a Salt Lake City lawyer, produced a pamphlet exco-
riating the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company and its price policies. 
One of his chief complaints was that the corporation “wanted 
to see a high freight rate on sugar to and from Utah” so that 
it could “squeeze a bigger profi t out of the people who had 
74. “Testimony of Charles W. Nibley,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1104.
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set them up in business.” How was this any different from 
a “burglar” or someone who “sticks a loaded revolver under 
your nose while he divests you of your valuables?” Patterson 
asked.75 Clearly, the freight policy damaged the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company’s reputation, but again, it was a price that 
Utahns had to pay for their economic integration.
The major problem, as Hardwick had stated, was the large 
role that the LDS church and its leaders still had in the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company. Such authorities were not supposed to 
be trying to squeeze profi ts out of their followers, no matter 
what national markets might dictate. In addition, the infl u-
ence of the LDS church over Utah and Idaho’s sugar busi-
ness still loomed large. Indeed, several essayists around 1910
devoted whole articles to this phenomenon, insisting that the 
Mormon church still improperly infl uenced and controlled 
business in the Intermountain Region. They examined indus-
tries in which the church had holdings, such as salt, news-
papers, railroads, and especially sugar as proof of their con-
tentions. As one writer stated, his investigations showed that 
the Mormons were “fast controlling the beet sugar industry 
of the intermountain region.”76 Judson Welliver, another con-
tributor, argued that the church not only governed Utah’s and 
Idaho’s beet sugar operations, but also, in collaboration with 
the American Sugar Refi ning Company, the entire beet sugar 
industry of America. “The Sugar Trust, individuals inter-
ested in the Sugar Trust, and the Mormon Church, these 
three groups working together, . . . absolutely dominates beet 
sugar,” Welliver declared. “It [sic] makes the market prices of 
sugar, distributes the territory, and completely controls tariff 
legislation.”77
Based on these allegations, the Hardwick Committee exam-
ined the LDS church’s role in the sugar industry. Although 
the First Presidency had issued a statement in April 1911
denouncing muckraking articles as “utterly false and without 
foundation,” “fi ctitious narratives,” and “grotesque in their 
75. Patterson, Business, Politics and Religion in Utah, 11, 14.
76. Barry, “The Mormon Method in Business,” 574–76.
77. Welliver, “The Mormon Church and the Sugar Trust,” 82. See also Alexander, 
Mormonism in Transition, 80.
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palpable absurdities,” the perception still remained that the 
church dominated the economic lives of its members.78 Rep-
resentative Hinds, in his interrogation of Cutler, was the fi rst 
to raise the issue. “I would like to know,” he asked, “if the 
question does not seem to you too impertinent, why the Mor-
mon Church goes into the sugar business.” Cutler was “per-
fectly willing and glad to answer that question.” He stated 
that the church had become involved in sugar not out of a 
desire for profi ts, but because its leaders wished to encour-
age “anything that affects the welfare of the Mormon people 
fi nancially,” especially if it provided labor. “It is easier to look 
out for the spiritual welfare of employed people rather than 
unemployed people?” Hinds asked. “It is their duty, if they 
can, to help and assist their people fi nancially by providing 
labor in any way, shape, or form,” Cutler answered.79
Cutler was only echoing statements that church leaders 
such as Wilford Woodruff, George Q. Cannon, Heber J. Grant, 
and Joseph F. Smith had been making for years. In 1893, for 
example, Smith, addressing church members, declared that 
one of the main reasons the church had become involved 
in the Utah Sugar Company was because “there was not a 
single enterprise of a public character [in Utah] that was 
calculated to give employment to our people.” The religion’s 
leaders thus believed that they had a “responsibility” to pro-
vide support to the beet sugar industry and other home 
enterprises such as wool and salt in order to give Mormons 
employment opportunities.80 Smith expanded these remarks 
in his own testimony before the Hardwick Committee. He 
explained that it was the policy of the church to help out any 
“home industry started by our own people” when such busi-
ness struggled to succeed.81 According to Charles W. Nibley, 
“nine out of ten of the interests that the church has helped . 
78. “Magazine Slanders Confuted by The First Presidency of the Church,” Improve-
ment Era 14 (June 1911): 720. This statement was originally read at the annual 
general conference of the church in April 1911.
79. “Testimony of Mr. Thomas R. Cutler,” June 23, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 813–14.
80. Joseph F. Smith, “True Economy,” Deseret Evening News, December 16, 1893.
81. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1041.
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. . are just in those extreme cases where people are down and 
out and they have got to have help.”82 Interestingly, however, 
neither Smith, Cutler, nor Nibley explained to the Hardwick 
Committee that Woodruff repeatedly stated the divine com-
mand to become involved in beet sugar; such an explanation 
would have merely fueled the charges of undue ecclesiastical 
infl uence.
Indeed, the committee dwelt on the accusation that the 
church, in concert with the American Sugar Refi ning Com-
pany, controlled the western beet sugar industry. In the 
minds of some members, Smith’s dual role as president of 
the church and the corporation meant that Utah-Idaho 
Sugar operated to benefi t the church and that the church 
used its infl uence to increase the profi ts of the sugar com-
pany. Others, such as Welliver, claimed that Smith used his 
power as Mormon president to set beet sugar prices and to 
ensure that western senators voted for tariffs that benefi ted 
Utah-Idaho Sugar.83
Smith, however, contended that he was no more than a 
fi gurehead as president of the company and that he had little 
real knowledge of how the sugar industry operated. He did 
not take an active interest in the day-to-day affairs of the cor-
poration, leaving that instead to Cutler. “Are you acquainted 
with any of the details of the business management of this 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.?” Representative Hardwick queried. 
“Very little,” Smith responded. He could not inform the com-
mittee about such things as the daily slicing capacity of Utah-
Idaho’s factories, the details behind Henry Havemeyer’s 
investment in the Utah Sugar Company, or even how he, him-
self, had become president of Utah-Idaho Sugar.84 Although 
some might claim that Smith was suffering from benefi cial 
amnesia, the minutes of the Utah Sugar Company and the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company indicate that he really did not 
take a large role in business discussions, deferring instead to 
82. “Testimony of Charles W. Nibley,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1092.
83. Welliver, “The Mormon Church and the Sugar Trust,” 86.
84. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1034, 1037–39.
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Cutler and other directors.85 Havemeyer too left most admin-
istrative matters to Cutler; his contact with Smith had been 
limited.86
As a staunch Republican and beet sugar man, however, 
Smith certainly advocated the maintenance of high tariffs to 
protect the industry. In response to inquiries by the Hard-
wick Committee, Smith declared that without a tariff “the 
great industry of beet raising and the manufacture of sugar 
in Utah and Idaho would, of course, cease.” Because cane 
manufacturers would be able to produce sugar at a reduced 
rate, Smith believed that Utah-Idaho Sugar would not be 
able to compete and make a profi t but for the tariff.87 Yet it is 
questionable that Smith had the ability to infl uence western 
senators outside of Utah on the tariff question, regardless of 
contentions that Mormons controlled the tariff decisions of 
politicians in Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Oregon, and Nevada. 
LDS populations existed in all of these states, but it is highly 
doubtful that the church exercised much political infl uence 
outside of Utah and perhaps southern Idaho. Indeed, well 
into the 1890s Mormons were not even allowed to vote or 
hold offi ce in Idaho.88 The situation improved after 1911,
but if LDS leaders could not infl uence Idaho senators and 
representatives to allow Mormons to vote, it is doubtful that 
they could convince such politicians to support the sugar tar-
iff solely for the sake of the LDS church.89 If western sena-
tors voted for a tariff, it was probably because they wanted to 
protect their own home industries and not because they felt 
85. “Notes from the Utah Sugar Company Minutes, 1900–1907,” Arrington Pa-
pers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 1.
86. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1057, 1062–63.
87. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, 1076–77.
88. Merle H. Wells, “Origins of Anti-Mormonism in Idaho, 1872–1880,” Pacifi c 
Northwest Quarterly 47 (October 1956): 116.
89. Even President Theodore Roosevelt disparaged the notion of Mormon political 
infl uence in areas such as Idaho and Wyoming. Responding to allegations that 
Smoot and other church leaders struck a bargain with Republicans to deliver 
electoral votes in Idaho and Wyoming during the 1908 presidential election, 
Roosevelt said, “Neither Senator Smoot nor any other citizen of Utah was, as far as 
I know, ever so much as consulted about the patronage in the States surrounding 
Utah.” See “Mr. Roosevelt to the Mormons,” Collier’s (April 15, 1911): 28.
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concern for the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company or the Mormons. 
As historian Thomas Alexander has argued, “That [Joseph F. 
Smith] controlled the votes of senators of six [western] states 
. . . was fantasy.”90
Yet Smith did have a clear infl uence on the sugar industry 
resulting from his position as president of the LDS church. 
Members were aware that Smith also served as president of 
Utah-Idaho Sugar; for example, whenever Utah agricultur-
ists had complaints about the way Utah-Idaho Sugar treated 
them, they did not go to the board of directors for relief, 
but to the church’s First Presidency.91 Smith had also served 
a fundraising mission for the Utah Sugar Company in the 
1890s and had declared in general conference that those 
who did not support that corporation might be Mormons 
but were not Saints. He refused to concede that the church 
used its infl uence on behalf of Utah-Idaho Sugar, claiming 
that the company’s business was completely separate from 
the church.92
The idea that his role as president of the church and the 
company did not infl uence Latter-day Saints to back the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company was simply not plausible. In 
addition, lower leaders in the church frequently told mem-
bers to support the corporation. Attorney Charles Patterson, 
a former bishop in the church who had, according to Smith, 
become a “‘Progressive’ of Socialistic tendencies,”93 for exam-
ple, claimed that bishops and scoutmasters had preached in 
church meetings that it was necessary for farmers to plant 
beets solely for Utah-Idaho Sugar. “When Presidents of 
90. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 80. Reed Smoot, however, a Mormon apos-
tle who also sat in the Senate, was decidedly pro-tariff. He had reached this 
position long before he became either an apostle or a senator, but he worked 
tirelessly in the Senate to maintain the sugar tariff. Merrill, Reed Smoot, 287. For 
a full discussion of Smoot’s tariff policies, see James B. Allen, “The Great Pro-
tectionist, Sen. Reed Smoot of Utah,” Utah Historical Quarterly 45 (Fall 1977):
325–45.
91. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 82.
92. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar Refi ning 
Company Hearings, 1042, 1057.
93. Joseph F. Smith to Senator Reed Smoot, December 31, 1915, Reed Smoot 
Papers, MSS 1187, box 49, folder 8, L. Tom Perry Special Collections and 
Archives, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
89
Before the Hardwick Committee of the House of Representatives
Stakes, bishops, high councilmen and others approach you 
in the capacity of sugar company hired men,” Patterson cau-
tioned LDS members, “it will help some if you forget every-
thing about them except that they are HIRED by the sugar 
company to boost for it.”94
After hearing testimony from Smith, Cutler, and Nibley, 
most members of the Hardwick Committee remained con-
vinced that Havemeyer, American Sugar, and Utah-Idaho 
Sugar had an inappropriate relationship and that their 
actions breached antitrust legislation. In a report issued in 
February 1912, Hardwick listed several transactions that 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. Among these was “the 
acquisition, by the American Sugar Refi ning Co., in 1901,
1902, and 1903, of one-half interest in ‘The Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co.’” In addition, the report charged that American 
Sugar’s holdings in Utah-Idaho contradicted the corpora-
tion’s claims that beet concerns were independent enter-
prises. Likewise, Hardwick condemned Utah-Idaho and 
other sugar corporations for stock watering. “The mania for 
overcapitalization seems to permeate the sugar industry in 
every direction,” he claimed, asserting that all beet sugar 
companies combined were overcapitalized at around $40
million.95
Hardwick’s fi ndings were not adopted unanimously. A 
supplementary report written by Representative Malby from 
New York offered a slightly different perspective. Malby most-
ly agreed with Hardwick, but could not concur with his con-
clusions that the American Sugar Refi ning Company had an 
improper relationship with beet sugar corporations. “I am 
unable to fi nd that the American Sugar Refi ning Co. has ever 
exercised or attempted to exercise any control over the man-
agement of the affairs of any such beet-sugar companies,” 
Malby declared. Instead, the testimony showed that each fi rm 
had been “managed and controlled entirely independent of 
the American and in wholesome competition therewith.” 
Because of this, Malby could not support the claim that beet 
94. C. G. Patterson, Cracking Nuts in Utah: Little Essays on Tender Subjects (Salt Lake 
City: n.p., 1922), 11.
95. House, American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others, 6, 25.
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sugar factories and American Sugar had violated the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.96
Malby’s contentions notwithstanding, the rest of the com-
mittee agreed with Hardwick’s report. Hardwick, however, 
did not recommend any action against either American Sugar 
or the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. The committee did not 
advocate breaking up American Sugar or issuing any penalties 
against it or any other corporation because most of the ille-
galities had taken place under the watch of Havemeyer, who 
was now dead. The current stockholders in American Sugar, 
numbering over eighteen thousand, had no way of informing 
themselves “defi nitely of the hazards into which he or she was 
buying,” and therefore should not be punished. Hardwick 
did suggest that the Sherman Act be “supplemented by legis-
lation that will make its provisions defi nite and certain, pro-
tect the consumer and investor from the evils of overcapi-
talization, and guarantee corporations from exploitation by 
their trusted offi cers and agents for their individual benefi t 
and profi t,” but he made no other recommendations.97 The 
committee was willing to let the government suit pending 
in New York handle any criminal charges against American 
Sugar.
The Hardwick Committee was mistaken in its belief that 
the government’s litigation would dissolve the sugar interest. 
On January 2, 1912, the federal court in New York City began 
taking testimony relative to American Sugar’s actions in the 
industry. Many of the issues explored were similar to ques-
tions asked by the Hardwick Committee, and many of the 
same people, including Thomas Cutler, testifi ed. On April 
3, 1915, the last of the pretrial depositions was taken, but 
the court postponed the actual trial until the U.S. Supreme 
Court had made a decision in an antitrust case against the 
International Harvester Company. Because of the outbreak 
of the First World War, the government settled its suit with 
International Harvester before the Supreme Court could 
96. House, American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others: Supplementary Report, 62d Cong., 
2d sess., 1912, H. Rept. 331 Part 2, serial 6135, 1–2.
97. House, American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others, 31–-32. See also “Committee 
Finds Monopoly in Sugar,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 18, 1912.
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rule. It was not until May 9, 1922, that American Sugar’s case 
was resolved. Under that settlement, the government issued a 
consent decree whereby the suit was dropped after American 
Sugar admitted past Sherman Act violations. Because Ameri-
can Sugar had sold off many of its holdings in other compa-
nies, including Utah-Idaho, by that time, no dissolution was 
recommended. As historian Alfred Eichner declared, the 
American Sugar Refi ning Company emerged from the 1910s
“scarred but still intact.”98
So did the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. The House of Rep-
resentatives had essentially accused the corporation of violat-
ing the Sherman Antitrust Act in its relations with American 
Sugar, of lining the pockets of its directors by overcapitalizing 
its stock, and of defrauding Utah and Idaho consumers by add-
ing nonexistent freight rates to its sugar prices, but no penal-
ties were levied. Yet to many observers, the hearings had pro-
vided congressional confi rmation that Mormon involvement 
in business was still strong and that LDS leaders were guilty 
of unseemly actions in their roles as Utah-Idaho authorities. 
Charles Patterson even stated at the end of the hearings that 
“the history of Standard Oil, or any other monopoly, reveals 
nothing so hateful, detestable or loathsome as does the his-
tory of our Utah sugar monopoly.” He continued, “when . . . 
the men . . . sustained [by Mormons] as leaders and in whom 
they have reposed confi dence bordering on the Divine, delib-
erately plan to exploit them in a temporal way, it is certainly 
time to raise the alarm.”99
In many ways, Utah-Idaho Sugar was the victim of nation-
al forces that it could not control. Rather than operating 
in a regional vacuum, the corporation now participated in 
national markets and had to follow national price trends and 
other practices. But its major problem, as both Patterson and 
98. Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly, 316–25; Jeremiah Jenks and Walter E. Clark, 
The Trust Problem, 5th ed. (Garden City, N.Y., 1929), 357; “Cutler Talks of Sugar 
Trust Suit,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 14, 1911; “Sugar Trust Files Answer 
to Charges,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 5, 1912. The 26 volumes of testimony 
relative to this suit are on fi le at the National Archives and Records Administra-
tion, Northeast Region, New York City, under the title United States v. American 
Sugar Refi ning Company, et al., File Equity 7–8.
99. Patterson, Business, Politics and Religion in Utah, 15.
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the Hardwick Committee implied, was that the LDS church 
and its leaders maintained their participation in a compa-
ny focused on maintaining profi tability for its investors. An 
ecclesiastical organization’s involvement in a profi t-making 
venture seemed disingenuous to many observers, especially 
since that organization exerted a large infl uence over the 
people to whom the enterprise marketed its product. Exac-
erbating the problem was that Utah-Idaho offi cials acted in 
collusion with the American Sugar Refi ning Company, a cor-
poration considered by many to be one of the most egregious 
trusts in the United States. To many observers, these condi-
tions proved that the LDS church was a snake in the sugar, 
ready, in the name of economic dominance, to bite anyone 
who intruded on its territory. LDS leaders insisted that there 
was no impropriety in their involvement in the sugar industry, 
but the evidence presented before the Hardwick Committee 
made that diffi cult to believe. Watever the case, it was clear 
that Utah-Idaho Sugar would face a stormy future as long as 
it appeared that Mormon offi cials were trying to profi t at the 
expense of their followers.
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National Sugar Policies and the 
First World War
Senator [Henry Cabot] Lodge: As to the matter of prices, 
there…has been an effort made to take the price of sugar 
in different forms out of the operation of the natural laws 
of supply and demand. . . .
Mr. [Herbert] Hoover: Yes; I considered that, when there 
was a short supply [of sugar] and practically a famine 
situation, the law of supply and demand was practically 
suspended as an economic practice, anyway.
—Shortage of Sugar, Senate hearings, 1918
In this crisis, this great war…some of these great industrial 
corporations place dividends before service. Ensconsed 
[sic] behind their mahogany desks and breathing only air 
that is loaded with the incense of dollars unrighteously 
wrung from the hands of toilers, the men managing these 
great enterprises have pulled down the blinds against the 
sunshine of democracy . . . THE FARMERS ARE ORGANIZING TO
WIN THE WAR AND AS THE LIGHT OF DEMOCRACY BREAKS OVER
THE BANKS OF THE RHINE AND ACROSS THE BALKANS IN EUROPE
SOME RAYS OF SUNSHINE ARE GOING TO PENETRATE BEHIND SOME
MAHOGANY DESKS IN AMERICA.
—Intermountain Association of Sugar Beet Growers, 1918
Chapter Four
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The Hardwick Committee hearings in 1911 and 1912indicated that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company had 
become much more than a regional concern and now oper-
ated in the national sugar market. The outbreak of the First 
World War in 1914 and the subsequent economic turmoil 
that it caused solidifi ed that perception. Utah-Idaho Sugar 
was drastically infl uenced by world and national trends in the 
sugar industry, and it also had to follow strict price control 
policies set by the federal government in order to forestall 
shortages and profi teering. At the same time, Charles Nibley, 
presiding bishop of the LDS church and a successful entre-
preneur, bought out the American Sugar Refi ning Compa-
ny’s interest in Utah-Idaho Sugar and assumed the position of 
largest stockholder. Naturally, Nibley wanted to see a return 
on his investment, and he pushed a large-scale advancement 
of Utah-Idaho’s territory while acting as an advisor to fed-
eral offi cials on beet sugar concerns. His actions ensured that 
Utah-Idaho would remain a national player, but it also caused 
some clashes with the federal government that would only 
increase after the war’s end.
The 1914 outbreak of war in Europe at fi rst presented 
increased economic opportunities to American business in 
general and the beet sugar industry in particular. Because of 
the war, several beet-producing countries, such as Germany, 
eliminated their sugar supply to the allies. Other nations, 
such as France, Belgium, and Italy, saw a marked decline in 
the number of beets produced because of wartime destruc-
tion. France’s sugar yield, for example, decreased from 
750,000 tons before the war to 210,000 tons during the con-
fl ict. Countries that had relied on European nations for sugar 
were forced to look elsewhere for the sweetener, and prices 
for the product began to rise. The greater demand for sugar 
by armies and civilians, combined with Europe’s decline in 
production, advanced sugar rates from less than four cents a 
pound to seven-and-a-quarter cents by the end of 1914.1
1. Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West: A History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company, 1891–1966 (Seattle, 1966), 82; Fred G. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar: Being 
A Story of the Romance and Development of Beet Sugar in the Rocky Mountain West
(Salt Lake City, 1944), 110–111; “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2,
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These higher prices signifi cantly affected the value of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company’s stock. The same certif-
icates that were worth $7 each in April 1914 jumped to 
$29 in November 1916.2 The increase had an especially 
signifi cant impact on Charles W. Nibley. Infl uenced by 
Hardwick’s condemnation of American Sugar stockhold-
ing in beet sugar corporations, the First Presidency of the 
LDS church authorized Nibley to purchase—on behalf of 
the religion—all Utah-Idaho stock held by American Sugar 
in May 1914. The church allowed Nibley to hold the stock 
in his own name, making Nibley the largest stockholder in 
Utah-Idaho Sugar and giving fi rm control of the company 
to LDS interests.3
When the price of sugar advanced not long after Nibley 
made his purchase, he obtained a considerable amount of 
money. Indeed, Utah-Idaho stock dividends increased from 
1.5 percent in the fi rst quarter of 1914 to 7 percent for the 
rest of the year.4 He later recalled with some exaggeration 
that “never in the history of the west . . . has such a large 
deal been turned and out of which so much money has been 
made by everybody concerned.” Nibley attributed his good 
fortune to “the blessing of the Lord,” and estimated that he 
1918, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures, Shortage of 
Sugar: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures, United 
States Senate, 65th Cong., 2d sess., 1918, 554–555 (hereafter referred to as 
Shortage of Sugar Hearings); William Clinton Mullendore, History of the United 
States Food Administration, 1917–1919 (Stanford, 1941), 168; Robert H. Wiebe, 
Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 
1962), 145.
2. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 83. See also Reed Smoot to Mr. N. B. Scott, May 
5, 1916, Reed Smoot Papers, MSS 1187, box 49, folder 8, L. Tom Perry Special 
Collections Library, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, 
Utah (hereafter cited as Smoot Papers).
3. Charles W. Nibley, “Facts Are Given About the Sugar Industry,” Salt Lake 
Tribune, June 25, 1916; Charles W. Nibley, Reminiscences (Salt Lake City, 1934),
128; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 80–81.
4. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, March 10, 1914” and “Minutes of 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1915,” Leonard J. Arrington Papers, 
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, MSS 1, box 10, folder 2, The 
Leonard J. Arrington Historical Archives, Special Collections and Archives, 
Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, Utah (hereafter referred to as 
Arrington Papers).
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“cleaned up a large amount . . ., running up to several million 
dollars.”5
But Nibley and other Utah-Idaho directors were not willing 
to sit on their profi ts. Instead, at Nibley’s urging, the compa-
ny began a period of unprecedented expansion, holding that 
it had a good opportunity to gain a larger share of America’s 
beet sugar market. From 1914 to 1918, it established new fac-
tories in Spanish Fork, West Jordan, and Brigham City, Utah; 
Yakima, Toppenish, and Sunnyside, Washington; and Shel-
ley, Idaho. In addition, it paid $100,000 for an interest in 
the Layton Sugar Company (an operation in northern Utah), 
and took over factories built by independent enterprises in 
Grants Pass, Oregon, and Fallon, Nevada.6
In the midst of such expansion, Joseph F. Smith gave a pos-
itive report of Utah-Idaho Sugar’s fi nancial status in 1915.
Relating how dismal the sugar industry had appeared in early 
1914 because of the passage of the Underwood-Simmons Tar-
iff (an act which lowered the duty on sugar imported into the 
United States), Smith commented that “the sudden outbreak 
of the war last summer changed conditions almost instanta-
neously. The results have been that sugar prices advanced all 
over the world,” enabling “the company . . . to pay the usual 
dividend of 7 per cent the past year.”7 As Nibley related, “is 
not the fact that the unlooked-for war turned what seemed a 
hazardous investment into a profi table enterprise?”8
But Utah-Idaho Sugar was not alone in trying to capitalize 
on the prices and strong markets created by the war. One 
5. Nibley, Reminiscences, 128.
6. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 83–86; Taylor, A Saga of Sugar, 110–11.
7. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1915,” Arrington Papers, box 
10, folder 2. Some anti-Mormons accused Utah-Idaho Sugar of masterminding 
the high prices of sugar in order to kidnap young women into polygamy. “It 
must not be forgotten that it is out of the unjust profi t extorted . . . from the 
general public,” one publication declared, “that the Mormon prophet and 
his polygamous compeers support their harems and fi nance the emissaries 
of their system who have gone abroad to inveigle the women of war-stricken 
homes to come to this country to keep up the polygamous establishment of 
Mormonism.” “Mormon Prophet Sugar Company,” Christian Statesman 51 (May 
1917): 228–29.
8. Nibley, “Facts Are Given About the Sugar Industry,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25,
1916.
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executive reported that “the prospects of the industry looked 
suffi ciently bright [during the war] to encourage indepen-
dent companies to organize and establish factories in various 
parts of the territory served by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany.”9 The People’s Sugar Company, for example, organized 
in 1917 and built a plant at Moroni, Utah, while the Delta 
Beet Sugar Company constructed one at Delta, Utah. Like-
wise, the Springville-Mapleton Sugar Company established a 
plant at Springville, Utah, in 1918, while the Beet Growers 
Sugar Company built a factory at Rigby, Idaho.10 Although 
directors in Utah-Idaho Sugar admitted that “this is a free 
country, and everyone is free to engage in any business that 
he may select,” they believed that building factories in their 
territory was a “malignant waste” because Utah-Idaho already 
adequately served the needs of the population.11
In 1916, however, Utah-Idaho Sugar had few concerns with 
outside fi rms, as money was fl owing into its coffers. The com-
pany decided to share some of its profi ts with its beet farm-
ers, distributing $65,000 among growers “as a bonus over 
the contract prices agreed upon.” Some farmers wanted the 
company to divide its profi ts by paying higher prices for beets 
rather than through bonuses, but Smith explained that such 
a raise would be hazardous to the corporation because the 
wartime prosperity might not last. In order to “protect itself 
at all points possible against a recurrence of adverse condi-
tions,” the corporation needed to “strengthen [its] reserves” 
and exercise “great care” in its monetary policies. “Should 
the time come when the industry can rely on a settled and 
defi nite policy on the part of the government,” Smith con-
cluded, “it will justify sugar companies in extending still fur-
ther recognition to the beet producers.”12
In the fall of 1916, heavy frosts destroyed much of the 
beet crop. Because of the cold temperatures, farmers for 
Utah-Idaho Sugar experienced disappointing results; those 
9. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar, 110–11.
10. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 86.
11. Nibley, “Facts Are Given About the Sugar Industry,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25, 1916.
12. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1916,” Arrington Papers, 
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
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beets that were harvested had low sugar content. However, 
since sugar continued to sell at high prices, Utah-Idaho 
“aid[ed] those who suffered most severely through inability to 
harvest their crops.” At the same time, due to continued agi-
tation on the part of some farmers and high profi ts, the com-
pany raised its beet prices from $5 to $7 a ton, “the highest 
rate ever before paid beet growers.”13 In comparison, the pre-
vious largest price raise for beets had occurred in 1912, when 
the corporation elevated rates by twenty-fi ve cents because of 
the “the most successful year in company history.”14
When the United States entered the First World War in April 
1917, sugar prices remained high because military demands 
for the product and for shipping led to shortages. In order to 
facilitate the production of sugar and to ensure that no cor-
poration made exorbitant profi ts from these conditions, the 
federal government set up agencies to regulate the nation’s 
sugar trade. Ideas stemming from the Progressive Movement 
validated government intervention in the economy, mak-
ing it easier for authorities to establish such institutions, but 
some politicians, such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge from 
Massachusetts, still voiced their concerns about government 
involvement in the economy, even in wartime.15
One of the most important organizations created to regulate 
the economy was the Food Administration. Congress autho-
rized this agency on August 10, 1917, under the Lever Food 
and Fuel Act, although preparations for it had begun in May 
1917.16 Herbert Hoover, its director, stated that the depart-
ment’s purpose was “to organize the service and self-denial of 
13. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1917,” Arrington Papers, 
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
14. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1912,” Arrington Papers, 
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
15. David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York, 
1980), 95, 97–98; Neil A. Wynn, From Progressivism to Prosperity: World War I 
and American Society (New York, 1986), 66; Roy G. Blakey, “Sugar Prices and 
Distribution Under Food Control,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 32 (August 
1918): 568; “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1918,” Arrington 
Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
16. “An Act To Provide Further for the National Security and Defense by 
Encouraging the Production, Conserving the Supply, and Controlling the 
Distribution of Food Products and Fuel” (40 Stat. 276).
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the American people so as to supply the Allies with foodstuffs 
during the war” and “to control, so far as its authority extend-
ed, the distribution of foodstuffs at home and to limit specula-
tion in them.”17 Because of shortages and skyrocketing prices, 
sugar became one of the main concerns of the administration. 
In June, Hoover summoned George Rolph, the manager of 
the California and Hawaiian Sugar Refi ning Company, to lead 
the proposed sugar department of the Food Administration. 
Rolph’s duties consisted of trying “to control the sugar situa-
tion, to eliminate speculation in sugar, to secure for the con-
sumer a fair and equitable price, and at the same time a fair 
price for the producer that would stimulate production.”18
Although Rolph’s job seemed fairly straightforward, he 
experienced numerous problems. For one thing, in the late 
summer of 1917, the sugar shortage in the United States 
worsened because of increased consumption by American 
consumers. For another, Rolph soon discovered that he did 
not have any real means of controlling prices.19 According 
to one economist, Rolph possessed the authority “to declare 
excessive profi ts extortionate,” but because both politicians 
and businessmen were wary of government control of the 
economy, he could take little action. On Hoover’s sugges-
tion, Rolph decided to try to persuade sugar producers to 
enter into “voluntary [price] agreements” with the government 
instead of attempting “to cure the trouble after the event by 
penalties.”20
To this end, Hoover and Rolph, realizing that the short-
age might advance sugar prices to twenty cents a pound, 
17. Quotation in Herbert Hoover, “Introduction,” in Mullendore, History of the Food 
Administration, 1917–1919, 3; see also Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution 
Under Food Control,” 573–74; Kennedy, Over Here, 117; Wynn, From Progressiv-
ism to Prosperity, 70. Although Mullendore’s book was not published until 1941,
Hoover had written his introduction in 1920, soon after his duties as food ad-
ministrator had ended.
18. “Testimony of Mr. George M. Rolph,” December 20, 1917, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 335; Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution Under Food Control,” 
574.
19. Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 169; “Sugar Famine 
Upon Country, Says Hoover,” Salt Lake Tribune, October 21, 1917.
20. Quotation in Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution Under Food Control,” 574;
see also Kennedy, Over Here, 118–20.
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invited representatives from several beet companies to come 
to Washington, D.C., in August 1917 and help set a ceiling 
on rates. Most corporations sent delegates to the meeting, 
including Utah-Idaho Sugar, represented by Charles Nib-
ley, who had recently replaced Thomas R. Cutler as gener-
al manager. Hoover and Rolph appealed to the patriotism 
of the manufacturers and asked them to pledge not to sell 
their sugar above what the two had determined to be a fair 
price: $6.75 per hundred pounds plus freight charges from 
seaboard points. Although some corporations could manu-
facture sugar for only four cents a pound, it cost others nearly 
seven cents, so $6.75 would mean a loss of money for some 
and a signifi cant profi t for others.21
Beet sugar representatives refused to accept the proposal, 
leading Rolph to suggest that they sell their sugar at $7 per 
hundred pounds or below. This, too, was rejected. Finally, 
after a month of negotiations, the manufacturers settled on 
$7.25 per hundred pounds plus freight charges from seaboard 
points. Senator Lodge and Senator James Reed from Missouri 
declared such action to be a deplorable form of price fi xing, 
but both Rolph and Hoover insisted that it was merely a vol-
untary compact between the government and the beet sugar 
companies. Rather than an example of government control, 
they declared, the agreement indicated the patriotism of the 
beet sugar industry during a time of crisis.22
The beet corporations also agreed to the creation of a 
federal sugar distributing committee which would deter-
mine where their product would be sold, thereby ensur-
ing that enough sugar would reach all areas of the United 
21. “Testimony of Mr. George M. Rolph,” December 20, 1917, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 338; “Beet Sugar People to Reduce Prices,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 
27, 1917; “Looks for Approval of Sugar Schedule,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 31,
1917; Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 171; Blakey, 
“Sugar Prices and Distribution Under Food Control,” 575. Cutler resigned as 
vice president and general manager of Utah-Idaho Sugar on May 28, 1917.
“Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, May 28, 1917,” Arrington Papers, Se-
ries 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
22. “Testimony of Mr. George M. Rolph,” December 20, 1917, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 338–46, 373; “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2, 1918,
Shortage of Sugar Hearings, 590–96; “Looks for Approval of Sugar Schedule,” 
Salt Lake Tribune, August 31, 1917; “Control of Sugar Starts October 1,” Salt
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States, not merely the trans-Mississippi West where most beet 
sugar was marketed. Representatives from a number of beet 
manufacturers, as well as several sugar brokers, composed 
this committee, including Stephen H. Love, sales agent for 
Utah-Idaho Sugar. According to economist Roy Blakey, the 
committee labored “to allot available sugar as fairly as pos-
sible to the dealers in the various localities” and to ensure 
that the product was “shipped from the factory [to areas] 
that will have the lowest freight rate to absorb.”23 Hoover 
hoped that the Sugar Distributing Committee would abol-
ish the “inequality” of distribution in the United States and 
alleviate acute sugar shortages in some regions such as the 
Northeast.24
By October 1917, the Food Administration had made sev-
eral efforts to ensure that American consumers had an ade-
quate supply of sugar at a reasonable price. Because of its 
price “agreement” with the beet sugar corporations, it had 
guaranteed that most companies would continue to receive 
at least some profi t from sugar. Because the Food Adminis-
tration had not required corporations to increase the price 
of beets, however, farmers claimed that they gained nothing 
by the arrangement; only sugar manufacturers benefi ted. 
Hoover himself admitted that the Food Administration had 
done little for farmers, but argued that because companies 
contracted with beet producers a year before the crop was har-
vested, there was little the administration could do to increase 
the 1917 price of beets. In response, many farmers declared 
that they would not plant beets in 1918 until the companies 
paid them more money for their crop.25 Nowhere was this 
Lake Tribune, September 12, 1917; “Sugar Producers to Decrease Prices,” Salt
Lake Tribune, September 21, 1917; Mullendore, History of the United States Food 
Administration, 171; Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution Under Food Con-
trol,” 575–76. For an example of the contract between the government and the 
companies, see “Exhibit No. 65: Agreement with United States Food Adminis-
tration,” Shortage of Sugar Hearings, 347.
23. Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution Under Food Control,” 576–77.
24. “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2, 1918, Shortage of Sugar Hearings, 
604.
25. “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2, 1918, Shortage of Sugar Hearings, 
590–91; “Testimony of C. G. Patterson,” December 22, 1917, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 523; “Beet Growers Will Seek Higher Prices,” Salt Lake 
Religion, Politics, and Sugar
102
relationship between beet farmer and sugar manufacturer 
more tense than in Utah.
In August 1917, Charles Patterson, the Mormon Salt Lake 
City attorney and excoriator of Utah-Idaho Sugar, formed the 
Intermountain Association of Sugar Beet Growers (IASBG) 
with a few other Utah residents to help farmers get higher 
prices for their beets.26 For several years prior to 1917, as we 
have seen, Patterson had actively worked to “expose” the busi-
ness practices of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. Although 
Patterson’s earliest political affi liations had been Republican, 
he had, according to Joseph F. Smith, become a “‘Progres-
sive’ of Socialistic tendencies” in the early 1910s. After this 
transformation, he had become a bitter enemy of the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company, charging its leaders with monopolis-
tic, illegal, and immoral conduct.27 His formation of IASBG, 
Cultivating sugar beets
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
Tribune, January 6, 1918; “Beet Men Protest 1918 Price for Crop,” Salt Lake 
Tribune, January 17, 1918.
26. “Beetgrowers Form Protective Society,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 26, 1917.
27. Joseph F. Smith to Senator Reed Smoot, December 31, 1915, Smoot Papers, 
box 49, folder 8. Despite his depictions of Joseph F. Smith, Charles Nibley, and 
Reed Smoot, Patterson, by his own admission, remained a believing Mormon.
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which worked to reveal the “plain, unvarnished truth” about 
the evil ways of Utah-Idaho Sugar, was consistent with his pre-
vious activities.28
When the IASBG was organized, its main complaint was 
that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company did not pay its farmers 
fair prices for their beets. Indeed, Utah-Idaho had a repu-
tation for paying as little as possible for the vegetable. Dur-
ing the Hardwick Committee’s investigation, for example, 
Hardwick asked Joseph F. Smith if it was true that “the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. pays less for its beets than almost any other 
beet-sugar company.” Although Smith denied this assertion, 
statistics proved otherwise.29 In 1916, for example, Utah-
Idaho only paid an average of $5.73 per ton for beets, the 
lowest amount among manufacturers in the American West. 
In 1917, it increased its price to $7.04 per ton, but this was 
still less than any other company. Recognizing this, the IASBG 
asked farmers to join with it to provide “justice, contentment 
and stability in the beet sugar business.”30
The IASBG believed it had an uphill battle to secure fair 
prices in Utah because, it claimed, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) worked for the benefi t of the sugar 
companies rather than the farmers. According to the asso-
ciation, the Farm Bureau and the county agent system, two 
new programs associated with the USDA, were especially 
guilty of siding with sugar manufacturers. The county agent 
system did not appear in the United States until 1910,
growing out of the extension services offered by state agri-
cultural colleges. In the late 1800s, these colleges set up 
programs to teach farmers about proper agricultural meth-
ods. When a boll weevil epidemic struck Texas cotton fi elds 
28. See Intermountain Association of Sugar Beet Growers [IASBG], Between the 
Millstones: The Arguments to the Jury in the Utah-Idaho Sugar Beet Case (The People 
are the Jury) (Salt Lake City, 1918), v.
29. “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, House Special Committee 
on the Investigation of the American Sugar Refi ning Co. and Others, Hearings
Held Before the Special Committee on the Investigation of the American Sugar Refi ning 
Co. and Others, 62 Cong., 1st sess., 1911, 1042 (hereafter referred to as American 
Sugar Refi ning Company Hearings).
30. Quotation in IASBG, Between the Millstones, iii–iv; see also Mullendore, History of 
the United States Food Administration, 177.
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in the early 1900s, Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson 
decided that extension programs were inadequate to solve 
the problem. He commissioned Dr. Seaman A. Knapp, one 
of his advisors, to fi nd a solution to the epidemic and to 
teach farmers about it “by doing rather than by telling.” 
When Knapp established a successful demonstration farm, 
Smith County, Texas, voted to provide “county funds to con-
tribute toward the salary of a demonstrator.” W. C. Stallings 
was appointed to that position, becoming the fi rst county 
agent in the United States. Other areas followed the Smith 
County example, and in 1912, “the fi rst federal funds defi -
nitely appropriated for county agent work in the North and 
West became available.” By 1915, over one thousand county 
agents labored in the United States, assuming the respon-
sibility of “going into a county, . . . to study its soils, crops, 
animals, men, women, children, [and] to . . . plan out bet-
ter ways” of farming.31
In order to convey their messages more effectively, and 
in order to enable agriculturists to learn from each other, 
county agents developed ways to bring farmers together in 
associations known as farm bureaus. Some of these alliances 
levied one to ten dollar annual membership fees and used 
the funds to pay county agents for their services. Because of 
these dues, many bureaus became organizations for wealthy 
farmers. As the 1910s progressed, city governments and 
state legislatures saw the bureaus as a more conservative 
way of organizing farmers than the radical associations of 
the late 1800s, such as the Grange, the Farmers’ Alliance, 
and the Populists. Several state legislatures subsequently 
enacted laws requiring the creation of a bureau before any 
state funding would be provided. In addition, the federal 
government passed the Smith-Lever Act in 1914, provid-
ing matching grants to states with farm bureaus supporting 
county agents. Thus, although farm bureaus were essentially 
independent organizations, they were approved by state and 
national governments and were inextricably connected with 
31. Quotations in Orville Merton Kile, The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades (Bal-
timore, Md., 1948), 24–36; see also Robert P. Howard, James P. Howard and the 
Farm Bureau (Ames, Ia., 1983), 71–77.
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the county agent system.32 As one publication argued, “The 
Farm Bureau is the board of directors, if you please, that 
limits and controls the activities of the county agent.”33
The First World War saw an explosion of both farm bureaus 
and county agents. Because Congress hoped to enlist agents 
to increase crop production throughout America, it passed 
a law providing more funding to the county agent system. 
The number of county agents subsequently increased from 
542 in July 1917 to 1,133 in June 1918, while the number 
of farm bureaus rose from 516 to 791.34 Because agents had 
connections to these “partisan, private farm organization[s] 
that [were] competing with other farm organizations for 
members,” they were sometimes condemned by agricultur-
ists not associated with farm bureaus.35 In Utah, for example, 
the IASBG disparaged the farm bureau and county agent sys-
tem, charging it with working only on behalf of the wealthy. 
Although the Utah Farm Bureau had promised everything to 
the farmer “except salvation after death” since its organization 
in December 1916, the IASBG claimed that the bureau had 
done nothing since that time to elevate beet prices. Instead 
of demanding increases from Utah-Idaho Sugar for the 1917
beet crop, the bureau merely asked the company to raise its 
price. The IASBG declared that the bureau “approached the 
company as the heathen approaches his idol; with fear, dread 
and veneration.” Although Utah-Idaho honored the request 
and began paying farmers $7 per ton, the IASBG was unwill-
ing to give the bureau any credit for the increase.36
Part of the reason for the association’s complaints was that 
the farm bureau was a competing organization that took 
members away from the IASBG. In addition, the IASBG did 
not believe that the bureau was radical enough in its demands, 
especially given the unique situation of the First World War. 
As America became more involved in the confl ict, discontent 
32. Samuel R. Berger, Dollar Harvest: The Story of the Farm Bureau (Lexington, Mass., 
1971), 91–93; Howard, James P. Howard and the Farm Bureau, 75–76; Kile, The
Farm Bureau Through Three Decades, 36–41; Kennedy, Over Here, 121.
33. IASBG, Between the Millstones, 18 (emphasis in the original).
34. Kile, The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades, 42; Kennedy, Over Here, 122.
35. Berger, Dollar Harvest, 113.
36. IASBG, Between the Millstones, 103–4.
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among farmers grew. Particularly galling to agriculturists 
was the Food Administration’s price-setting agreement with 
beet manufacturers. Many farmers, including those in Utah, 
claimed the $7.25 price set by the Food Administration 
allowed companies enormous profi ts, yet the administration 
had not forced any fi rm to raise its beet prices.37 Thus, in the 
fall of 1917, there was a general “insurrection . . . among the 
sugar beet growers of the West.” Even though some corpora-
tions had offered substantially more for 1918 beets, “many of 
the growers,” according to economist Roy Blakey, “claimed 
that they were insuffi cient [advances] and that they could not 
afford to plant the usual acreage, much less the increased 
acreage which was urged in the name of patriotism.”38
In order to present their position on sugar prices, farmers 
arrived in Washington, D.C., in the winter of 1917 and 1918
and testifi ed at hearings held before the Senate Committee 
on Manufactures on sugar shortages in the United States.39
Charles Patterson appeared on behalf of the IASBG. Pat-
terson, who admitted that he had never grown sugar beets, 
claimed that his organization represented “the sentiment of 
practically 90 per cent of the growers in Utah and Idaho.”40
He told the committee that Utah and Idaho farmers suffered 
from low beet prices because the two major sugar corpora-
tions in the region, Utah-Idaho Sugar and the Amalgamated 
Sugar Company (in which LDS leaders also held an interest), 
37. “The Secrets of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company—An Open Letter to the Beet 
Growers of the Intermountain Region,” Exhibit No. 130B, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 531.
38. Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution Under Food Control,” 584–85. See also 
“Salt Lake Growers of Beets Protest,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 25, 1917;
“Beet Growers Appeal from Sugar Prices,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 13,
1917; “Higher Prices Sought for Beets,” Salt Lake Tribune, January 19, 1918.
39. “Beet Sugar Growers to Appeal to Hoover,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 18,
1917.
40. “Testimony of C. G. Patterson,” December 22, 1917, Shortage of Sugar Hearings, 
521. Patterson’s claim might have been exaggerated. Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company offi cials told Herbert Hoover that the Intermountain Association did 
not “represent [all] beet growers.” Instead, it consisted of only a few “agitators.” 
The “majority” of farmers, Utah-Idaho asserted, expressed no dissatisfaction 
with the company’s payments. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company Jan. 3,
1917 to Jan. 3, 1920,” Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. 
Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
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worked in collusion to lower prices. The corporations had 
“divided” the beet-producing territory in Utah and Idaho 
between themselves, Patterson asserted, agreeing not to 
build competing factories in the same areas. Farmers had no 
recourse but to accept low prices for their beets.41
Patterson also declared that if Utah-Idaho and Amalgam-
ated Sugar did not give farmers more for their 1918 beets, 
agriculturists would refuse to plant the crop because it was 
more profi table to produce other things. “They have been 
losing for many years in growing sugar beets, suffering actual 
loss,” Patterson averred. Because the government had now 
set sugar prices at a level that would allow companies to reap 
large profi ts, beet farmers had decided to take a stand. “I have 
visited the farmers at their dumps, met them in meetings, and 
have spoken with them at their homes,” Patterson stated. “I 
have talked to hundreds of them, and I know from personal 
knowledge just exactly how they feel.” Patterson assured the 
Committee on Manufactures that Utah agriculturists were 
just as willing as any citizen to sacrifi ce for the good of the 
nation in wartime, “but they object positively to being called 
upon to make sacrifi ces for the benefi t of those corporations 
there that have exploited them for years and years.”42
The crux of Patterson’s argument was that because Utah-
Idaho manufactured sugar at a relatively cheap price, the 
$7.25 rate would allow it to make huge profi ts on every bag 
of sugar it sold. The company, however, contended that with 
41. “Testimony of C. G. Patterson,” December 22, 1917, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 520–22. Patterson accurately assessed the situation in Utah and 
Idaho. The LDS church largely controlled both Utah-Idaho and Amalgamated 
Sugar; Joseph F. Smith served as president of Utah-Idaho Sugar while Anthon 
H. Lund, a counselor to Smith in the LDS First Presidency, was the president 
of Amalgamated. In December 1916, the boards of directors of the two 
corporations had met and “agreed to divide their territory.” In addition, 
according to historian Thomas G. Alexander, “the companies agreed together 
at times on the setting of prices for beets and sugar.” Mormonism in Transition: 
A History of the Latter-day Saints, 1890–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1986), 82. Because of 
this situation, the Intermountain Association asked Hoover in September 1917
to investigate the lack of competition between the concerns, but nothing ever 
came from the request. “Hoover Asked to Investigate Sugar,” Salt Lake Tribune,
September 30, 1917.
42. “Testimony of C. G. Patterson,” December 22, 1917, Shortage of Sugar 
Hearings, 523–29.
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the $7.25 price, it could only get $1 per hundred pound bag 
profi t if it paid the farmers the agreed-upon $7 per ton price. 
It also insisted that at $7 per ton, farmers themselves made a 
profi t of about $2.50 per ton. Patterson and the IASBG dis-
puted that fi gure, insisting that it cost growers $9.59 to pro-
duce a ton of beets.43
These different profi t fi gures were major reasons why the 
Food Administration had failed to act on behalf of beet grow-
ers. “I fi nd an enormous confl ict of evidence on all sides 
about [the cost of manufacturing sugar],” Herbert Hoover 
declared. After farmers had appeared before the Senate 
Committee on Manufacturing, Hoover and Rolph decided to 
establish commissions to investigate beet prices in California, 
Colorado, and Nebraska, and these inquiries determined that 
the fi gures used by farmers were more accurate than those 
employed by beet corporations. The reports of these investi-
gations forced sugar companies in those three states to give 
farmers $10.00 per ton for the upcoming season.44
Inexplicably, no commission was appointed in Utah, outrag-
ing the IASBG, which claimed that Utah-Idaho Sugar controlled 
the state’s Food Administration. The association alleged that at 
the urging of Utah-Idaho’s directors, W. W. Armstrong, a Utah 
banker heading Utah’s administration, insisted that no inves-
tigating commission was needed in Utah. Instead, he “urged 
the settlement of the differences between the beet grower 
and the sugar manufacturer” without outside interference. 
Armstrong even distributed several circulars admonishing 
43. C. W. Nibley to The Farmers and Beet Growers of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany’s Territory, August 15, 1917, Exhibit No. 130B, Shortage of Sugar Hear-
ings, 532–33; “Sugar Profi ts Shared,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 17, 1917; “Higher 
Prices Sought for Beets,” Salt Lake Tribune, January 19, 1918. One of the reasons 
why Utah-Idaho Sugar was willing to share profi ts above $1 per bag was because 
of an excess-profi ts tax that Congress had enacted in March 1917 to raise more 
money for the war effort. Kennedy, Over Here, 107. Instead of having to pay taxes 
on profi ts above $1 per bag, Utah-Idaho offi cials proposed sharing their surplus 
with the farmer, thereby cementing their relationship with agriculturists while 
escaping some of the taxation levied by the federal government.
44. Quotation in “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2, 1918, Shortage 
of Sugar Hearings, 590–91; see also Blakey, “Sugar Prices and Distribution 
Under Food Control,” 584–86; Mullendore, History of the United States Food 
Administration, 175–76.
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farmers that it was their patriotic duty to grow sugar beets 
regardless of the prices set by the companies.45
Further, the IASBG charged, J. A. Brock, head of the sugar 
division of the Food Administration in Utah, reiterated Arm-
strong’s position in a farm bureau meeting held on Febru-
ary 10, 1918, telling the farmers in “a speech of a very excit-
ed character” that “you need not look for a commission.” 
Although it was Armstrong’s prerogative to decide whether 
a commission was needed in Utah, the IASBG believed that 
Utah-Idaho’s directors had instructed him to oppose a fed-
eral investigation of prices and that he had readily acquiesced 
to this demand. Since Armstrong was a banker, the associa-
tion argued, his interests naturally lay with any type of busi-
ness. When Armstrong declared a commission unnecessary, 
the matter was settled for most Utah farmers because they 
believed the food administrator had their interests at heart. 
The association concluded that “the prestige of Mr. Arm-
strong’s offi ce was sought and used by [Utah-Idaho Sugar] 
to subjugate the beet growers to their [sic] own selfi sh ends 
and uses.”46 It is diffi cult to substantiate the Intermountain 
Association’s charges because no records indicate any contact 
between Utah-Idaho’s directors and Armstrong and Brock, 
but, given the infl uence of the LDS church in the sugar busi-
ness, it is not unlikely that Armstrong was persuaded, either 
indirectly or directly, to take his stance.47
The IASBG also charged a conspiracy between Utah-Idaho 
Sugar and Utah’s county agents to maintain low beet prices. 
It accused county agent leader R. J. Evans, who had grown 
up in Lehi “in the atmosphere of that sugar factory town,” of 
45. These circulars were prepared by the Food Administration and sent out under 
Hoover’s signature. Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration,
175.
46. IASBG, Between the Millstones, 49–56, 61–62.
47. Armstrong and Brock may have believed that because of the federal government’s 
record of interference in Utah’s affairs, such as the 1858 military expedition 
sent out by President James Buchanan to quell a nonexisting rebellion in Utah 
and the legislation passed in the late nineteenth century to rid the state of 
polygamy, it was better for Utahns to deal with matters themselves. Armstrong 
stated that “we had always settled our differences among ourselves and . . . we 
should do so in this case.” IASBG, Between the Millstones, 55; “Plan To Increase 
Utah Beet Output,” Salt Lake Tribune, January 27, 1918.
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counseling his subordinates to side with Utah-Idaho in the 
price controversy. Evans attended the organizational meeting 
of the IASBG in August 1917 “at the suggestion of the offi cers 
of the sugar companies in Utah” and “was unsparing in his 
criticism of the movement to those with whom he talked.” 
After the association had been incorporated, Evans discussed 
with Utah-Idaho directors “how best to combat the said Inter-
mountain Association.”48
The IASBG accused Evans and his subordinates of prevent-
ing it from securing higher prices for farmers by alleging that 
it consisted of radicals who wanted to help Germany more 
than American farmers. The association insisted that at farm 
bureau meetings, county agents had prevented Patterson and 
other representatives from issuing resolutions against Utah-
Idaho Sugar, while also instructing farmers not to agitate for 
more money than the company was willing to give. Because of 
these actions, county agents and farm bureau representatives 
“nourishe[d] the vampire which has bled the people of Utah 
and Idaho to exhaustion.”49
The IASBG’s claims had kernels of truth. The agents and 
the bureau did actively work against the association, in part 
because they believed it was too extreme; wealthier farmers 
and businessmen generally formed farm bureaus “in reac-
tion to the spread of more radical farmer movements.” James 
Howard, the fi rst president of the American Farm Bureau, 
even claimed that the bureau stood “as a rock against radical-
ism.” As the Russian Revolution progressed in the late 1910s,
representatives of different bureaus tried to get farmers to 
join “in order to ‘stop bolshevism.’”50 Because bureau mem-
bers and county agents were largely “from the more progres-
sive and more prosperous class,” they were less inclined to 
rail harshly against businesses such as the Utah-Idaho.51
But, as with the charges against Armstrong, it is diffi -
cult to substantiate whether county agents intentionally 
48. IASBG, Between the Millstones, 88–91.
49. IASBG, Between the Millstones, 126–47.
50. Berger, Dollar Harvest, 93.
51. Quotation in Howard, James R. Howard and the Farm Bureau, 76–77; see also 
Kennedy, Over Here, 121.
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colluded with Utah-Idaho Sugar to maintain low beet pric-
es. What evidence does exist indicates that, at the very least, 
the IASBG had exaggerated its point. Many county agents 
were members of the LDS church, meaning that the abil-
ity of Utah-Idaho leaders to infl uence them was great, but 
most county agents considered themselves on the forefront 
of the battle for higher prices and took credit when Utah-
Idaho Sugar raised its rates. In a December 1920 report, for 
example, Joseph P. Welch, county agent for Utah County, 
claimed that because of “the unity of the local and County 
Farm Bureaus,” Utah-Idaho Sugar was forced to raise beet 
prices $1.00 per ton.52 Likewise, R. L. Wrigley, county agent 
for Cache County, reported in November 1918 that “the 
farm bureau takes credit for an increase in the price of 
beets from $7.00 to $10.00 per ton.”53 In addition, Robert 
H. Stewart, county agent for Box Elder County, argued in 
December 1918 that because the Box Elder Farm Bureau 
had compiled a “cost of production” sheet and represented 
the farmers in negotiations with Utah-Idaho, “the farm-
ers were more justly treated on beet prices by the Sugar 
Companies than ever before in the history of the sugar beet 
industry.”54
And there were increases. The price of sugar beets rose 
from $7 per ton to $9 per ton in 1918 and fi nally to $10
per ton in 1919. Whether this came because of the IAS-
BG’s work or that of county agents and the farm bureau is 
unclear, but both probably played a role. At a conference in 
Logan, Utah, in January 1918, for example, beet growers, 
both through the IASBG and the farm bureau, expressed 
their concern over beet prices and declared that “the farm-
ers and [the company] should share equally” in any profi ts. 
Other gatherings were held and resolutions denouncing 
52. Joseph P. Welch, “Annual Report of Agricultural Activities 1920, Utah County 
Farm Bureau, State of Utah,” 8–9, University Extension Service, Record Group 
[RG] 19.1/1:47, box 74, folder 4, Utah State University Archives, Special Collec-
tions and Archives, Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. 
53. R. L. Wrigley, “Annual Report of Cache County Farm Bureau, November 30,
1918,” 33, University Extension Service, RG 19.1/1:47, box 8, folder 2.
54. Robert H. Stewart, “Annual Report of County Agent, December 1, 1918,” 11–
12, University Extension Service, RG 19.1/1:47, box 3, folder 2.
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low prices were sent to Utah-Idaho’s directors who read and 
fi led them.55
Perhaps the largest factor in the increases, however, was 
the workings of the Food Administration on behalf of the 
farmer, emphasizing once again that Utah-Idaho Sugar was 
more concerned with national forces than with regional ones. 
Using statistics from the United States Tariff Commission and 
the Federal Trade Commission to determine the cost of pro-
ducing sugar, the Food Administration decided that most 
corporations could afford increases, even though some com-
panies disagreed.56 Charles Nibley and Senator Reed Smoot 
corresponded closely with Herbert Hoover during the early 
months of 1918 to resolve the price diffi culties, but at the 
same time, both Nibley and Smoot believed that the price 
of sugar would have to be raised if beet prices increased. 
Nibley asked Smoot to inform Hoover that if the sugar tariff 
were increased fi fty cents per one hundred pounds, it would 
allow Utah-Idaho Sugar to match the $10 per ton price of 
California, Colorado, and Nebraska manufacturers. “This, 
of course, would raise the price of sugar 50 cents,” Nibley 
admitted, “but the government would get ¾ of it back in the 
duty on Cuban and other foreign sugar.”57 Hoover rejected 
this idea, but assured Smoot “that the price of sugar [will be] 
fi xed high enough to allow a profi t to the Sugar Companies 
. . . no matter what price they fi nally decide the beet-growers 
should receive.” Smoot counseled Nibley to have faith that 
Hoover would look out for the manufacturer as well as the 
producer: “[Hoover] was at my home the other night and 
we spent a long time discussing this question.”58 Nibley took 
55. Quotation in “Sugar Beet Prices Not Yet Determined,” Salt Lake Tribune, Janu-
ary 22, 1918; see also “Beet Price of $9 Set At Conference,” Salt Lake Tribune,
January 25, 1918; “Utah-Idaho Board Approves $9 Beets,” Salt Lake Tribune,
January 30, 1918; “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company Jan. 3, 1917 to Jan. 
3, 1920,” Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, 
box 10, folder 2.
56. Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration, 176–77.
57. C. W. Nibley to Senator Reed Smoot, December 21, 1917, Smoot Papers, box 
41, folder 3. See also Smoot to Nibley, December 28, 1917.
58. Smoot to Nibley, January 8, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4. See also 
Harvard S. Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot (Salt Lake City, 
1997), 381.
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Smoot’s advice, and in April 1918, he, along with other sugar 
directors in the West, reluctantly agreed to pay farmers $10
per ton for their 1919 beets.59
The price advance created discontent among beet sugar 
companies, including Utah-Idaho Sugar. In an April 1918
report, Joseph F. Smith insisted that because of “fi xing of 
sugar prices by the government, and agitation for higher 
prices for beets,” Utah-Idaho Sugar had endured “the most 
strenuous of any [year] in our history.” Nibley agreed. “From 
an operating standpoint,” he declared, “the past season has 
been the worst in the history of the company.” Exactly why 
Smith and Nibley considered the year to be so poor is not 
entirely clear, as the company still provided 9 percent divi-
dends on its stock in both 1917 and 1918.60
Despite the high return on the company’s stock, Utah-
Idaho leaders continued to complain about the $10 beet price. 
Learning of this discontent, and also aware that some areas 
of the United States were not receiving adequate supplies of 
sugar, Hoover decided that more drastic measures would have 
to be taken. In his January 1918 testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Manufactures, Hoover had declared that if 
the Food Administration could purchase sugar directly from 
the factories and then offer it for sale at a set price, it would 
take care of the unequal distribution, the exorbitant profi ts 
that some sugar companies were making, and the problems 
that corporations had with the current prices. “If we had the 
right to buy the sugar, we could buy it from each factory at 
a proper ratio to his costs, and then, by putting all the sugar 
together, we could arrive at an average” price for the nation, 
Hoover proclaimed. Some senators, such as Henry Cabot 
Lodge, blanched at this appeal for government control, but 
Hoover insisted that extraordinary war conditions called for 
the unusual measure.61
59. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company Jan. 3, 1917 to Jan. 3, 1920,” Ar-
rington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 
2.
60. As quoted in “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, April 10, 1918,” Arrington 
Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
61. “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2, 1918, Shortage of Sugar Hearings, 
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Hoover resumed his pleas for more stringent control in 
May 1918. He recognized early that year that there were two 
problems with sugar that the Food Administration, as con-
structed, could not solve. The fi rst was the price of sugar 
to the consumer and the second was the distribution of 
the sugar supply. Because of different costs of production, 
Hoover realized that cane sugar refi ners needed to sell their 
Senator Reed Smoot
Special Collections and Archives,
Utah State University
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sugar at 8.5 cents per pound to maintain a profi t, while beet 
sugar producers required 9 cents. Louisiana cane producers, 
meanwhile, failed to earn a profi t unless their sugar sold for 
at least 10 cents a pound. At the same time, another sugar 
shortage seemed imminent because of continued distribution 
problems and increased consumption by American consum-
ers. In order to regulate more effectively the amount of sugar 
consumed and distributed in the United States, and in order 
to ensure that all manufacturers received a fair price for their 
sugar, Hoover proposed the creation of a federal corporation 
to regulate the industry. President Woodrow Wilson, using 
his emergency war powers, subsequently provided $5 million 
for the establishment of the Sugar Equalization Board (SEB), 
formed by a presidential proclamation on July 11, 1918.62
According to the U.S. Senate, the SEB had the power “to 
purchase, or otherwise acquire, manufacture, sell, dispose 
of, store, handle, and deal in raw and refi ned cane and beet 
sugar.” Using this authority, the SEB bought the 1919 Cuban 
sugar crop and “arranged with the beet-sugar producers of 
the United States and Louisiana cane-sugar producers to take 
their product at a compensatory price.”63 The SEB, whose 
members included Hoover and Rolph, negotiated with indi-
vidual beet sugar companies in the summer of 1918 to buy 
their product. In July, representatives of approximately 90 per-
cent of the beet corporations in the United States proposed 
that the SEB buy their sugar for at least $9 per 100 pound bag 
in order to compensate them for the $10 per ton that they 
paid farmers for beets. Rolph refused the proposition, so the 
manufacturers appointed a three-person committee, includ-
ing Nibley, to present their case before the entire board.64
On August 9, 1918, the committee explained the beet 
sugar manufacturers’ position to the SEB, but did not men-
tion the $9 per hundred pound price that the representatives 
of the sugar corporations had requested. Instead, infl uenced 
62. Joshua Bernhardt, “Government Control of Sugar During the War,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 33 (August 1919): 684–90, 693–94; Mullendore, History of 
the United States Food Administration, 178–79.
63. Senate, Sugar Shortage, 66th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 286, 1919, serial 7590, 1–2.
64. Nibley to Smoot, August 14, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
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by Nibley’s ideas, the committee proposed that the board 
increase the price of beet sugar to $11 per hundred pounds. 
If the board would do this, the beet sugar companies could 
give the farmers $15 per ton for their beets, “the entire 
increase of $5.00 over the present price . . . to go direct to 
the farmer, not a cent of it to be paid to the manufacturers.” 
The committee believed that such a price would increase the 
sugar production of the United States by more than fi ve hun-
dred million pounds. The SEB requested time to think about 
the proposal.65
For the next few weeks, Nibley pressured Smoot to keep 
in close contact with Hoover about the price of beet sugar. 
“Everywhere our farmers are asking: ‘What price are we going 
to get for our beets next year,’” Nibley wrote the senator, 
“and we are unable to tell them.”66 He worried that farmers 
would begin to plant other crops. Hoover needed to make a 
decision quickly, but he wanted to reach an agreement with 
the Cuban cane sugar producers before he set the price of 
beet sugar. “He fully understands the urgency in the matter,” 
Smoot assured Nibley, “and just as soon as the price is fi xed 
for Cuban sugar he will take [up] the question of the price 
of beets.”67
Finally, during the fi rst week of September, Hoover 
informed Smoot that neither he nor the SEB could accept 
the proposal that the price of sugar be raised $2 per hundred 
pounds in order to provide farmers with $15 beets. For one 
thing, Hoover wondered whether the war might end “before 
the sugar was manufactured from the $15 beets.” Since no 
one knew what would happen to the SEB or the Food Admin-
istration at the war’s conclusion, Hoover could not guarantee 
that beet sugar companies would get enough money for their 
sugar.68 Hoover did agree, however, to the original offer to 
buy beet sugar for $9 per hundred pounds, and he also coun-
seled the beet companies “to do everything in their power 
65. Quotation in Nibley to Smoot, August 14, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 
4; see also Nibley to Smoot, August 22, 1918.
66. Nibley to Smoot, August 24, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
67. Smoot to Nibley, August 28, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
68. Smoot to Nibley, September 8, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
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to increase the sugar product for 1919.”69 In order to fulfi ll 
Hoover’s request, Nibley and Utah-Idaho Sugar decided to 
raise their beet prices to $12.50 per ton and rely on Hoover 
“to treat us fairly and reimburse us for the extra amount” if 
the war continued. If the war ended, Nibley believed that 
“sugar will go considerably higher than $10.00 per bag,” 
ensuring that no matter what happened, Utah-Idaho would 
earn a profi t.70
Although Nibley appeared genuine in his wish for farmers 
to receive a fair payment for their product—at least as long as 
the corporation could continue to make a profi t—his motives 
were not entirely benign.71 Nibley knew that increased prices 
enabled farmers to plant more beets, thereby providing the 
company with more sugar to sell. He also wanted to enhance 
the political career of his friend and fellow Republican, Reed 
Smoot. “If we succeed in getting this raise for the farmers 
it will mean very much to this state and Idaho also,” Nibley 
declared, telling Smoot that “you should be publicly given 
credit for a great deal of the results.” Smoot’s improved stand-
ing among Utah farmers would help his chances for reelec-
tion in 1920.72 Finally, Nibley may have realized that his $11
per bag proposal would make the manufacturers’ original 
proposition of $9 per bag seem conservative, virtually guaran-
teeing that Hoover and the SEB would accept the fi rst offer.
Whatever Nibley’s motives, the SEB’s ability to purchase and 
market sugar clearly benefi ted farmers, sugar manufacturers, 
and consumers, including Utah-Idaho. The policy provided 
beet sugar companies with enough money to increase prices 
to their producers, but it also kept the cost of sugar down for 
the consumer. After purchasing sugar from beet corporations, 
Cuban producers, and Louisiana cane sugar manufacturers, 
all at different prices, the SEB resold the sugar at nine cents 
per pound and absorbed its losses (since it bought some of 
the sugar at a higher price) with the $5 million provided by 
President Wilson at its incorporation. The SEB divided the 
69. Nibley to Smoot, September 25, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4
70. Nibley to Smoot, September 25, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
71. See Nibley to Smoot, August 22, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
72. Nibley to Smoot, August 28, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
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nation into zones of distribution and authorized “the nearest 
and most effective sources of supply” to furnish each section 
with sugar. It therefore created “a rigorous yet elastic control 
over sugar consumption and distribution.”73 Once the war 
ended in November 1918, most politicians were reluctant 
to retain government control, but during the war, the SEB 
worked effectively with sugar companies and enabled them 
to maintain their profi ts.
Sugar corporations cooperated on other national issues, 
too, including working with the U.S. Department of Labor to 
guarantee that beet farms would have an adequate labor pool 
to produce their crop. Cultivating beets required arduous 
hand labor, such as thinning beet plants, harvesting the crop, 
and topping the beets. Unlike other farmers, Mormon agri-
culturists largely relied on their own families to provide the 
necessary labor, with sons and daughters working alongside 
fathers and mothers in the fi elds.74 After the United States 
became involved in the First World War, however, drafting 
young males created a labor shortage for Utah and Idaho 
farmers, persuading many growers to turn to other crops.
In order to remedy the manpower shortage, Utah-Idaho 
Sugar developed several different plans. In the summer of 
1917, Simon Bamberger, governor of Utah, proposed to Sec-
retary of War Newton D. Baker that “ten thousand German 
prisoners of war” held “somewhere in Europe” be imported 
to the United States and used as laborers on Utah farms.75 In 
January 1918, Nibley echoed Bamberger’s plan, requesting 
that the War Department authorize German prisoners of war 
interned in America to work on beet farms. “It would help 
to relieve the farmers of the terrible strain they are under to 
secure such help,” Nibley argued, “and would increase the 
planting of beet acreage wonderfully.” In addition, Nibley 
wondered whether American troops at Fort Douglas, Utah, 
73. Bernhardt, “Government Control of Sugar During the War,” 698, 708.
74. See “Testimony of Mr. Joseph F. Smith,” June 27, 1911, American Sugar 
Refi ning Company Hearings, 1065; Congressional Record, 63d Cong., 1st sess., 
50, pt. 4:3505.
75. “10,000 German Prisoners May Farm Utah Land,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 7,
1917.
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and Fort Lewis, Washington, could be used as laborers. These 
military establishments contained “several thousand men 
that could be used for this work without any injury at all to 
the men or to the work they are training for.” Refl ecting the 
outlook of many Americans toward Germany, Nibley hinted 
that these “American” boys would be preferable to any Ger-
man workers.76
Acting on behalf of Nibley, Senator Smoot proposed these 
strategies to Provost Marshal General Enoch H. Crowder, 
who rejected both suggestions because German prisoners 
had already refused to work on farms in Maine and because 
“under existing laws it was impossible to grant a furlough to 
enlisted men of the Army without pay and allowances.” Yet 
Crowder seemed open to the idea of supplying labor to farm-
ers, and he, along with other War Department offi cials, asked 
Congress to introduce a measure authorizing the secretary of 
war to grant the necessary furloughs.77 Because of the demand 
for troops in Europe—not to mention the view that beet fi eld 
labor was beneath Anglo-Saxons—the law never passed.
Another source of labor arrived on May 23, 1917, when 
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson issued an order allow-
ing the importation of Mexican laborers for use on American 
farms. Beet producers in California and Colorado had long 
relied on such workers, but in 1917 and 1918 they became 
important to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company as well. The 
corporation began actively recruiting Mexicans, although 
Nibley complained about the costs of importing and support-
ing these immigrants. Regardless, the company brought in 
approximately two thousand Mexicans from April 1917 to 
April 1918 to assist Utah and Idaho farmers who had been 
crippled by the draft.78
Because Mexican workers became essential to Utah-Idaho 
Sugar, the corporation was concerned in December 1918
when the Department of Labor, worried about jobs for return-
ing soldiers, issued a proclamation that Mexicans would no 
76. Nibley to Smoot, January 16, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
77. Smoot to Nibley, January 24, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
78. United States Sugar Manufacturers Association [Palmer and Oxnard] to The 
Secretary of Labor, December 28, 1918.
Topping sugar beets, a laborious process
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
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longer be allowed to enter the United States to work. Nibley 
immediately wrote to Smoot and asked him to persuade the 
secretary of labor that Mexican workers were essential to the 
beet sugar industry, especially since most American soldiers 
were still in Europe. In addition, Truman G. Palmer and 
Henry T. Oxnard of the United States Sugar Manufacturers 
Association wrote to Secretary Wilson, outlining the reasons 
why Mexican laborers were still needed. Palmer and Oxnard 
argued that if immigration were eliminated, it would reduce 
the beet production of California alone by one hundred 
thousand tons, thereby creating another sugar shortage and 
increasing prices to the consumer. Likewise, sugar companies 
had already stipulated in their contracts with beet growers 
that necessary labor would be provided for the 1919 beet sea-
son. Unless Mexican immigrants were allowed to execute the 
“arduous, back-aching work, which they are capable and will-
ing to perform,” many corporations, which had “done their 
best to meet the requirements of the Government” through-
out the war, would experience “grave fi nancial injury.”79
These pronouncements had the desired effect, and on 
January 2, Secretary Wilson issued an order that Mexicans 
would be permitted to immigrate until June 30, 1919, but 
only if their purpose was to work in the production of sugar 
beets.80 Smoot assured sugar manufacturers that if they still 
needed Mexican workers after June 30, “there will be no ques-
tion about the extension of the time.”81 Because of Smoot’s 
work on behalf of the industry, Merrill Nibley, vice president 
of Utah-Idaho Sugar and Charles’s son, thanked the senator 
profusely “for the interest you have taken in the matter.”82
Unfortunately, the federal government soon charged 
79. United States Sugar Manufacturers Association [Truman G. Palmer and Henry 
T. Oxnard] to The Secretary of Labor, December 28, 1918.
80. W. B. Wilson to the Assistant Secretary and the Acting Secretary of Labor and 
the Commissioner-General of Immigration, January 3, 1919, Smoot Papers, 
box 41, folder 5.
81. Smoot to Hon. John D. Spreckles, January 2, 1919, Smoot Papers, box 41,
folder 5.
82. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company [Merrill Nibley] to Smoot, January 8, 1919, Smoot 
Papers, box 41, folder 5. See also The Amalgamated Sugar Company [Fred 
Taylor] to Smoot, January 14, 1919, ibid.
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Utah-Idaho Sugar with mistreating these workers. Trouble 
arose on January 17, 1919, when Ralph W. Adair, a prosecuting 
attorney for the Department of Labor, reported that in 1918,
Utah-Idaho Sugar had imported a “large number of Mexican 
laborers and families” into Blackfoot, Idaho, and promised 
them “work and subsistence” even after the beet harvest had 
ended. Adair accused the company of refusing “to provide 
fuel or food,” causing pronounced suffering among the work-
ers and their families and forcing Bingham County, Idaho, to 
care “for hundreds of Mexicans at large expense.” Instead of 
demanding that Utah-Idaho Sugar honor its contracts, Adair 
suggested that the workers “be deported at once.”83
Having received a telegram from the commissioner general 
of immigration explaining that its labor supply faced expul-
sion, Utah-Idaho’s directors sent F. A. Caine, their superin-
tendent of labor, to meet with Bingham County offi cials and 
Adair. Caine discovered that county offi cials had contacted 
Adair after Father Gresl, a Catholic priest in Blackfoot, told 
them “that a great number of Mexicans there were in desti-
tute circumstances and appealed to the county commission-
ers for assistance in their behalf.” The commissioners then 
informed Adair of the situation, and he wired U.S. Repre-
sentative Addison T. Smith of Idaho, describing the predica-
ment. However, Adair had not conducted his own investiga-
tion of the matter before sending the telegram to Smith, nor 
had he asked Utah-Idaho Sugar for its explanation.84
After Adair telegrammed Smith, the county issued one 
thousand pounds of fl our and several tons of coal to Father 
Gresl, with instructions to deliver them to those Mexican 
workers in need. The priest distributed only fi ve hundred 
pounds because he found that “the conditions were not 
nearly so bad as he had fi rst thought.” Soon after, Caine began 
his own investigation. He related to his employers that only 
forty-fi ve men were out of work, and that they had all been 
offered jobs on the local railroad after they had completed 
83. Ralph W. Adair to [Addison T. Smith], January 17, 1919, Smoot Papers, box 
41, folder 5.
84. F. A. Caine to Merrill Nibley, January 25, 1919, Smoot Papers, box 34, folder 5.
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the beet harvest. In addition, Utah-Idaho Sugar had supplied 
$165.60 to sixteen families “whose condition seemed to war-
rant receiving some assistance,” while also providing “a great 
deal of fuel,” although he never specifi ed how much “a great 
deal” was. Thus, Caine wrote Merrill Nibley, “the statement 
that our Company has refused to furnish fuel and food is not 
based on the facts in the case.” Caine confronted the county 
commissioners and Adair with his fi ndings, and, without try-
ing to substantiate Caine’s claims, they “admitted that their 
previous action had been hasty and uncalled for.” Adair tele-
grammed the commissioner general of immigration that the 
county was recalling its complaint, and the workers were not 
deported.85
Extant records do not explain whether Adair really did 
overreact or whether Caine merely whitewashed the matter, 
but if Utah-Idaho Sugar was like most sugar concerns in the 
early twentieth century, the chances are that the Mexican 
workers were in poorer shape than Caine admitted. Cane 
sugar concerns, such as those in Louisiana as well as in the 
Caribbean and Latin America, were notorious for abusing 
their workforce in order to keep profi ts high. Most beet grow-
ers were no less culpable, relying on migratory labor for their 
workforce since the early 1900s. One observer in the 1930s
described the conditions of these laborers:
It lives in material poverty. To a large extent indis-
pensable, nevertheless it is commonly exploited . . . . 
It slips through stable and often rich communities of 
which it is never an accepted part . . . . It migrates 
reluctantly, seeking a foothold on the land, which it 
seldom gains.86
Likewise, in 1949, the Rocky Mountain Council on Inter-
American Affairs published a report stating that whites por-
trayed these Mexican laborers in derogatory terms, such as 
lazy, indolent, lawless, violent, and a “menace.” At the same 
85. Caine to Nibley, January 25, 1919.
86. Paul S. Taylor, “Migratory Farm Labor in the United States,” Monthly Labor 
Review 44 (March 1937): 537.
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time, they regarded Mexicans as perfectly suited for migra-
tory labor because they were “migratory in their nature.” 
Although some sugar companies attempted to alleviate the 
conditions of their imported laborers by providing housing, 
giving them employment, and “printing materials in Span-
ish,” the attitudes expressed by many of their directors and 
employees still exuded racism.87
These racist and condescending perceptions were seen 
in Caine’s report on the condition of the laborers. He 
informed Nibley that “if there [was] any case of destitu-
tion” in Bingham County, “it must be blamed on . . . the 
Mexicans themselves, as our Company has made every pos-
sible effort to supply [them] with work.” Caine also con-
demned the laborers for trying “to appeal to the sympa-
thy of the community by making out that they were mis-
treated.” Even Adair and the county commissioners refused 
to reproach Utah-Idaho Sugar directly. If the allegations 
of mistreatment were true, they advocated deporting the 
Mexicans rather than punishing the company, indicating 
that the commissioners themselves regarded the workers as 
somehow at fault. Although Caine claimed that Utah-Idaho 
Sugar treated Mexican immigrants “far better than any peo-
ple of their nationality have ever been treated in the state 
of Idaho,” it was clear that his claims had to be taken with 
a grain of salt.88
While Utah-Idaho’s treatment of Mexican laborers typifi ed 
many of the problems that Mexicans faced in the beet fi elds, 
it also revealed that the company was becoming further inte-
grated into national beet sugar policies. Utah and Idaho beet 
sugar concerns had largely avoided using migratory labor 
in the past, mainly because Mormon families had suffi cient 
numbers of children to supply adequate labor. But as the 
draft took potential laborers away, and as other beet concerns 
87. Rocky Mountain Council on Inter-American Affairs, When Different Cultures 
Meet: An Analysis and Interpretation of Some Problems Arising When People of Spanish 
and North European Cultures Attempt to Live Together (Denver, 1949), 8–11. See 
also Jorge Iber, Hispanics in Mormon Zion, 1912–1999 (College Station, Tex., 
2000), 8–9.
88. Caine to Nibley, January 25, 1919.
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advocated the importation of workers, Utah-Idaho leaders 
enthusiastically supported the plan. Thereafter, migratory 
labor, largely at the hands of Japanese and Mexican workers, 
would maintain a larger presence in Utah and Idaho beet 
sugar fi elds.
The First World War had many consequences, then, both 
indirect and direct, on the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. In 
the fi rst years of the confl ict, the war provided directors with 
huge profi ts because of the increased price of sugar. This 
money in turn fueled an expansion of factory construction 
unprecedented in the company’s existence. Another impor-
tant effect was how the war enmeshed the corporation in 
the national sugar market. Nibley emerged from the First 
World War as an important beet sugar player because of his 
roles on advisory committees helping Herbert Hoover and 
the Food Administration set policies for the industry. Yet 
the war did not just provide positive benefi ts. It produced a 
price war between Utah-Idaho Sugar and farmers over beet 
prices. It also created a labor shortage rectifi ed only by the 
exploitation of Mexican laborers. In both of these instances, 
Utah-Idaho leaders, who also served as LDS offi cials, faced 
embarrassing publicity about the conduct of their business 
and its effects on individuals, many of whom were members 
of the church.
The war also caused Utah-Idaho Sugar to experience 
national constraints such as price controls, affecting how 
much remuneration it could receive for its product. But 
Utah-Idaho leaders such as Nibley and Smith were willing to 
accept such restrictions, in part because they believed that 
the SEB and the Food Administration would ultimately give 
them “a square deal” in regard to sugar prices.89 Corporate 
offi cers expressed some discontent with the policies—at 
times Nibley referred to Hoover as the “food dictator”90—but
as Nibley informed a congregation of Mormons in 1917, the 
company believed that it had a patriotic duty to “willingly” 
follow government proscriptions “and compl[y] with them 
89. Nibley to Smoot, September 25, 1918, Smoot Papers, box 41, folder 4.
90. See, for example, Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 365.
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in every particular.”91 This cooperation led some observ-
ers, such as Charles Patterson, to accuse sugar interests of 
manipulating the federal government for their own interests. 
“Monster business organizations” such as Utah-Idaho Sugar 
had “reached into the government and [had] shaped leg-
islation that would favor them in their exploiting policies,” 
Patterson charged.92 Yet in 1919 and 1920, Utah-Idaho Sugar 
would fi nd itself on the opposite side of the federal govern-
ment. In these instances, the company and the government 
would not work hand in hand, but would battle over the issue 
of reasonable prices and the freedom of businesses to pursue 
the effects of supply and demand.
91. Bishop Charles W. Nibley, Eighty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, April 8, 1917 (Salt Lake City, 1918), 144–145. Nibley 
also showed his patriotism for the war effort by purchasing $100,000 of Liberty 
Loan bonds. “Nibley Subscribes $100,000 To Loan,” Salt Lake Tribune, October 
6, 1917.
92. IASBG, Between the Millstones, 206. Historian Robert Wiebe has explained 
additional ways that business learned to cooperate with economic regulation in 
Businessmen and Reform, while Gabriel Kolko outlined how business appropriated 
government regulation from 1900 to 1916 in The Triumph of Conservatism: 
A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900–1916 (New York, 1963; reprint, 
Chicago, 1967). Martin J. Sklar also explored how business became overseers 
of regulation in The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916: 
The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge, 1988).
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Chapter Five
Political and Legal Troubles in the 
Aftermath of the First World War
The Wilson Administration was active in trying to keep 
the price of beet sugar at about ten cents per pound, when 
it was allowing cane sugar from every part of the world 
to be sold in our market freely at from twenty to twenty-
fi ve cents a pound. When our company, the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company, had stood this about as long as it could, 
it announced it would sell the remainder of its product 
at the market rates, the same as it had always done for 
thirty years. For this action our offi cers and directors were 
indicted by the United States Grand Jury and we were put 
to endless trouble and expense and held up to ridicule and 
scorn for simply doing that which practically everybody 
else in the sugar business was doing, namely, selling at 
the market price.
—Charles W. Nibley, 1921
In 1920, the federal government and the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company clashed because of an unstable sugar mar-
ket created by the cessation of the First World War. When the 
United States entered the war in 1917, the federal govern-
ment, through the Food Administration and the Sugar Equal-
ization Board, established price controls over sugar in order 
to prevent profi teering by manufacturers. Most sugar corpo-
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rations, including the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, followed 
the policy. However, after the war ended, the government 
retained the proscriptions in peacetime in order to counter-
act existing sugar shortages and to keep prices low. Forced 
to take a cut in its potential profi ts because of these controls, 
Utah-Idaho Sugar, along with other fi rms, abandoned the 
regulations. Therefore, in 1920, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice and several federal grand juries issued over thirty indict-
ments against Utah-Idaho’s directors. The charges accused 
the company of selling sugar for excessive profi ts, but Utah-
Idaho offi cials claimed they had acted only to decrease the 
profi t margin of speculators depleting the supply of cheap 
beet sugar in the American West. Republicans Reed Smoot 
and Charles Nibley, together with William Wattis, a candi-
date for Utah’s governorship, declared that the indictments 
stemmed from political motivation and trickery by Democrat-
ic politicians in Utah. Whatever the explanation, the indict-
ments, coupled with a 1920 collapse in sugar prices, adversely 
affected Utah-Idaho Sugar and edged it perilously close to 
bankruptcy.
To historians examining the indictments today, the legal 
troubles also illustrate the economic and political problems 
that ensued in the years immediately following the First World 
War, as business and the American government eased back 
into peacetime conditions. In addition, they highlight how 
national market forces affected Utah-Idaho Sugar and could 
be used to justify questionable actions; how deeply ingrained 
the concept of profi t had become to Nibley and other Utah-
Idaho leaders, even at the expense of their community; how 
church leadership continued to use its infl uence on behalf of 
Utah-Idaho Sugar; and how continued church involvement in 
the for-profi t enterprise led to some embarrassing results.1
The confl icts with the Department of Justice over 
peacetime sugar regulations formed another chapter in 
1. Although the 1920 indictments are an interesting and integral part of the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company’s past, they are not discussed in the corpora-
tion’s two “offi cial” histories: Leonard J. Arrington’s Beet Sugar in the West: A 
History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1891–1966 (Seattle, 1966) and Fred 
G. Taylor’s A Saga of Sugar, Being A Story of the Romance and Development of Beet 
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Utah-Idaho Sugar’s evolving relationship with the federal 
government in the 1910s. Although Nibley and Utah-Idaho 
Sugar had proclaimed it their patriotic duty to follow the reg-
ulations established by the SEB in the sale of sugar during 
the war, it was unclear how they would react if controls con-
tinued after the end of the confl ict. Indeed, when the war 
ended in November 1918, few government offi cials or sugar 
magnates expected the SEB to continue its wartime respon-
sibilities. Because the government wanted to demobilize “all 
war organizations” and remove “government restraints upon 
business enterprise,” the sugar industry prepared for the 
return of normal market conditions. The SEB even issued 
a resolution in January 1919 declaring that “a return of 
free market conditions in sugar would be welcomed by the 
Board.” However, certain conditions in 1919 changed its atti-
tude and convinced Congress to extend the agency’s author-
ity into peacetime.2
For one thing, a lack of “accurate statistics” prevented 
experts from knowing at the end of 1918 what the “actual net 
world balance of supply and demand for sugar” was. Some 
sugar experts forecasted a normal crop, which would guaran-
tee an adequate world supply, but others claimed that a severe 
shortage was imminent. Although some war-torn countries 
were able to begin producing beets again in 1919, increased 
consumption of sugar in the United States and Europe indi-
cated that a worldwide shortage might occur by the end of 
1919. This caused “a state of nervous panic” in the United 
States, intensifi ed by longshoremen and marine worker 
strikes which cut off foreign sugar supplies. By the end of 
Sugar in the Rocky Mountain West (Salt Lake City, 1944), presumably because of the 
embarrassment they caused the company. Arrington mentioned in his preface 
that time constraints forced him to “pick out certain topics that were interest-
ing, instructive, and typical” of Utah-Idaho’s history. “The choice of the episodes 
treated is entirely my own,” Arrington wrote, “and if the judgment has been bad, 
the fault is mine.” Beet Sugar in the West, vii. Thomas G. Alexander briefl y men-
tions the indictments in Mormonism in Transition: A History of the Latter-day Saints, 
1890–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1986), as does Milton R. Merrill in Reed Smoot: Apostle in 
Politics (Logan, Utah, 1990), but little other scholarly work on the topic exists.
2. As quoted in Joshua Bernhardt, “The Transition from Government Control of 
Sugar to Competitive Conditions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 34 (August 
1920): 721.
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1919, it seemed certain that America would once again face 
high prices because of sugar scarcity.3
Throughout 1919, the SEB worked to prevent such a dearth. 
Even though the Food Administration and the War Trade 
Board had been demobilized in early 1919, the SEB continued 
to operate because it had been authorized to deal in all matters 
with the 1918–1919 sugar crop. The board worked with cane 
sugar refi ners to suspend exports to other countries, while also 
continuing to purchase sugar from manufacturers to sell in 
regions of scarcity. At the end of 1919, the SEB was uncertain 
whether it would remain in operation in 1920 since it had no 
statutory authority over the 1919–1920 crop.4
The board’s need for clarifi cation increased when Cuban 
growers asked it to negotiate the purchase of the 1920 Cuban 
crop. Because the executive branch’s emergency war funds 
had fi nanced the SEB, the board fi rst inquired of President 
Woodrow Wilson whether it had the authority to buy the 
crop. Wilson refused to consent to the acquisition because Dr. 
F. W. Taussig, a member of the SEB, believed that no short-
age existed in the United States and that it was unnecessary 
for the government to buy the Cuban harvest. Other board 
members disagreed with Taussig’s assessment. Believing that 
the situation was urgent, they petitioned Congress to autho-
rize negotiations with Cuban producers. Because of political 
wrangling, Congress could not pass a bill until December 
1919, and by that time, Cuba had already sold part of its har-
vest elsewhere. Drought also caused the island nation to pro-
duce a lower than normal harvest defi cient by nearly six hun-
dred thousand tons—meaning that little Cuban sugar was 
available for the United States.5
Consumer agitation over the lack of sugar, and this dearth’s 
effects on prices, convinced Congress to authorize the SEB to 
3. Bernhardt, “The Transition from Government Control of Sugar,” 722–25.
4. Bernhardt, “The Transition from Government Control of Sugar,” 726–27.
5. House, Continuing the Sugar Equalization Board, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Rept. 
506, 1919, serial 7652, 1–6; Bernhardt, “The Transition from Government 
Control of Sugar to Competitive Conditions,” 728–29; Reed Smoot to Hon. C. 
W. Nibley, December 24, 1919, Reed Smoot Papers, MSS 1187, box 41, folder 
5, L. Tom Perry Special Collections Library, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham 
Young University, Provo, Utah.
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buy Cuba’s sugar in December 1919. In effect, this congressio-
nal empowerment allowed the board to continue its control 
of the domestic sugar industry. During the war, the SEB had 
purchased sugar from manufacturers at varying prices and 
then sold it to consumers at reduced rates. After the armistice, 
however, the situation became more complicated as specula-
tors began buying sugar directly from refi ners at higher prices 
than the SEB could offer. Because the board did not possess 
the authority to prosecute speculators, it turned to the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in late 1919 to ensure that sugar 
was sold only at the prices established by the SEB and only to 
those individuals authorized by the agency.6
By this time, the DOJ was well versed in the prosecution of 
food industries for profi teering. In 1917, it had begun inves-
tigations into price fi xing actions by dairy farmers, while in 
1920 it would commence a prosecution of the California 
Associated Raisin Company for unduly high prices. The dif-
ference in these investigations, however, was that no price 
controls existed in the dairy or raisin industries after the war, 
meaning that the DOJ conducted its examinations under 
the authority of the Sherman Act.7 Because the SEB main-
tained its restrictive price and supply powers over sugar, the 
DOJ could use the Lever Act in sugar prosecutions. Accord-
ingly, A. Mitchell Palmer, the United States attorney gen-
eral, instructed his attorneys to arraign food hoarders and 
profi teers under sections four and six of the Lever Act of 
1917. To strengthen the DOJ’s position, Congress amended 
the Lever Act on October 22, 1919, “to provide as the pen-
alty for profi teering a fi ne of $5,000 or two years in prison 
or both.”8
6. Bernhardt, “The Transition from Government Control of Sugar,” 720–31; Act 
of December 31, 1919 (41 Stat. 386). After the Food Administration had been 
disbanded, the DOJ had taken upon itself many of the administration’s former 
duties. The department received offi cial authorization to use Food Administra-
tion powers in a presidential proclamation issued on November 21, 1919.
7. Victoria Saker Woeste, The Farmer’s Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural 
Cooperation in Industrial America, 1865–1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 144,
152–56.
8. F. Hardee Allen, “Preliminary Checklist of the High Cost of Living Records 
of the Department of Justice,” 3, Records of the High Cost of Living Division, 
Record Group [RG] 60, General Records of the Department of Justice, 
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Armed with these provisions, the DOJ began investigating 
profi teers. Palmer issued specifi c instructions to his 
attorneys. They needed to obtain proof that a company 
had sold products at high prices, whether through confi s-
cating sales slips or by recording “the testimony of persons 
actually making purchases.” Thereafter, Palmer stipulat-
ed, agents should examine company invoices to determine 
what it cost the corporation to produce the disputed item. 
To determine whether the profi t margin was excessive, 
Palmer continued, attorneys should consult with experts in 
the food trade about what constituted a reasonable prof-
it. Finally, Palmer required his attorneys to try to “obtain 
an admission from the party being investigated” that it had 
earned exorbitant profi ts—“the most valuable evidence of 
all.”9
Palmer proclaimed that the DOJ would prosecute any beet 
sugar manufacturer that sold the product for more than thir-
teen cents per pound, which was the price determined by 
the SEB to be a reasonable rate. Palmer also declared that 
Louisiana plantations could market cane sugar at no more 
than twenty cents per pound. Two reasons accounted for the 
price discrepancy: cane sugar cost more than beet sugar to 
produce, and it also was a higher quality sugar. To enforce 
these prices, the DOJ created the Cost of Living Division of 
the Bureau of Investigation whose sole purpose was to inves-
tigate Food Control Act violations.10
Although the Cost of Living Division tried to control it, 
wild speculation in sugar continued, especially in San Francis-
co, New Orleans, and New York. Part of the problem was that 
some district judges refused to prosecute anyone under the 
Lever Act because they believed the law was unconstitutional 
National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland 
[hereafter referred to as NARA II].
9. “Directions for Investigations of Violations of Section 4,” Records Relating to 
the Validity of the Food Control Act, 1919–1920, box 1, Records of the High 
Cost of Living Division, RG 60, NARA II.
10. Allen, “Preliminary Checklist of the High Cost of Living Records of the 
Department of Justice,” 4. To assist the Cost of Living Division, the DOJ also 
appointed a state fair price commissioner in every state. Usually, the former 
state food administrator served in this capacity.
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in peacetime.11 The situation escalated to the point that the 
government asked the Federal Trade Commission to investi-
gate sugar prices. In that inquiry, the commission noted that 
even though the DOJ and Congress had acted to protect con-
sumers, “retail prices on [sugar] from June, 1919, on var-
ied considerably from the maximum price regarded as fair.” 
According to the commission, the main culprit was not the 
sugar producer, but the speculator who purchased refi ned 
sugar from companies and then sold it at a higher price to 
wholesale grocers and manufacturers.12
Despite the nationwide speculation, Utah-Idaho Sugar, 
like other beet sugar producers in the American West, did 
not raise its prices above the thirteen cents per pound 
rate. But as 1920 dawned, it became increasingly difficult 
for the company to obey the DOJ’s proscriptions. Whole-
sale buyers, influenced by speculators, were offering beet 
corporations more than thirteen cents per pound, thereby 
prompting some companies to maintain their sugar sup-
plies until they could assess whether the federal govern-
ment would prosecute those selling to wholesalers. Real-
izing that large profits could be made at the higher prices, 
Utah-Idaho’s board of directors, along with officials of 
Colorado’s Great Western Sugar Company, asked Senator 
Reed Smoot to inquire whether the Cost of Living Division 
would prosecute Utah-Idaho Sugar if it sold its product 
to wholesale buyers at the higher rate. Smoot consulted 
with A. W. Riley of the DOJ’s Bureau of Investigation, who 
informed him that the DOJ would prosecute any com-
pany that increased its price more than three cents per 
pound. On January 19, Smoot telegrammed Nibley and 
W. L. Petrikin, an officer in Great Western, stating that an 
increase would result in legal action. Nibley accepted his 
11. “Statement of the Work of the Cost of Living Division of the Bureau of Inves-
tigation, For the Fiscal Year 1919–1920,” Memorandums, 1917–1920, box 1,
folder 6, Records of the High Cost of Living Division, RG 60, NARA II; Tele-
gram to be sent to all United States Attorneys, December 4, 1919, Letters Sent, 
1919–1920, box 8, folder 4, ibid.
12. Quotation in Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Sugar Supply and Prices
(Washington, D.C., 1920), 11, 87, 95; see also Bernhardt, “The Transition 
from Government Control of Sugar,” 730–31.
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findings unenthusiastically, while Petrikin promised “to 
cooperate to full extent.”13
Yet Utah-Idaho and other beet sugar corporations still 
enjoyed considerable prosperity in 1919 and 1920. As tech-
niques for producing beets improved, and as workers and 
farmers returned from the war, the number of sugar beet 
growers escalated and the production of sugar increased. In 
1913, for example, American beet sugar farmers harvested 
580,000 acres of beets, yielding 733,000 short tons of sugar. 
By 1920, the fi gure had jumped to 872,000 acres harvested, 
with 1,089,000 short tons produced. Utah-Idaho Sugar saw 
similar increases. In 1910, the company only harvested 
29,461 acres of beets, yielding 709,658 bags of sugar, but in 
1920, it harvested 86,971 acres, producing 2,359,355 bags, 
the biggest crop it had ever seen (see Table 1). Such output 
gave the company a prominent position among sugar corpo-
rations in the United States; by 1916, it was the third largest 
American producer of beet sugar, providing 15 percent of 
the nation’s beet sugar supply.14
However, Utah-Idaho’s directors still chafed under the 
DOJ’s regulations, especially since cane sugar refi ners were 
selling their sugar for more than 20 cents per pound. As 
the fi rst months of 1920 passed and as Cuban and cane sug-
13. As quoted in “Smoot Calls Utah-Idaho Probe A Frame-Up; Utah Senator Asserts 
Aim of Move Political,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 25, 1920; see also [A. Mitchell] 
Palmer to All Beet Sugar Refi ners, October 18, 1919, Lever Act Documents, 
November 1917–November 1919, box 1, folder 1, Records of the High Cost 
of Living Division, RG 60, NARA II; Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1920, 59, pt. 7:7507–8; Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Sugar Supply 
and Prices, 101–2; Reed Smoot to Honorable C. W. Nibley, May 9, 1920, Smoot 
Papers, box 42, folder 1.
14. Myer Lynsky, Sugar Economics, Statistics, and Documents (New York, 1938), 33;
Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 201; C. W. Nibley to Senator Reed Smoot, 
December 28, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1; Thomas G. Alexander, 
“The Burgeoning of Utah’s Economy, 1910–18,” in A Dependent Commonwealth: 
Utah’s Economy from Statehood to the Great Depression, Charles Redd Monographs 
in Western History No. 4, Dean L. May, ed. (Provo, Utah, 1974), 39; “Passing 
Events,” Improvement Era 24 (December 1920): 180. Despite the increased beet 
sugar production, the United States still faced a shortage of the commodity 
because beet sugar made up such a small proportion of its total output. From 
1916 to 1920, for example, Cuban farms produced 19,657,000 short tons of 
raw sugar while the beet sugar industry grew only 4,223,000 short tons. Sugar
Facts and Figures (New York, 1948), 30.
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ars maintained their high prices, the company decided to 
forego DOJ warnings about price increases.15 On April 10,
Utah-Idaho’s board of directors, emboldened by the advice 
of attorneys Daniel N. Straup and Joel Nibley that if the cor-
poration did not exceed cane sugar rates, the DOJ could 
not prosecute, voted to elevate its price to cane sugar lev-
els. Only one offi cial dissented: Heber J. Grant, who had 
assumed the presidency of both the LDS church and Utah-
Idaho Sugar when Joseph F. Smith died in 1918, and who 
probably understood the public outcry that a price raise 
would cause.16
A little more than a week later, Utah consumers watched 
in shock as Utah-Idaho’s prices skyrocketed to twenty-eight 
cents per pound. Understandably, the hike created bitter 
feelings, especially since LDS leaders were so involved in the 
company’s leadership. Utah-Idaho’s policies seemed a far 
cry from Mormon enterprises such as Zion’s Cooperative 
Mercantile Institution, which, as late as 1895, had made it 
an avowed policy to “never advance the price of any article 
Year Number of Growers
Acres
of Beets 
Planted
Acres
of Beets 
Harvested
Tons of 
Beets
Harvested
Tons of 
Beets per 
Acre
Bags of 
Beet Sugar 
Produced
1910 3,379 30,904 29,461 277,638 9.4 709,658
1911 4,205 38,070 36,139 452,047 12.5 1,167,784
1912 4,206 39,452 38,436 422,210 11.0 1,119,907
1913 4,464 40,803 39,725 473,243 11.9 1,235,620
1914 4,789 44,602 42,891 565,977 13.2 1,551,348
1915 6,351 61,487 59,348 631,141 10.6 1,749,298
1916 7,697 81,265 70,800 696,217 9.9 1,697,657
1917 8,078 75,227 66,339 588,799 8.9 1,563,705
1918 7,766 69,040 58,677 681,023 11.6 1,636,588
1919 8,156 86,208 66,321 583,137 8.3 1,339,036
1920 8,123 93,603 86,971 901,154 10.4 2,359,355
15. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Sugar Supply and Prices, 105; Charles W. 
Nibley to Senator Reed Smoot, May 14, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1.
16. “Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company Held at Salt Lake City, Utah, April 10, 1920 at 10 A.M.,” Reports, 
1919–1920, box 1, folder 1, Records of the High Cost of Living Division, RG 
60, NARA II.
Table 1: Production Record of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
1910–1920. Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 201.
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because of its scarcity” and had operated for the economic 
benefi t of the Mormon people, especially in the realm of 
providing goods at low costs.17 Now, a corporation found-
ed primarily to promote jobs among the LDS people and 
to make Utah Mormons more self-suffi cient seemed to be 
motivated by a “profi ts-at-all-costs” attitude that had led to 
gouging of the general public. Feelings ran high enough 
that, according to Reed Smoot, some made threats of per-
sonal injury against Grant and Nibley. One Utah resident 
even commented to Smoot that “the advance of [the] sugar 
price [was] the most unfortunate occurrence that has ever 
happened in Utah affecting the faith of the Mormon peo-
ple.”18 Smoot told Nibley that he did not “know whether the 
situation throughout the State is as serious as [his] letters 
would indicate,” but the price hike greatly angered some 
citizens.19
Utah-Idaho Sugar, however, was not the only beet corpora-
tion in America allowing its product to sell at whatever price 
it could obtain; in many ways, it appears that the board of 
directors was merely following a national trend. DOJ records 
indicate that several other companies abandoned the con-
trols established by the SEB and the attorney general. In 
January 1920, for example, an assistant to the attorney gener-
al asked James L. McClear, a United States attorney in Boise, 
Idaho, to investigate the Beet Growers Sugar Company, an 
Idaho corporation, for allegedly shipping sugar to Chicago 
“at excessive prices.”20 By April 1920, the Justice Department 
had pursued over 150 sugar profi teering cases, obtaining 21
convictions. The illegalities had been committed in several 
states, including Washington, Texas, Oklahoma, North and 
17. As cited in Leonard J. Arrington, Feramorz Y. Fox, and Dean L. May, Building
the City of God: Community and Cooperation Among the Mormons (Salt Lake City, 
1976), 97.
18. Harvard S. Heath, ed. In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot (Salt Lake City, 
1997), 437, 439.
19. Smoot to Hon. Charles W. Nibley, May 26, 1920, in Smoot Papers, box 42,
folder 1.
20. Special Assistant to the Attorney General to James L. McClear, Esq., January 26,
1920, Letters Sent, 1919–1920, box 2, folder 16, Records of the High Cost of 
Living Division, RG 60, NARA II.
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South Dakota, and Louisiana.21 But the claim that “everyone 
was doing it” held little weight for Utah consumers, especially 
since Utah’s other major sugar producer, the Amalgamated 
Sugar Company (which also had a large LDS infl uence), kept 
its prices at the level established by the DOJ.
After the DOJ was informed of the escalation, it sent one of 
its special agents, Floyd T. Jackson, to Salt Lake City to inves-
tigate. Isaac Blair Evans, the United States District Attorney 
for Utah and a son-in-law of Heber J. Grant, informed Jack-
son that the company had increased prices without consult-
ing either Evans or James W. Funk, the state’s fair price com-
missioner. After examining the corporation’s records closely, 
Jackson concluded that Utah-Idaho was guilty of a “plain case 
of profi teering.” The increase was unjustifi ed, Jackson rea-
soned, because other companies had maintained the Depart-
ment’s recommended prices, and because it cost Utah-Idaho 
Sugar considerably less than twenty-eight cents to manufac-
ture a pound of sugar.22
On May 8, Jackson fi led a complaint with United States 
Commissioner Henry V. Van Pelt charging Utah-Idaho Sugar 
with profi teering. The complaint consisted of three differ-
ent counts, accusing the organization of obtaining “undue, 
exorbitant, immoderate, excessive and monstrous” profi ts on 
sugar. Based on the complaint, Deputy United States Marshal 
C. W. Blair arrested Merrill Nibley, vice president and assis-
tant general manager of the company (and Charles’s son), 
and required him to post a $5,000 bond.23
Utah-Idaho’s directors were outraged at both the charges 
21. “Prosecutions Under Food Control Act,” Records Relating to Cases Under the 
Food Control Act, 1920–1921, box 1, folder 2, Records of the High Cost of 
Living Division, RG 60, NARA II.
22. As quoted in “U.S. Agent Will Sift Sugar Rise,” The Salt Lake Tribune, May 4,
1920; see also “Probe of Sugar Price Started,” The Salt Lake Tribune, May 5,
1920; “Sugar Allotment by Ogden Company,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 15, 1920;
Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 437–38; Sen. Smoot to Hon. 
Charles W. Nibley, May 26, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1; Report of the 
Federal Trade Commission on Sugar Supply and Prices, 106; “Lever Act Decision 
Voids Sugar Indictments; Pending Charge of Profi teering to be Dismissed,” Salt
Lake Tribune, March 1, 1921.
23. Quotation in “Sugar Company Charged With Profi teering,” Salt Lake Tribune,
May 9, 1920. Two counts covered the corporation’s sale of sugar to the 
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and the arrest, and they decided to defend themselves by 
issuing a public statement.24 This declaration explained that, 
among other things, “no company in the United States has 
been more earnest in its endeavors to carry out every regula-
tion and desire of the government with respect to the price 
of sugar.” Utah-Idaho Sugar was among the fi rst to advocate 
the establishment of price restraints on the industry, the ad 
continued, to prevent “unjust, unreasonable, unfair, and waste-
ful commissions, profi ts, and practices.” A simple explanation 
existed for the increase, the company insisted. In the eastern 
United States, where cane and Cuban sugars dominated the 
market, sugar sold on average for approximately twenty-three 
cents per pound. Because Utah-Idaho Sugar had adhered to 
the regulations of the DOJ by selling its product at only thir-
teen cents per pound, some eastern distributors had bought 
sugar in the intermountain region, shipped it to Chicago, sold 
it at the higher rate, and made a handsome profi t of $5 to $10
per hundred pound bag. Attorney General Palmer seemed 
unable or unwilling to eliminate this traffi c, so the company 
decided to raise its prices, thereby abolishing any advantageous 
opportunities and restricting the fl ow of sugar out of the West. 
How, the ad concluded, could the DOJ charge it with profi teer-
ing when it had actually attempted to prevent it?25
Skeptics disregarded these arguments, but Utah-Idaho’s 
explanation did contain some elements of truth. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission had discovered that high prices in 
the United States stemmed in part from sugar speculators 
Anderson-Taylor Company, wholesale grocers in Salt Lake City, at 23.84 cents 
per pound on May 1. The other count charged Utah-Idaho Sugar with selling 
sugar to the same corporation on May 4 at 22.75 cents per pound. Although 
the DOJ had the authority to revoke Utah-Idaho’s license and shut down its 
factories because of its violation of the law, the Attorney General believed that 
it was better to conduct a criminal prosecution because a “consequent stoppage 
of business [was] liable to be of greater injury to the community than benefi t.” 
Special Assistant to the Attorney General to J. L. McClear, Esq., July 7, 1920,
Letters Sent, 1919–1920, box 2, folder 17, Records of the High Cost of Living 
Division, RG 60, NARA II. See also Special Assistant to the Attorney General 
to Edward C. Day, Esq., May 19, 1920, Letters Sent, 1919–1920, box 3, folder 
48, ibid.
24. Nibley to Smoot, May 14, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1.
25. “Sugar Company Charged With Profi teering,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 9, 1920.
139
Political and Legal Troubles in the Aftermath of the First World War
purchasing sugar from corporations and selling it to whole-
sale grocers at higher prices. Stephen Love, Utah-Idaho’s sales 
manager, informed the company’s board of directors at the 
April 10 meeting that speculators had purchased large quan-
tities of intermountain sugar and sold it in eastern markets. 
This left only small amounts held by Utah-Idaho Sugar to sup-
ply communities east of the Sierra Nevada and Cascade Moun-
tains and west of Helena, Montana, and Rawlins, Wyoming. 
According to Love, this region required more than three hun-
dred thousand bags of sugar, but Utah-Idaho only had one 
hundred forty-fi ve thousand bags, in part because the SEB’s 
distribution policies required it to sell sugar in other markets. 
Therefore, the region’s sugar jobbers and manufacturers asked 
Utah-Idaho’s directors to raise their prices, thereby preventing 
easterners from obtaining more of the supply.26
These circumstances notwithstanding, several arguments 
Beets loaded on a train for transportation to the factory
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
26. “Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany Held at Salt Lake City, Utah, April 10, 1920 at 10 a.m.”
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poked holes in Utah-Idaho’s explanation. For one thing, nei-
ther Love nor the corporation could say why the company 
did not merely refuse to sell to eastern distributors. For 
another, Heber J. Grant himself informed the board of direc-
tors in a later meeting that Utah-Idaho Sugar had enough 
of the product to supply its home market. The DOJ, more-
over, had informed Utah-Idaho’s directors that increasing its 
price was not the best way to stop the outfl ow of sugar and 
had counseled the fi rm to let government offi cials handle 
speculators. Finally, Utah-Idaho offi cials never clarifi ed why 
other companies such as Great Western and Amalgamated 
Sugar were able to cooperate fully with the federal govern-
ment while maintaining a reasonable amount of sugar for 
their customers.27
For these reasons, Utah-Idaho’s directors failed to convince 
the DOJ or the general public of their innocence, leading the 
fi rm to buy another full-page advertisement in the Salt Lake 
Tribune to explain its position further. The ad took a differ-
ent tack, now arguing that the company had been “grossly 
misrepresented” and its offi cers “held up to public scorn 
and ridicule.” It claimed that the problem lay with the DOJ, 
which had decided to harass the corporation unnecessarily. 
To discover “the real situation,” Utah-Idaho Sugar proposed 
that Utah governor Simon Bamberger appoint a committee 
of “fi ve or nine disinterested . . . business men . . . familiar 
with the sale and distribution of food products” to investigate 
the company’s actions. Utah-Idaho was confi dent it would be 
exonerated by such an inquiry. In the event that the proposed 
committee agreed with the DOJ’s complaints, the company 
would “request and empower [the committee] to evolve, if 
possible, some practical plan” to stop the outfl ow of sugar 
and guarantee a suffi cient supply to Utah consumers.28
27. “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, May 10, 1920,” Leonard J. Arrington 
Papers, MSS 1, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2,
The Leonard J. Arrington Historical Archives, Special Collections and Archives, 
Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, Utah (hereafter referred to as Ar-
rington Papers); “Sugar Jobbers Seek Increase,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 6, 1920;
Howard Figg to [Isaac Blair] Evans, May 4, 1920, Letters Sent, 1919–1920, box 
7, folder 21, Records of the High Cost of Living Division, RG 60, NARA II.
28. “Sugar!” Salt Lake Tribune, May 9, 1920.
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Yet another advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune made
additional claims, ones that portrayed the corporation as still 
looking out for the welfare of its people at great sacrifi ce to 
itself. In the past six months, the ad maintained, Utah-Idaho 
Sugar had “sacrifi ced a lot of money in order to retain suf-
fi cient sugar for home consumption.” It had only increased 
prices to stop the fl ow of sugar from the intermountain 
region. But the ad also indicated that Utah-Idaho offi cials 
believed that they were helpless to swim against the current 
of national trends, and that consumers should not criticize 
them for accepting profi ts that naturally came from the mar-
ket. “It is generally conceded,” the ad declared, “that the 
price of any commodity is universally fi xed the world over by 
the demand and available supply. Isn’t the manufacturer of 
sugar entitled to as much profi t as the middleman who dis-
tributes his goods?”29
Not long after the publication of these advertisements, 
new developments in the profi teering case emerged. Reed 
Smoot proclaimed in the U.S. Senate that the accusations 
leveled against Utah-Idaho Sugar, together with an investi-
gation of the company by the Federal Trade Commission, 
were politically motivated to prevent his reelection. The 
Republican senator claimed to have a telegram from 
George E. Sanders, a Salt Lake City resident and member 
of the Democratic Party, to Henry W. Beer, special counsel 
for the Federal Trade Commission, predicting that if Beer 
continued his investigation “for two months it will cost 
Smoot his senate seat.” Smoot was indignant. “When any 
department of our government undertakes to secure the 
defeat of the election of a United States senator through 
an investigation of the affairs of a sugar company,” he com-
plained, “it is time that such a contemptible practice be 
called to the attention of the public.”30 While not condon-
ing Utah-Idaho’s price increase, Smoot objected strongly 
to a politically motivated investigation, warning that those 
hoping for his defeat would be disappointed: the “honest 
29. “Supply and Demand,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 14, 1920.
30. Quotations in “Smoot Accuses Trade Commission,” New York Times, May 25,
1920.
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people of this country will not approve of any such rotten 
politics.”31
Smoot’s accusations sparked swift reactions. Sanders 
claimed that Smoot had taken his telegram out of context 
and that he had never discussed the senator’s reelection with 
Beer. Beer explained that after receiving Sander’s telegram, 
he immediately replied to Sanders that the commission was 
not interested in politics. Smoot entered a formal explanation 
of the matter prepared by Huston Thompson, chairman of 
the Federal Trade Commission, into the Congressional Record,
including the two telegrams, but he remained convinced that 
Utah-Idaho Sugar’s legal woes stemmed from Democratic 
intrigue. Lacking further evidence, he instructed Charles 
Nibley to inform him if Sanders continued to aid Beer in the 
Federal Trade Commission investigation.32
Nibley extended the political intrigue argument even 
further. He declared that James H. Moyle, a prominent Utah 
Democrat serving as assistant secretary of the treasury under 
Woodrow Wilson, and William King, Utah’s Democratic sena-
tor, had persuaded both the Federal Trade Commission and 
the DOJ to begin their investigations. Nibley claimed that 
the two Democrats hoped to uncover information implicat-
ing Smoot in the price increase, but because Smoot was 
only a nominal stockholder in Utah-Idaho Sugar, the efforts 
backfi red. Indeed, Nibley maintained, the entire scheme 
was “about the worst lot of bunk that has ever been gotten 
31. Quotation in Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, 59, pt. 8:7663–
64; see also Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 438; Merrill, Reed
Smoot, 312–14; Nibley to Smoot, May 15, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1;
Nibley to Smoot, May 20, 1920, ibid.
32. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, 59, pt. 8:7663–64; “Sanders 
Denies Smoot Sugar Hearing Charge,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 26, 1920; “Trade 
Commissioner Denies Smoot Charges; Sugar Counsel Sought Delays, Offi cial 
Says,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 27, 1920; Smoot to Nibley, May 26, 1920, Smoot 
Papers, box 42, folder 1. Beer also claimed that Nibley had stolen the Sanders 
telegram from his offi ce. “Nibley Accused of Stealing Telegram,” Salt Lake 
Tribune, June 11, 1920. Nibley informed Smoot of the telegram, which gives 
some credence to Beer’s claims. Nibley to Smoot, May 15, 1920, Smoot Papers, 
box 42, folder 1; Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 438. However, 
Beer never fi led charges against Nibley, and Nibley did not publicly respond to 
the accusations.
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together.” Moyle and King never publicly responded to these 
accusations, making it diffi cult to determine whether or not 
the charges were true, but correspondence between Smoot 
and Nibley suggests that many Utah Republicans believed the 
charges.33 In fact, because Heber J. Grant, ordinarily a Demo-
crat, had declared his support of Smoot in the 1920 sena-
torial election, Utah Democrats, including Moyle, believed 
that drastic measures were needed to defeat the senator.34 It 
is entirely possible that Moyle used his infl uence as assistant 
secretary of the treasury to make sure that Utah-Idaho Sugar 
and its pro-Republican leaders were prosecuted for profi teer-
ing, but the high price of Utah-Idaho sugar was still the main 
catalyst.
Meanwhile, Utah-Idaho’s situation worsened. On June 10,
Charles W. Nibley with his three wives, left to right, Ellen 
Ricks, Rebecca Neibaur, and Julia Budge
Author’s personal collection
33. Nibley to Smoot, May 14, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1. See also Nibley 
to Smoot, August 20, 1921, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 2.
34. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 53–54.
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in Pocatello, Idaho, J. E. Marriman, head of Idaho’s Depart-
ment of Justice, fi led charges against the company, stating that 
the corporation had “made excessive profi ts in the selling of 
sugar to dealers at Pocatello.” Marriman specifi cally accused 
six offi cers: Heber J. Grant, Charles W. Nibley, Thomas R. 
Cutler, Horace G. Whitney, Walter T. Pyper, and Stephen H. 
Love. Eleven days later, Marriman issued warrants for the offi -
cials’ arrests.35
Many members of the LDS church reeled at the news that 
Heber J. Grant, who had served as their president since 1918,
and Charles W. Nibley, their presiding bishop since 1907,
faced criminal charges. Some rallied behind the offi cials, 
blaming the DOJ and characterizing the event as another 
example of federal interference in Utah’s affairs. On July 
11, a group of beet growers and businessmen met at Span-
ish Fork, Utah, to discuss the pending case and concluded 
that Utah-Idaho Sugar had acted appropriately under the cir-
cumstances. “Unless intermountain beet sugar can be sold 
for prices which the open competitive market affords,” they 
decided, “sugar-beet growing in this section will have to cease.” 
The group alleged that the charges against the company were 
merely examples of “discrimination against a home indus-
try.”36 The only problem with this argument was that Utah-
Idaho Sugar had ceased to be a home industry after Henry 
Havemeyer and the American Sugar Refi ning Company had 
become involved in 1902; since that time, it had decidedly 
operated in a national, rather than a regional, context, sell-
ing much of its sugar outside of Utah.
The DOJ doggedly pursued its case. On July 19, Utah-
Idaho offi cials attended a preliminary hearing in Salt Lake 
City where Jackson introduced the minutes of the April 10
meeting. J. T. Goddard, a certifi ed public accountant who had 
35. Quotation in “Sugar Offi cials Under Charges,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 11, 1920;
“Warrants Here For Sugar Men,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 22, 1920. See also “Ar-
rest 11 In Sugar Deals,” New York Times, June 12, 1920.
36. “Sugar Company Case Discussed,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 12, 1920. In private, 
Charles Nibley expressed little concern with the warrants. On June 28, Reed 
Smoot noted that the two “talked over” the DOJ’s investigation, and that Nibley 
“was not greatly worried over the results.” Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of 
Reed Smoot, 444.
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examined the company’s records, also submitted evidence 
that the same sugar sold by the company at over twenty cents 
per pound cost only nine cents to produce. In the company’s 
defense, Stephen Love reiterated that sugar jobbers in the 
state had encouraged the corporation to raise its prices in 
order to alleviate the sugar shortage. Commissioner Van Pelt, 
who presided over the meeting, was unsympathetic, and he 
bound the company over for trial in the November term of 
the U.S. district court.37
A few days later, Nibley, concerned that the indictments 
would anger Utah-Idaho’s stockholders, issued a statement 
“to better acquaint [them] with the status and . . . the alleged 
causes of the proceedings.” Nibley advanced no new argu-
ments in his statement, but instead appealed to the stock-
holders’ sense of patriotism to garner sympathy for the com-
pany, claiming that the Lever Act and the DOJ gave unfair 
advantage to foreign manufacturers of cane sugar:
We do not believe that it was the intention of congress 
to so discriminate against white labor and producers 
of beet sugar in this country and in favor of negro 
and Japanese labor and producers of Cuba, Porta 
[sic] Rico, Hawaii, or the south. . . . Nor do we believe 
that the courts will so interpret the law as to permit 
such results. . . . Anything less than this is an unjust 
discrimination against the home producers of sugar, 
which brings and distributes more real money to the 
people of Utah and Idaho than the production of any 
other product.
He pleaded with stockholders to withhold judgment against 
the company “until both sides have been fully heard.”38
In this statement, Nibley appealed to a different sort of 
patriotism than that exhibited by Utah-Idaho Sugar during 
the First World War. When the confl ict raged, Nibley had 
insisted that the corporation had a patriotic duty to follow the 
37. “Sugar Company To Face Trial,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 20, 1920.
38. “Utah-Idaho Manager Issues Statement on Sugar Situation,” Salt Lake Tribune,
July 25, 1920.
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regulations established by the government. Now, he reverted 
back to ideas expressed by sugar companies during their bat-
tles over tariff reduction, claiming that America had an obli-
gation to support white American sugar producers, rather 
than foreign or non-white growers. In the years following the 
First World War, nativist sentiment, already rampant in the 
United States because of the confl ict, had increased because 
of an economic depression, culminating in the passage of the 
Johnson Quota Act in 1921, signifi cantly limiting the number 
of immigrants who could enter the United States. Nibley’s 
opinions tapped into this sense of “America for Americans,” 
hoping to sway observers to accept Utah-Idaho’s actions as 
patriotic.39
Within a few days after the appearance of Nibley’s arti-
cle, the company fi nally received some good news pertain-
ing to the Idaho indictments. Because Heber J. Grant had 
voted against the price increase, and because Horace G. 
Whitney and Walter T. Pyper had not attended the April 
10 meeting, District Attorney Evans fi led a new complaint 
with Commissioner Van Pelt dropping these three from the 
charges. The revised complaint accused Nibley, Cutler, and 
Love, and added David A. Smith, fi rst counselor to Nibley 
in the Presiding Bishopric, William S. McCornick, James 
D. Murdock, and William H. Wattis, board members who 
had not been named in the fi rst complaint. But Van Pelt 
informed the company that warrants for the directors’ 
arrest would not be served if the defendants appeared 
before him to post their bonds. The directors agreed and 
pleaded not guilty to all charges at the subsequent hearing. 
On August 9, Van Pelt set October 11 as the date that the 
39. See Roy G. Blakey, The United States Beet-Sugar Industry and the Tariff (New York, 
1912), 207, 209; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin Amer-
ica (New York, 1992), 260; Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 80–81. After 
the Spanish-American War increased American control in Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
and the Philippines, United States’ investors poured money into cane sugar 
production in these countries. These investors then lobbied for preferential 
duties for the imported sugar, and the government complied. Utah-Idaho of-
fi cials and Senator Smoot constantly worked to promote tariffs to end what 
they considered to be preferential treatment, but they frequently encountered 
Democratic opposition.
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grand jury would convene to decide the fate of the direc-
tors in Idaho.40
Conditions worsened on August 22, however, when a fed-
eral grand jury in Utah produced ten indictments against 
Utah-Idaho’s directors. In response to these accusations, and 
in an attempt to bolster sagging support for his Republican 
candidacy for Utah’s governorship, William H. Wattis took 
out a full-page advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune. In July, 
“a dozen of the leading businessmen of Ogden” had visited 
Reed Smoot and expressed concern about Wattis’s candidacy 
because of the sugar situation. Both Smoot and the business-
men believed that the price hikes would hinder Wattis’s bid 
because of the “bitter feelings” against Utah-Idaho Sugar. 
According to Smoot, “the [political] boys [were] beginning 
to doubt the wisdom of nominating W H Wattis for Gover-
nor.”41 To quell these reservations, Wattis echoed Smoot’s 
and Nibley’s political intrigue arguments, claiming that Utah 
Democrats were “attempting to destroy” the sugar beet indus-
try by issuing the indictments against Utah-Idaho’s directors. 
If Republicans failed to bring a halt to partisan Democratic 
dealings, “every other industry in Utah would suffer in pro-
portion,” Wattis continued. His ad called for his election as 
the Republican nominee for governor because he would 
“stand fearlessly against Democratic efforts to ruin Utah’s 
industries.”42
Wattis’s advertisement produced immediate results, but 
not in the way he intended. The federal grand jury respon-
sible for the indictments asked Judge Tilman D. Johnson to 
fi nd Wattis in contempt of court for his statements. Because 
the jury contained both Republicans and Democrats, it 
40. “New Complaint Charging Sugar Profi teering Filed,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 28,
1920; “Papers Issued for Arrest of Utah-Idaho Offi cials,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 
29, 1920; “Sugar Case Set for Next Week,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 3, 1920;
“Second Sugar Case Dismissed,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 10, 1920.
41. Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 448–49.
42. Quotation in “We’ll Win With Wattis,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 23, 1920; see 
also “Thirteen Utahns Indicted Under Lever Act; Sugar Offi cials, Financiers and 
Canners Named,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 22, 1920. Unfortunately for Wattis, 
his advertisement failed to garner additional support and the Republicans 
refused to nominate him for governor, opting instead for Charles R. Mabey.
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issued a resolution “resent[ing] the insult embodied in the 
said advertisement.” Judge Johnson agreed, declaring “for 
any man to say that the indictments . . . were animated by 
politics is unworthy and shows that the man who said such 
thing spoke recklessly, foolishly, improperly.” He issued the 
contempt citation soon thereafter.43
At the same time, Utah’s Democratic party began its state 
convention. H. L. Mulliner, chairman of the party, wondered 
in his opening address “why Republican leaders in this state 
should charge that the indictment of sugar profi teers by a 
grand jury of representative citizens is a political attack . . . by 
the Democrats.” Mulliner answered his own question by stat-
ing that it was to cover up the sugar company’s own illegali-
ties. By raising the price of sugar, Mulliner said, Utah-Idaho 
Sugar had “insert[ed] its greedy hand into the family purses 
of families all over this state” and then used the money to 
fi nance Republican campaigns and Republican newspapers. 
Indeed, Mulliner continued, Utah-Idaho’s directors had only 
three business policies: “to oppose the farmers, get the money 
and elect the Republican ticket.” Mulliner also discounted 
the claim by some Utah-Idaho offi cials, such as Nibley, that 
the real cause of the high price of sugar was a worsening 
sugar shortage caused by the failure of President Woodrow 
Wilson to authorize the purchase of the Cuban sugar crop. 
“The facts do not justify charging the president with the 
responsibility for the high price of sugar,” Mulliner argued. 
He concluded by accusing the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
the Republican party, and Senator Smoot of only wanting to 
exploit the people for their own selfi sh interests. If Utah citi-
zens wanted to stop the abusive policies of big business, they 
had only to elect Democratic representatives.44 Clearly, the 
issue of profi teering in sugar had become a political fi reball 
in Utah.
43. As quoted in “Jury Requests Contempt Trial,” Salt Lake Tribune, September 18,
1920; “Demurrer Halts Plea of Wattis,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 21, 1920.
44. “Sugar Concern Under Fire in Opening Talk,” Deseret News, August 30, 1920.
Mulliner’s declarations about Utah-Idaho’s political leanings were somewhat 
accurate. Nibley was a diehard Republican and worked aggressively for the party 
in all elections. However, Grant was a Democrat, even though he supported 
Smoot in his senatorship.
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Meanwhile, problems continued to mount for Utah-Idaho 
Sugar. On August 28, South Dakota’s district attorney fi led a 
complaint against the company, alleging profi teering in the 
sugar trade. The charges stemmed from the sale of approxi-
mately one thousand pounds of sugar to Jewett Brothers and 
Jewett in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, at twenty-seven cents 
per pound, although it only cost the company nine cents a 
pound to produce. Charles and Merrill Nibley, Smith, Cutler, 
McCornick, Wattis, Love, and Murdock were named as the 
guilty parties.45
The South Dakota allegations came only a few weeks before 
the LDS church began its semiannual general conference in 
Salt Lake City. Some church members, convinced that the 
company was motivated by greed, continued to denounce 
both Grant and Nibley for their involvement, while others 
defended the leaders’ actions. Susa Young Gates, daughter 
Mormon leaders Anthony W. Ivins, Heber J. Grant, and 
Charles W. Nibley (from left to right) in the early 1920s
Special Collections and Archives,
Utah State University
45. “Sugar Company Again Accused,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 29, 1920.
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of Brigham Young and an editor of the church’s Relief Society 
Magazine, for example, counseled against indulging “in bit-
ter criticism of good men about a business transaction which 
had for its motive the upbuilding of this state and this peo-
ple.”46 One interesting facet was that Utahns had not been 
so vehement about profi teering until Utah-Idaho’s May price 
raise. Prior to this time, according to the Justice Department, 
it had been extremely diffi cult to enforce the profi teering 
provisions of the Lever Act in Utah. However, because of the 
“high-handed conduct of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in 
advancing prices of sugar regardless of cost,” public opinion 
had changed and even hardened against any profi teers, be 
they church leaders or other citizens.47
Aware of such criticism, Nibley and Smoot encouraged 
Grant to issue a statement in Nibley’s behalf at the conference. 
When Grant consulted with the Quorum of the Twelve Apos-
tles about this course of action, however, Stephen L. Richards, 
Anthony W. Ivins, Charles W. Penrose, and James E. Talmage, 
all Democrats, expressed their opposition. Grant, himself a 
conservative Democrat but a good friend of both Nibley and 
Smoot, rejected the advice of his cohorts and prepared a pro-
Nibley statement. In his keynote address, he spoke at length 
about the importance of forgiving others and declared:
There are a great many people who believe that if a 
person is indicted, he is undoubtedly a criminal. . . . 
The law itself provides—as I understand it—. . . that 
every man shall be considered innocent until such 
time as he is proved guilty; and no man is guilty, in 
the true sense of the word, of an offense, just because 
a Grand Jury fi nds an indictment against him. . . . 
Certainly Latter-day Saints ought to be as liberal in 
their judgments, as the cold law of the land; and cer-
tainly every man ought to be considered innocent in 
46. Susa Young Gates to Mrs. Jane Rockwell, n.d., in Relief Society Magazine 7 (Octo-
ber 1920): 620.
47. “Prosecutions Under Food Control Act,” Records Relating to Cases Under the 
Food Control Act, 1920–1921, box 1, folder 2, Records of the High Cost of 
Living Division, RG 60, NARA II.
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the estimation of the Latter-day Saints—particularly if 
that man is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints and has devoted his life for the up-
building of God’s kingdom until such time as he has 
what is known as “his day in court.” 
Although he had not mentioned anyone by name, conference 
attendees understood Grant’s meaning, especially after he 
expressed sorrow that politics had invaded the sugar industry. 
“I feel in my heart of hearts,” Grant declared, “that it has engen-
dered bitterness, that it has created a great deal of animosity.” 
The topic was not mentioned again in the conference, even 
when Nibley himself spoke, but, for one of the fi rst times since 
the 1890s, a church leader had once again used the pulpit of a 
general gathering of Mormons to speak on behalf of the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company and its leaders. Ecclesiastical economic 
infl uence seemed to be alive and well.48
Utah-Idaho’s problems continued after the conference 
had adjourned. On October 14, Idaho’s federal grand jury 
indicted the company on thirteen counts of selling essen-
tial food products at unlawful prices. The indictments were 
issued because of the corporation’s sale of sugar from May 1
through May 25 to the Idaho Wholesale Company and Zion’s 
Cooperative Mercantile Institute. The next day the company 
was informed that its Idaho trial would be postponed indefi -
nitely because of its pending hearing in Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota. When the South Dakota grand jury met, it returned 
three indictments against the eight directors.49
With no relief from the legal battles forthcoming, Utah-
Idaho Sugar faced another round of accusations. On Novem-
ber 27, a federal grand jury in Butte, Montana, issued six more 
48. Quotations in Heber J. Grant, “Keep the Commandments,” Improvement Era 24
(November 1920): 48–50; see also Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed 
Smoot, 454, 456–57; Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 83; “Grant Makes Ap-
peal for Charity of Judgment; Plea Against Ill Will Theme of Conference,” Salt
Lake Tribune, October 9, 1920; “Record First Session Crowd in Attendance,” 
Deseret News, October 8, 1920.
49. “Sugar Company Again Indicted,” Salt Lake Tribune, October 15, 1920; “Utah-
Idaho Sugar Trial at Pocatello Postponed,” Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1920;
“Federal Court Indicts Utah Sugar Offi cials,” Deseret News, October 21, 1920.
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indictments, charging that the fi rm had gained $50,000 in 
excess profi ts from selling sugar in Montana at nearly twenty-
four cents per pound. The indictments accused the board 
of directors of “direct conspiracy to evade provisions of the 
Lever Act.” Six cities in six different states had now delivered 
indictments against Utah-Idaho Sugar.50 As Nibley told Reed 
Smoot, “the sugar situation gets worse and worse.”51
But hope came to Utah-Idaho magnates in the form of a 
Supreme Court decision on the Lever Act. In Missouri, grand 
juries had indicted the L. Cohen Grocery Company of St. 
Louis under charges strikingly similar to those levied against 
Utah-Idaho offi cials. Cohen Grocery appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court on October 18 and 19, 1920. Arguing that the 
language of the Lever Act was suffi ciently vague as to warrant 
numerous interpretations of illegalities under the law, Cohen 
Grocery placed the matter into the justices’ hands. Utah-
Idaho Sugar, meanwhile, fi led demurrers with several courts, 
asking them to wait until the Supreme Court had decided on 
the constitutionality of the law before continuing their pros-
ecution. At the same time, it exerted its infl uence through its 
attorneys and personal friends to persuade the court to nul-
lify the Lever Act. Thomas Marioneaux and John A. Marshall, 
two prominent judges, and Daniel N. Straup and Joel Nibley, 
Utah-Idaho’s legal counsel (Joel was another of Charles’s 
sons), presented oral arguments before the Supreme Court 
on behalf of the company. Straup and Nibley also fi led a brief 
reiterating the vagueness argument employed by Cohen Gro-
cery. The company trusted that the court would see its point 
of view, and it was not disappointed.52
50. “Sugar Company Again Indicted,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 28, 1920. This 
article stated that Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Medford, Oregon, had also is-
sued indictments against the company, but the Tribune carried no coverage of 
these charges.
51. Nibley to Smoot, December 3, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1. See also 
John F. Crosby to Edward C. Day, Esq., September 10, 1920, Letters Sent, 
1919–1920, box 3, folder 48, Records of the High Cost of Living Division, RG 
60, NARA II.
52. United States v L. Cohen Grocery Company, 255 U.S. 81 (1921); “Demurrer Halts 
Plea of Wattis,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 21, 1920; “Sugar Company Again 
in Court,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 4, 1920; “Lever Act Decision Voids Sugar 
Indictments,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 1, 1921.
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On February 28, 1921, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Lever Act was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Edward Dou-
glass White delivered the court’s opinion, holding that the 
language in the Lever Act was so ambiguous and vague that 
people could not adequately be informed of charges brought 
against them, thus violating the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.53 Therefore, the Lever Act could not be considered 
binding, and all indictments issued under it were subsequent-
ly quashed. According to Utah-Idaho’s directors, the decision 
was proof to “every right-thinking person . . . that the policy 
of our company has been vindicated.” Sugar beet consumers 
were not so sure, as Utah-Idaho Sugar had unquestionably 
made $14 or $15 per hundred pounds from its high-priced 
sugar. Yet even though the DOJ had been poised to make 
Utah-Idaho pay for its actions, all indictments for profi teer-
ing, which exceeded thirty, were nullifi ed.54
Utah-Idaho offi cials did not have long to celebrate their vic-
tory. Although rates for sugar reached all-time highs in May 
1920, they fell soon thereafter because of a commodity glut 
resulting from an infl ux of sugar into the United States. By 
the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, prices were spiral-
ing downward dramatically, falling to just over four cents per 
pound by March 1921, the lowest price since the outbreak of 
the First World War in 1914. Exacerbating this decline were 
sugar beet contracts with farmers that Utah-Idaho Sugar had 
to honor, even though prices had plummeted. Since these 
problems occurred after the SEB’s authority to regulate the 
sugar trade had expired on June 30, 1920, some companies 
53. United States of America v L. Cohen Grocery Company, 255 U.S. 81 (1921). This 
reasoning hearkened back to Herbert Hoover’s statement before the Senate 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures that it was diffi cult for the 
Food Administration to prosecute profi teering because “the determination of 
what profi teering is is rather diffi cult, that is until after the crime has been 
committed.” “Testimony of Herbert Hoover,” January 2, 1918, Senate Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Manufactures, Shortage of Sugar: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures, United States Senate, 65th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1918, 584.
54. Quotation in Thirtieth Annual Report of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, For the Fiscal Year Ended February 28, 1921 (Salt Lake City, 1921),
n.p.; see also “Lever Act Decision Voids Sugar Indictments; Pending Charge of 
Profi teering to be Dismissed,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 1, 1921.
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actually decried the end of control and declared that the gov-
ernment had abandoned them to the rigors of capitalism at a 
time when the market was unstable. Whether or not the SEB 
would have been able to prevent the collapse in sugar prices 
is debatable, but it certainly could have mitigated some of the 
disastrous effects, as many corporations realized. In any case, 
the government responded to the industry’s complaints by 
enacting the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, and by instruct-
ing the War Finance Corporation to lend money to weakened 
corporations.55
Despite these measures, Utah-Idaho Sugar still faced huge 
fi nancial debts that ultimately led to Nibley’s resignation as 
the corporation’s general manager. Stating, according to the 
Salt Lake Tribune, that “the burdens of the offi ce had become 
too onerous for a man of his years and heavy responsibili-
ties elsewhere,” Nibley transferred management to William 
Wattis.56 Although Nibley never specifi cally mentioned the 
indictments, it is clear that they and the company’s fi nancial 
problems contributed heavily to the diffi culties of his posi-
tion. Smoot asserted that Nibley had faced “enough burdens 
and griefs” from the sugar debacle “to kill ’most any ordinary 
man.”57 Nibley subsequently wrote in his memoirs that the 
accusations had caused Utah-Idaho’s directors and offi cers 
“endless trouble and expense . . . ridicule and scorn.” Disdain 
directed against high-ranking Mormon offi cials had also 
tarnished the church’s public image, making it likely that 
Nibley resigned in part to remove himself from the public 
spotlight.58 Yet much of the turmoil that Nibley faced stemmed 
55. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 93–95; Nibley, Reminiscences, 140–42; Taylor, A
Saga of Sugar, 111–15.
56. Quotation in “Sugar Manager Resigns Duties,” Salt Lake Tribune, January 23,
1921; see also Nibley to Smoot, April 7, 1921, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 2;
Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 93–97.
57. Smoot to Nibley, February 1, 1921, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 2.
58. Quotations in Nibley, Reminiscences, 141–42; see also Thirty-First Annual Report of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, For the Fiscal Year Ended February 
28, 1922 (Salt Lake City, 1922), n.p.; Alexander, Mormonism in Transition,
82–84. Leonard Arrington attributed Nibley’s resignation to demands made 
by the Bankers Trust Company of New York that a change in management 
occur before it provided assistance, but these stipulations were not made 
until July 1921, six months after Nibley’s departure. Beet Sugar in the West, 96.
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from policies that he advocated. Although maintaining sugar 
at thirteen cents per pound would not have forestalled the 
economic problems that Utah-Idaho Sugar faced in 1920
and 1921, it certainly would have lessened adverse publicity 
against Nibley, the company, and the LDS church.
With Nibley’s resignation, Grant and other Utah-Idaho 
leaders tried to deal with the corporation’s precarious fi nan-
cial situation. In November 1920, the company borrowed over 
$1 million from a number of American banks, but on Novem-
ber 26, Utah-Idaho decided that it needed $8 million more 
“to fi nance ourselves to January 1, 1921.”59 Conditions wors-
ened in 1921, especially after Cuba dumped a large amount 
of sugar on the American market. Confronting heavy losses, 
Utah-Idaho Sugar could not pay its farmers the required $12
per ton for beets.60 The corporation appealed to banks in San 
Francisco, Chicago, and New York, but since it had already 
taken out so many loans, the banks declined its requests. In 
despair, Heber J. Grant and other directors turned to Smoot 
and asked him to meet with Eugene Meyer, Jr., head of the 
War Finance Committee. On October 1, 1921, Smoot wired 
Grant, explaining that Meyer had assured him “that some 
plan will be arrived at that will enable the [War Finance] cor-
poration to advance money on refi ned sugar.”61
Subsequently, both Smoot and Grant met with Meyer and 
newly-elected President Warren Harding to discuss the pros-
pect of aid to the sugar industry. After the meeting, Harding 
told Meyer that Utah-Idaho Sugar was entitled to aid, and 
Meyer authorized the War Finance Corporation to provide 
Nibley himself told Reed Smoot that he was relinquishing control because of 
ill health. Heath, ed., In the World: The Diaries of Reed Smoot, 467. Whatever the 
reasons, Nibley continued to serve as the LDS church’s presiding bishop, and 
in 1925, he became second counselor to Heber J. Grant in the organization’s 
First Presidency. He served in that capacity until his death in 1931.
59. Quotations in “Minutes of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, November 18, 1920,
November 26, 1920,” Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. 
Arrington, box 10, folder 2; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 95.
60. Thirty-First Annual Report of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, For 
the Fiscal Year Ended February 28, 1922, n.p.
61. Quotation in Smoot to President Heber J. Grant, October 1, 1921, Smoot 
Papers, box 48, folder 9; Heber J. Grant, “Signifi cant Conference Themes,” 
Improvement Era 25 (June 1922): 713.
Religion, Politics, and Sugar
156
the company with a $10 million loan to “harvest the beet 
crop and to furnish the money to pay the farmer.” Meyer also 
consulted with a New York bank that had previously provided 
cash to Utah-Idaho offi cials and secured a yearlong exten-
sion on the loan.62 With this aid, and because sugar prices 
slowly began to rise again, Utah-Idaho Sugar remained sol-
vent.63 Grant gratefully acknowledged the support of Meyer 
and the War Finance Corporation and declared that he was 
“delighted that the men who stand at the head of this nation 
[were] anxious for the welfare of . . . the beet industry and 
every other industry in our country.”64
 Other corporations were not so lucky. Many independent 
companies that fl ourished because of the opportunities pre-
sented by the First World War were destroyed by the precari-
ous fi nancial conditions of 1920 and 1921. According to his-
torian Leonard Arrington, “A particular and tragic instability 
[in the sugar industry] grew out of World War I—an instabil-
ity which created diffi cult problems throughout the 1920’s 
and continued without satisfactory solution into the Great 
Depression years.”65 This economic uncertainty bankrupted 
several companies and pushed others, such as Utah-Idaho 
Sugar, deep into debt.
By the end of 1921, the economic turmoil in the sugar indus-
try had taught Utah-Idaho offi cials several lessons, most of 
which revolved around how certain characteristics or features 
of its business could both help and damage the industry. First, 
Grant, Nibley, Smoot, and others realized how political parti-
sanship could infect the sugar industry, as well as how these 
political divisions could be used to their advantage. Nibley, 
Smoot, and William Wattis all utilized claims of Democratic 
trickery to mask the real reason for the DOJ’s investigation—
that the corporation had elevated its prices illegally—while 
62. Grant, “Signifi cant Conference Themes,” 713–14.
63. Thirty-First Annual Report of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, For 
the Fiscal Year Ended February 28, 1922, n.p.
64. Grant, “Signifi cant Conference Themes,” 713. See also Grant to Smoot, 
October 20, 1921, Smoot Papers, box 48, folder 9; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the 
West, 98–99.
65. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 100, 195–96.
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Utah Democrats were no less reluctant to use profi teering 
indictments to their political advantage.66 Likewise, federal 
control of the economy was both benefi cial and problematic. 
Nibley and others had chafed at government restrictions, but 
Utah-Idaho’s real problems stemmed from the end of federal 
control of the sugar industry. After the SEB had expired, the 
laws of supply and demand meant the demise of high prices as 
sugar poured into the country from around the world.
More important, the legal troubles showed that the LDS 
church’s continuing presence in Utah-Idaho Sugar could be 
both a boon and a hindrance. Grant’s position as president 
of both the LDS church and Utah-Idaho Sugar allowed him 
to make a passionate plea on Nibley’s behalf at the religion’s 
semiannual general conference, but such declarations would 
not have been necessary had not high-ranking church lead-
ers been involved in a corporation that had attempted to 
gouge its own people. Church participation in a for-profi t 
business could provide much embarrassment, especially if a 
corporation placed profi ts above the good of the community. 
Coupled with this message was the lesson that Utah-Idaho 
Sugar’s involvement in national sugar markets could both 
help and hinder its business. Skyrocketing prices of sugar 
after the First World War provided the corporation with an 
opportunity, legally or not, for immense profi ts, but when the 
bottom fell out of the national market, Utah-Idaho Sugar was 
pushed to the edge of bankruptcy. The company’s foray into 
providing sugar for the nation as a whole, which fi rst began 
with the American Sugar Refi ning Company’s involvement 
in 1902, had allowed the corporation to increase its territory 
and profi ts, but it had also subjected the company to the fl uc-
tuations of the United States economy and had increased 
federal scrutiny of Utah-Idaho’s business policies. This lesson 
was reinforced in 1920 when the Federal Trade Commission 
investigated Utah-Idaho for monopolistic and unfair busi-
ness practices, stemming largely from the use of ecclesiastical 
infl uence in business affairs.
66. It seems that the Republicans used the sugar situation to the greatest effect, as 
they regained the governorship in Utah and reelected Smoot to his senate seat. 
Merrill, Reed Smoot, 222.
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Chapter Six
Restraint of Trade: Federal Trade 
Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar
And now as to the building of additional factories and the 
much-talked-of endeavor to restrict or restrain competitive 
factories. This is a free country, and everyone is free to 
engage in any business that he may select. No one has a 
monopoly. . . . and there cannot be any monopoly in this 
particular business; but is it good business or good sense to 
build two factories where one will do all that there is to do?
—Charles Nibley, 1916
Now, therefore, it is ordered, that the respondents, Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company and the Amalgamated Sugar Company, 
each of them and their offi cers, agents and employees . . . 
shall forever cease and desist from conspiring or combining 
between and among themselves to maintain or retain the 
monopoly of corporation respondents hereinbefore set out; 
to prevent the establishment of beet sugar enterprises and 
the building of sugar factories by persons or interests other 
than said corporation respondents.
—Findings and Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 1923
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A t the same time that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company battled the U.S. Department of Justice over profi teer-
ing in the sugar industry, the corporation faced legal con-
fl icts with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a relatively 
new agency formed to ensure competition in business and 
to police unfair business actions. In 1919, the commission 
accused Utah-Idaho directors of using illegal methods to pre-
vent independent sugar factories from operating in its terri-
tory. After a lengthy trial, the FTC declared that Utah-Idaho 
was in fl agrant violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
of 1914 for its actions in areas of Utah, Idaho, and Oregon. 
Although the company proclaimed its innocence, the FTC 
disagreed and ordered the fi rm to cease and desist any unfair 
practices. In 1927, however, a federal court overturned the 
FTC’s fi ndings, holding that manufacturing sugar did not 
constitute interstate commerce and that the commission had 
no authority over the case.
Aside from this demonstration of the FTC’s weakness in 
its initial years, the most signifi cant aspect of the case was the 
pile of evidence that the FTC collected showing that the Mor-
mon infl uence was still alive and well in Utah’s sugar indus-
try. Most of the charges of unfair business practices stemmed 
from LDS offi cials—whether leaders of Utah-Idaho Sugar or 
not— directly and indirectly implying that good Mormons 
would support Utah-Idaho over other sugar concerns. Yet 
the evidence also suggested that many Mormon agricultur-
ists and entrepreneurs chafed at such implications, which is 
not surprising; since 1902, farmers and consumers had had 
many indications that Utah-Idaho Sugar leaders, despite 
their positions in the LDS church, were looking out for their 
own interests. Authorities such as Nibley claimed that Utah-
Idaho’s policies benefi ted the LDS people, but the general 
public saw the situation in a different light, especially as the 
FTC trial continued and received wide publicity.1
1. As with the 1920 Department of Justice investigation, Leonard J. Arrington’s 
Beet Sugar in the West: A History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1891–1966 (Se-
attle, 1966) and Fred G. Taylor’s A Saga of Sugar: Being A Story of the Romance 
and Development of Beet Sugar in the Rocky Mountain West (Salt Lake City, 1944) do 
not discuss Utah-Idaho’s battles with the Federal Trade Commission. The only
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As with the profi teering case, the Utah-Idaho Sugar Compa-
ny’s problems with the FTC had their roots in the prosperity of 
the sugar industry during the First World War. The outbreak 
of the war signifi cantly decreased beet sugar production in 
several European countries, generating opportunities for 
other nations while simultaneously increasing sugar prices 
because of the subsequent shortages. American businessmen 
formed numerous beet sugar corporations throughout the 
United States in order to gain a share of the market and more 
income from high prices. This boom in factory construction 
affected Utah-Idaho Sugar, as more and more companies 
arose, intruding on its territory.2 The Beet Growers Sugar 
Company began operations in 1917 in Rigby, Idaho, for 
example, while the Gunnison Valley Sugar Company formed 
in Gunnison, Utah, in 1918. Utah-Idaho’s directors claimed 
that both of these corporations erected factories in territories 
that it already served adequately, creating unsatisfactory con-
ditions for everyone involved.3
In order to offset these independent corporations, Utah-
Idaho Sugar entered into secret agreements with the Amal-
gamated Sugar Company, the other major sugar producer 
in the Intermountain West, which also had a signifi cant LDS 
presence. Amalgamated Sugar had formed in 1902 when 
the Ogden Sugar Company, the Logan Sugar Company, and 
the Oregon Sugar Company consolidated. At the time of this 
combination, David Eccles, a prominent Mormon business-
man, was president of the corporation, while Charles Nibley—
unaffi liated with Utah-Idaho Sugar at this time—worked as a 
director and as treasurer and Joseph F. Smith served on the 
board.4 Because Smith and other directors were high-ranking 
scholarly treatments of the subject are brief delineations in Thomas G. Alex-
ander, Mormonism in Transition: A History of the Latter-day Saints, 1890–1930 (Ur-
bana, Ill., 1986), 82; Jesse R. Smith, Thomas Robinson Cutler: Pioneer Sugarman 
Churchman (Washington, D. C., 1985), 163–64; and Milton R. Merrill, Reed
Smoot: Apostle in Politics (Logan, Ut., 1990), 312–14.
2. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar, 110–11.
3. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar, 111; Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 84, 86, 190–91,
194–96.
4. J. R. Bachman, Story of the Amalgamated Sugar Company, 1897–1961 (Ogden, Ut., 
1962), 17–18.
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LDS offi cials, Amalgamated Sugar, like Utah-Idaho, was con-
sidered by many to be a Mormon enterprise.
This perception was reinforced in 1914 when Nibley, 
who had already bought out the American Sugar Refi ning 
Company’s holdings in Utah-Idaho Sugar, purchased 25 per-
cent of American Sugar’s stock in Amalgamated on behalf 
of the LDS church. That same year, Smith, who was serv-
ing as president of both the church and Utah-Idaho Sugar, 
was appointed to a one-year term as president of Amalgam-
ated. After Smith’s tenure expired, Anthon H. Lund, one 
of Smith’s counselors in the First Presidency, assumed lead-
ership. Some Amalgamated directors, such as William H. 
Wattis, served on Utah-Idaho’s board as well, meaning that 
the companies had interlocking directorates. Because of 
the close relationship between the two corporations, their 
boards of directors met in 1916 and “agreed to divide” their 
Utah territory. In this way, the sister corporations hoped to 
provide an adequate share of the market for both, to main-
tain a solid front against independent enterprises, and to 
keep beet prices low.5
Understandably, this arrangement angered some Utah 
and Idaho agriculturists. When they wanted to grow beets 
for an independent enterprise, Utah-Idaho representatives 
would visit the farmers, inform them that the fl edgling fi rm 
had fi nancial problems, and threaten that Utah-Idaho Sugar 
would never deal with anyone entering contracts with other 
concerns. Many times such intimidation worked, antagoniz-
ing both the farmers and the stockholders of the new cor-
porations.6 A group of Utah farmers, however, the majority 
of which were probably Mormon, decided that Utah-Idaho 
Sugar had exceeded the boundaries of the law, and com-
plained to the FTC about the company’s commercial transac-
tions in 1919, instigating an investigation. After a preliminary 
inquiry, the FTC issued a complaint on June 26, 1919, against 
Utah-Idaho Sugar, Amalgamated Sugar, and E. R. Woolley, A. 
5. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 81–82.
6. Federal Trade Commission Decisions: Findings and Orders of the Federal Trade 
Commission. Volume 6: February 14 to November 4, 1923 (Washington, D. C., 
1925), 393.
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P. Cooper, and E. F. Cullen, three businessmen with connec-
tions to the two corporations.7
When the FTC began these proceedings, it had only 
been in operation for fi ve years. On September 26, 1914,
Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
thereby creating the fi ve-member commission. A product of 
Progressive Era politics, the FTC assumed the functions of 
the Bureau of Corporations, a regulatory board created by 
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903. Between the 1880s
and 1900, Congress had enacted several regulatory laws, 
including the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, to protect the public from 
the evils of monopolies and trusts. By the early 1900s, many 
Americans claimed that the legislation was insuffi cient to 
control business, and thus clamored for the government to 
take a greater regulatory role.8
One of the major advocates for increased regulation 
was Louis Brandeis, a Boston attorney active in progres-
sive reform. A vocal critic of big business since the 1880s,
Brandeis argued that smaller businesses were more effi cient 
than huge conglomerates. In August 1912, he counseled 
presidential candidate Woodrow Wilson “to stress competi-
tion as a means of regulating monopoly, and support a fed-
eral commission to enforce the antitrust laws.” Brandeis 
foresaw this agency as different from Roosevelt’s Bureau of 
Corporations, in that the bureau had accepted big business 
and attempted to regulate it while the proposed commission 
would emphasize “a restoration of competition and a reli-
ance on government to achieve and maintain a competitive 
balance.” Wilson heeded Brandeis’s advice and stressed the 
7. Before the Federal Trade Commission: Federal Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Co., The Amalgamated Sugar Co., E. R. Wooley, A. P. Cooper, and E. F. Cullen, Respon-
dents, Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. (Washington, D. C., 1921), 1; copy 
in Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 142, Records of the Federal 
Trade Commission [FTC], RG 122, National Archives and Records Administra-
tion II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter referred to as NARA II).
8. Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. 
Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 80–82;
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 
1900–1916 (New York, 1963; reprint, Chicago, 1967), 255.
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need for competition in industry enforced and regulated by 
the federal government.9
After Wilson was elected president, Brandeis served as his 
economic consultant and continued to agitate for the cre-
ation of a new trade commission to ensure that competitive 
conditions existed in America. Brandeis published a series 
of articles in Harper’s Weekly, which were compiled in a 1914
book, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It. These 
essays assailed big business and called for its breakup by the 
federal government. In addition, several businessmen, want-
ing the federal government to draw a clearer line between 
legal and criminal business practices, decided that “a regula-
tory commission was preferable to . . . the spasmodic whims 
of individual judges” trying to enforce the Sherman Act.10
Because of Brandeis’s counsel, and with the support of 
many businessmen, Wilson decided in 1914 that the time 
had come for more stringent governmental efforts. He called 
for laws clearly defi ning and eliminating illegal methods, and 
Congress responded by passing the Clayton Antitrust Act and 
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Wilson saw the FTC as 
vigorously enforcing antitrust laws, but other politicians, such 
as Senator Reed Smoot, believed that the commission would 
actually protect business by defi ning illegal and legal prac-
tices.11 Some modern-day scholars have agreed with Smoot’s 
opinion of the commission, especially since some of the FTC’s 
early commissioners were businessmen who used the agency 
for their benefi t.12 Indeed, several corporations welcomed the 
establishment of the FTC, believing they could obtain advice 
9. Lewis L. Gould, Reform and Regulation: American Politics from Roosevelt to Wilson,
2nd ed. (New York, 1986), 172; McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 116; Thomas K. 
McCraw, “Rethinking the Trust Question,” in Regulation in Perspective: Historical 
Essays, Thomas K. McCraw, ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 25–38.
10. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 113–16; Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and 
Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 139–40;
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, 256.
11. Reed Smoot to Bishop C. W. Nibley, January 6, 1921, Reed Smoot Papers, MSS 
1187, box 42, folder 2, L. Tom Perry Special Collections Library, Harold B. 
Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; Susan Wagner, The Federal 
Trade Commission (New York, 1971), 4–15, 19; McCraw, Prophets of Regulation,
114–24.
12. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, 270–71.
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from it about what business practices would be considered 
illegal, forestalling any investigations of their actions.13
Because of these confl icting ideas about the FTC’s role, 
it faced several diffi culties in its early years. First, its mis-
sion was ambiguous. The Federal Trade Commission Act 
gave the FTC responsibility to investigate anyone suspected 
of committing “unfair methods of competition,” but it did 
not elucidate what that meant. The commission had to use 
its own discretion to decide what “unfair methods” were, 
much like federal judges had to determine what constitut-
ed a crime under the Sherman Act.14 In addition, presiden-
tial politics often infl uenced the FTC. No more than three 
members of the fi ve-member commission could be from the 
same party, but presidents could assure that their party had 
the majority by appointing loyal commissioners. The FTC 
thus sometimes issued decisions based more on party prin-
ciples than on objective interpretations of the law. Finally, 
the act creating the commission gave it little real power to 
halt questionable business dealings, as it provided no licens-
ing authority or price regulation control. Once it found a 
corporation guilty of unfair practices, the FTC could issue 
cease and desist orders and advise the attorney general to 
prosecute the offender, but these mandates were subject to 
judicial review. In the 1910s and 1920s, pro-business courts 
that resented the FTC’s usurpation of their responsibility to 
interpret antitrust laws frequently overturned the agency’s 
conclusions.15
Such weaknesses notwithstanding, the FTC issued its 
complaint against Utah-Idaho Sugar in 1919 and began 
13. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R (New York, 1955),
249–50; Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 147–48.
14. Quotations in “The Federal Trade Commission Act” (38 Stat. 719); see also 
Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916: 
The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge, 1988), 328–29; McCraw, Prophets
of Regulation, 125.
15. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 328–31; McCraw, 
Prophets of Regulation, 125–27; Thomas C. Blasidell, Jr., The Federal Trade 
Commission: An Experiment in the Control of Business (New York, 1932), 77; Kolko, 
The Triumph of Conservatism, 271–72; Wagner, The Federal Trade Commission, 21–
27; 38 Stat. 719–20.
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preparing for trial. At the time, three Democrats dominated 
the commission: Victor Murdock, former chair of the Pro-
gressive party, Huston B. Thompson, and William B. Colver. 
These three formed an “aggressive triumvirate” who “stepped 
up the investigations of unfair trade practices.” Although 
Republican commissioners John Garland Pollard and Nel-
son B. Gaskill largely favored business, Murdock, Thompson, 
and Colver consistently outvoted them. After Colver resigned 
in 1920, John F. Nugent, another antibusiness Democrat, 
retained the Democratic majority and continued attacks 
against corporations.16
With this makeup, the FTC charged Utah-Idaho Sugar 
with entering into unlawful agreements with Amalgamated 
and with using anticompetitive business practices against 
independent fi rms. In its explanation of the complaint, the 
FTC declared that Utah-Idaho Sugar “for some time past 
ha[s] been and [is] now engaged in an unlawful conspiracy 
unduly, unreasonably, and directly to restrain . . . trade and 
commerce . . . in the manufacture and sale of refi ned beet 
sugar.”17 The commission claimed that the corporation had 
circulated false and unfl attering fi nancial reports about its 
competitors, while also issuing misleading statements that its 
rivals could not secure necessary beet seed and equipment. 
Utah-Idaho’s directors used their infl uence to prevent banks 
from cooperating with its opponents, the FTC argued, and 
employed secret agents to throw competing fi rms into receiv-
erships. Interestingly, the FTC did not directly charge Utah-
Idaho with using the LDS church to infl uence farmers and 
consumers to stick with the company, but in many of these 
actions, ecclesiastical pressure was clear. In entering a plea of 
16. Quotations in Wagner, The Federal Trade Commission, 24; see also Blaisdell, The
Federal Trade Commission, 91. When Nugent was appointed, Charles Nibley 
wrote Senator Smoot that he feared Nugent would not give Utah-Idaho Sugar 
a “square deal.” Nibley to Smoot, December 22, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42,
folder 1; Smoot to Nibley, January 6, 1921, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 2.
17. Before the Federal Trade Commission: Federal Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 
The Amalgamated Sugar Co., E. R. Wooley, A. P. Cooper, and E. F. Cullen, Respondents, 
Brief of Claimant (Washington, D. C., 1921), 4, copy in Special Collections and 
Archives, Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. See also “Sugar 
Hearing to Start Soon,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 4, 1920.
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innocence, Utah-Idaho offi cials did not refute the individual 
charges, but merely maintained that their actions did not 
affect interstate commerce and, therefore, the FTC had no 
authority to investigate it.18
The trial commenced on April 1, 1920, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, before examiner Judge Joseph Dunham. Henry Ward 
Beer and Herbert L. Anderson argued the case for the FTC, 
while Daniel N. Straup, a future Utah Supreme Court jus-
tice, and Joel Nibley, Charles’s son, presented Utah-Idaho’s 
side. By the end of the trial, which lasted until February 
8, 1921, testimony had been taken at six different places, 
including Medford, Oregon; Washington, D. C.; Cleveland, 
Ohio; Rigby, Idaho; and San Francisco, California, and the 
transcript contained 13,428 pages of testimony and 6,000
pages of evidence. Most of the trial occurred in Salt Lake 
City, receiving extensive coverage in regional newspapers 
such as the Salt Lake Tribune. Although the FTC examined 
several incidents of unfair business practices, it focused on 
Utah-Idaho’s actions in Rigby, Idaho, Gunnison, Utah, and 
Grants Pass, Oregon.19
The commission fi rst looked at the dealings of Utah-
Idaho Sugar in Rigby. From 1900 to 1907, the Idaho Sugar 
Company, one of Utah-Idaho’s predecessors, had purchased 
three factories in this region at Blackfoot, Idaho Falls, and 
Sugar City, and Utah-Idaho had maintained these facili-
ties after 1907. The factories served beet farmers in several 
towns including Menan, Lewisville, and Rigby; Utah-Idaho 
Sugar assisted in the transportation of beets to the process-
ing plants by “erect[ing] and maintain[ing] numerous beet 
dumps along the lines of railroads, branches and spurs for 
the convenience of farmers in the loading of beets.” Utah-
Idaho offi cials claimed that “at no time, either prior or subse-
quent to the year 1917, were there any more beets grown . . . 
than could be taken care of by the factories of the Utah-Idaho 
18. Brief of Claimant, 5–7.
19. Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1925 
(Washington, D. C., 1925), 46; “Sugar Company Trial is Opened,” Salt Lake 
Tribune, April 2, 1920. The commission also discussed the company’s actions in 
Springville, Utah; Delta, Utah; and Hamilton, Montana.
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Sugar Company.” In some years, the area failed to produce 
enough beets to keep the operating plants at full capacity. 
If farmers in Menan and Lewisville ever produced enough 
beets to justify the construction of another factory, the cor-
poration’s directors stated, the fi rm would be happy to build 
one.20
Yet on May 12, 1917, a new beet sugar concern, unaffi li-
ated with Utah-Idaho, incorporated itself as the Beet Growers 
Sugar Company (BGSC), and began plans for a factory in 
Rigby. In February 1917, James Sprunt and A. C. Goodwin, 
two sugar promoters who, according to Utah-Idaho Sugar, 
had no “experience in constructing or operating a sugar fac-
tory,” held meetings in Rigby “endeavoring to interest mer-
chants and farmers in that locality in the building of a factory 
at Rigby.” Sprunt and Goodwin contacted “everyone owning 
lands,” Utah-Idaho offi cials claimed, and urged farmers to 
sign agreements to grow beets for them, eventually securing 
contracts for fi ve thousand acres of beets. The two told their 
recruits that the new corporation would be “a cooperative 
organization to be owned and managed by farmers,” and they 
promised to furnish free beet pulp to agriculturists if they 
fed the pulp to their animals “so as to leave the fertilizer on 
the land which produced the beets.”21 Ironically, standing in 
the way of the BGSC’s cooperative was the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company, a for-profi t enterprise birthed from the remnants 
of Mormon cooperation.
Despite their recruiting efforts, Sprunt and Goodwin 
failed to attract enough farmers to begin construction on 
their factory. They therefore reconsidered their venture 
20. Before the Federal Trade Commission: Federal Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 
The Amalgamated Sugar Co., E. R. Wooley, A. P. Cooper, and E. F. Cullen, Respondents, 
Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. (Washington, D. C.: Government Print-
ing Offi ce, 1921), 54–55; copy in Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303,
box 142, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
21. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 56. Goodwin had previously run into 
trouble with Utah-Idaho Sugar when he tried to build an independent sugar 
factory at Delta, Utah. “Gutleben’s Sugar Thesaurus: Rigby, Idaho,” 2, Leonard 
J. Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, MSS 1, box 
8, folder 1, The Leonard J. Arrington Historical Archives, Special Collections 
and Archives, Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, Utah (hereafter 
referred to as Arrington Papers).
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and decided to incorporate themselves as a stock company, 
rather than as a cooperative.22 By doing so, they could better 
fulfi ll their mission “of manufacturing, producing, refi ning, 
and selling refi ned beet sugar in interstate commerce.” In 
May 1917, the BGSC put its stock on the market, obtaining 
suffi cient funding to begin construction of the Rigby factory. 
Claiming that the BGSC was “usurping” its territory, Utah-
Idaho Sugar attempted to stop construction by reiterating 
to Rigby’s Commercial Club that it would erect a factory in 
the area no later than 1921, provided that farmers “raised 
suffi cient beets to justify and warrant” the construction.23
The Commercial Club rejected Utah-Idaho’s proposal, opt-
ing instead for the immediate construction of the BGSC 
factory.24
Having failed to prevent construction, the FTC alleged, 
Utah-Idaho offi cials then decided to spread false rumors 
about BGSC directors throughout Rigby. George Hill, secre-
tary-treasurer of the BGSC and a former Idaho senator, testi-
fi ed that agents for Utah-Idaho Sugar told numerous agri-
culturists that the fl edgling corporation lacked the fi nancial 
means to buy steel machinery for its factory or even to pur-
chase beet seed for the farmers. Several growers thus shied 
away from entering contracts with the BGSC, while some 
stockholders refused to pay their subscriptions. Hill coun-
tered that Utah-Idaho’s statements were blatantly false, and 
that the company had no fi nancial diffi culties.25
22. See “Beet Growers Sugar Company,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 22, 1917.
23. Quoted in Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 55; Transcript of Testimony, 
Rigby, Idaho, May 7, 1920, Federal Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 
et al., 3937, 3940–41, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 147,
FTC, RG 122, NARA II; “Gutleben’s Sugar Thesaurus: Rigby, Idaho,” 3.
24. Brief of Claimant, 98.
25. Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, Idaho, May 7, 1920, 3973; Brief of Claimant,
99–100. According to sugar expert Dan Gutleben, Rigby was “George Hill’s 
town.” Hill had helped lay out the townsite in 1887 and was elected its fi rst 
mayor. “Thereafter,” Gutleben declared, “he put enthusiasm behind every 
movement designed to improve the health, wealth and wisdom of the village.” 
“Gutleben’s Sugar Thesaurus: Rigby, Idaho,” 1. Charles Nibley claimed that 
Hill was Commissioner John Nugent’s “special friend” who had helped to 
orchestrate the investigation of Utah-Idaho Sugar. Nibley to Smoot, December 
22, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1.
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Utah-Idaho offi cials, however, insisted that their claims 
about the BGSC’s fi nancial standing were accurate. Because 
the BGSC did not have suffi cient capital to construct an entire 
factory, Utah-Idaho’s defense declared, it began building 
one “by piece work,” a little at a time. The foundation for the 
structure was laid in October 1917, but because of funding 
diffi culties and a shortage of supplies, the BGSC had to sus-
pend construction in April 1918. Indeed, in May, the BGSC 
issued a fi nancial statement showing that its “disbursements 
exceeded the receipts on stock subscriptions.” Utah-Idaho 
Sugar charged that this evidence proved that the BGSC had 
monetary problems.26
Hill offered another explanation for the fi nancial 
diffi culties: falsehoods told by A. P. Cooper, a construction 
engineer for the BGSC who secretly worked as an agent 
for Utah-Idaho.27 Hill charged that in early 1918, Cooper 
informed Hill and the board of directors that, according 
to his records, the BGSC was not meeting its fi nancial obli-
gations to the construction company erecting the factory. 
Shaken by Cooper’s announcement, Hill wondered wheth-
er he should turn the company over to more fi nancially sta-
ble individuals. Yet Hill later discovered that Cooper’s state-
ments were false; Cooper had merely manipulated the books 
to show discrepancies in the BGSC’s fi nances.28
Charles T. Bray, cashier for the BGSC, confi rmed Hill’s sus-
picions. Bray stated that Cooper and E. S. Cullen, a BGSC 
26. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 57–62; “Financial Statement, Beet Grow-
ers Sugar Company, May 20, 1918,” Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303,
box 155, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
27. Cooper had a long-standing record of employment in the beet sugar industry. 
In 1897, he was a draftsman for the Oxnard Construction Company, a fi rm that 
constructed sugar factories. He then was employed with the Great Western Sugar 
Company, and subsequently worked as chief engineer for the M. C. Peters Mill 
Company. Before becoming involved with the BGSC, he helped construct the 
Peoples Sugar Company factory at Moroni, Utah. Cooper apparently had no 
direct tie with Utah-Idaho Sugar before his employment with the BGSC besides 
residing in Salt Lake City where Utah-Idaho’s headquarters were located. E. F. 
Ogborn to Mr. R. W. Crary, March 11, 1918, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43,
Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
28. Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, Idaho, May 7, 1920, 3954–55; “Rigby Company 
Finance Probed,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 11, 1920.
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bookkeeper, advised him to look for another job before the 
company “blew up” because of its fi nancial condition. Soon 
thereafter, Bray realized that the corporation’s fi nances were 
largely in order and that Cooper had exaggerated the situa-
tion.29 When news of this deceit reached the BGSC’s board of 
directors, they issued a resolution condemning Cooper and 
subsequently dismissed him.30
According to the FTC, Utah-Idaho’s sister company, 
Amalgamated Sugar, hired Cooper almost immediately 
after his termination. While with Amalgamated, Cooper 
continued plotting against the BGSC.31 In September 1918,
the FTC charged, he informed several Beet Growers’ stock-
holders in Cache Valley, Utah (approximately 150 miles 
south of Rigby), that the BGSC “was just about to go to the 
wall.” He continued that “they were out of funds entirely 
and their affairs were in such a shape that he expected that 
[a] receiver would be appointed in a very short time.”32
Likewise, Cullen, the bookkeeper, continued to warn the 
BGSC’s employees that they should “make preparations, as 
the company was going into the hands of a receiver very 
soon.”33 At the time, their claims contained some truth, for 
the BGSC’s factory remained unfi nished, forcing the com-
pany to relinquish its beets to Utah-Idaho Sugar for pro-
cessing.34 According to Hill, the problem was not a lack of 
29. Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, Idaho, May 7, 1920, 3853, 3869. The BGSC 
did have trouble making payments on equipment and salaries because some 
stockholders refused to pay the amount of money they had subscribed for, but 
the situation was not as drastic as Cooper had painted it. “Gutleben’s Sugar 
Thesaurus: Rigby, Idaho,” 6.
30. Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, Idaho, May 7, 1920, 3959; “Resolution, June 
4, 1918,” Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122,
NARA II. Dan Gutleben mistakenly believed that Cooper had resigned because 
of his unhappiness with the corporation. “Gutleben’s Sugar Thesaurus: Rigby, 
Idaho,” 6.
31. Even though Cooper worked for Amalgamated, he conspired on behalf of 
Utah-Idaho Sugar because Rigby was in Utah-Idaho’s territory according to the 
two companies’ agreements. Brief of Claimant, 23–24, 110.
32. Brief of Claimant, 108.
33. Quotation in Brief of Claimant, 111; see also Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, 
Idaho, May 7, 1920, 3857.
34. “Minutes of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, October 9, 1918,” Arrington 
Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
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funds, but a shortage of building materials due to the First 
World War.35
Despite these obstacles, the BGSC fi nally fi nished the fac-
tory in October 1919, which, according to the FTC, led Utah-
Idaho Sugar to employ other nefarious schemes. Early in 
1920 (after the commission had fi led its charges), Ernest R. 
Woolley, a close associate of Utah-Idaho leaders and a grand-
son of Edwin Woolley, a prominent Mormon bishop in the 
1800s, continued Cooper’s efforts to throw the BGSC into 
receivership.36 The FTC charged that Woolley had asked his 
brother-in-law, Ezra Ricks (who was also from a prominent 
LDS family), to buy stock in the corporation and then initi-
ate a stockholder’s suit against it. Ricks tried to induce H. R. 
Johnson of Logan, Utah, to join him in the scheme, but when 
Johnson refused, Ricks bought $97 worth of stock himself, 
and fi led a complaint on March 8, 1920. The suit accused the 
BGSC’s board of directors of accepting large sums of money 
from the company “secretly and unlawfully and without the 
consent or knowledge of the stockholders,” prompting the 
complainant to ask the court to appoint a receiver. The BGSC 
fi led a demurrer, stating that the charges were “ambiguous, 
unintelligent, and uncertain.”37 Although Ricks insisted that 
he had submitted the suit “purely on his own initiative,” 
Johnson testifi ed that Ricks had told him that he was repre-
senting the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company.38 According to the 
FTC, this was an example of “vexatious and unjustifi ed litiga-
tion” employed by Utah-Idaho Sugar to eliminate competi-
tion.39
35. “Sugar Hearing Opens in Idaho,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 8, 1920.
36. Woolley had previously been involved in the organization of the Pioneer Sugar 
Company in Utah, and had also had an interest in the bank owned by William 
McCornick, one of Utah-Idaho’s directors. Preston W. Parkinson, The Utah 
Woolley Family (Salt Lake City, 1967), 373.
37. Transcript of Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 30, 1920, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 3668, Docketed Case Files, 
1915–43, Docket 303, box 146, FTC, RG 122, NARA II. For all of Johnson’s 
testimony, see pages 3636–70. See also “Utah-Idaho Back of Suit, Charge,” Salt
Lake Tribune, May 1, 1920.
38. “Pocatello Man Gives Evidence,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 13, 1920.
39. Brief of Claimant, 122–29; “Utah-Idaho Back of Suit, Charge,” Salt Lake Tribune,
May 1, 1920.
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Nonetheless, Ricks continued to claim that he had the 
purest of motives in bringing the receivership against the 
BGSC. Before he spoke to Johnson, he related, he already 
had purchased stock in the corporation, believing it was a 
good moneymaking venture. Similarly, Ricks claimed that 
he was the one who approached Woolley and that he merely 
asked his brother-in-law whether the men fi nancing the BGSC 
were “solid men.” Woolley explained “that he did not know 
anything about their fi nancial ability,” but further investiga-
tion convinced Ricks that the sugar fi rm was merely a stock 
promotion scheme and, for that matter, one that “was not 
run right.” Accordingly, he lodged a minority stockholder’s 
suit against the corporation on his own initiative. He claimed 
that he had never informed Johnson that he was representing 
Utah-Idaho Sugar.40
According to the FTC, Utah-Idaho offi cials employed addi-
tional “unfair methods” besides secret stockholders’ suits and 
rumormongering. In an effort to infl uence farmers intent on 
trying their luck with the BGSC, the company took out adver-
tisements in March 1920 in newspapers near Rigby.41 These 
statements declared:
It is worth while to the beet grower, when he comes 
to make his 1920 contract, to consider the reli-
ability of the concern with which he is dealing. It 
is one thing for a company to make promises, and 
another thing to keep those promises—especially 
when the company in question is not permanently 
and well-established in the business. . . . [The Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company] knows what promises can be 
made and kept, and is fi nancially prepared to fulfi ll 
all terms of its contracts. you take no chances if 
you raise sugar beets for the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
40. Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, Idaho, May 12, 1920, Federal Trade Commission 
v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 4521–4648, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43,
Docket 303, box 147, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
41. “Minutes of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, March 2, 1920,” Arrington Papers, 
Series 12: The Writings of Leonard J. Arrington, box 10, folder 2.
42. “Farmers Take Notice!” Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 155,
FTC, RG 122, NARA II; emphasis in the original. This advertisement was sent 
to the Idaho Falls Daily Post, the Idaho Register (Idaho Falls), the Idaho Republican
(Blackfoot), and the Shelley Pioneer (Shelley).
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Company.42
When some newspapers were hesitant to print the ad, Utah-
Idaho Sugar sent letters promising that it would soon “extend 
its advertising activities” and would naturally choose those 
newspapers who were “friendly and loyal” to it as recipients 
of its business.43 The FTC concluded that this threat was one 
more example of Utah-Idaho’s use of intimidation to stop the 
BGSC. Utah-Idaho Sugar had no defense for these actions, 
only stating that it had every right to advertise in newspapers 
that it considered friendly and that “such publications related 
to matters entirely local and intrastate and in no manner to 
commerce of any kind.”44
Although no direct Mormon infl uence was implied in any 
of these previous actions (although, as noted, some of the 
individuals came from prominent LDS families), the FTC 
uncovered other instances where ecclesiastical power was 
used. John Hart, Mark Austin, and Heber Austin, all of whom 
served as LDS leaders in Rigby, allegedly informed several 
of their constituents that it was better to have a beet sugar 
company controlled by the church than one led by non-Mor-
mons. Hart, president of the local Mormon stake who was 
also on Utah-Idaho’s payroll, told individuals in an LDS meet-
ing to “just as well forget” about growing beets for the BGSC 
because the corporation was “nothing but a joke.” “It will 
never go through in the world,” he continued. “They have 
not got the [fi nancial] backing.”45
43. See, for example, Utah-Idaho Sugar Company to Bingham County Daily News, 
February 25, 1920, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 155, FTC, 
RG 122, NARA II; see also “Rigby Growers Are Witnesses,” Salt Lake Tribune,
May 12, 1920.
44. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 80.
45. Quotations in Transcript of Testimony, Rigby, Idaho, May 10, 1920, Federal
Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 4256, Docketed Case 
Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 147, FTC, RG 122, NARA II; see also Jno. W. 
Hart to Mr. Mark Austin, November 19, 1917, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43,
Docket 303, box 156, ibid. Heber Austin’s daughter, Myrtle Austin, insisted 
that even though her father believed that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company was 
the best corporation for farmers, he always took the side of the growers and 
the employees in disputes with the company. Myrtle Austin to Dr. Leonard 
Arrington, July 22, 1964, Arrington Papers, Series 12: The Writings of Leonard 
J. Arrington, box 9, folder 4.
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In addition to Hart’s declarations, the FTC alleged, the 
church used other authority to erect barriers against the 
BGSC. When the BGSC applied for a loan from Anderson 
Brothers Bank in Rigby, for example, Merrill Nibley, vice pres-
ident of Utah-Idaho Sugar, informed the bank that it was in 
its “best interest to work in harmony” with Utah-Idaho and to 
“discourage the Independent [sic] concern.”46 Bank directors 
replied that they would never work against Utah-Idaho Sugar 
because the company had “done so well by the beet growers 
. . . that we can see no occasion for encouraging a competi-
tive concern to enter the fi eld.”47 But James H. Steele, a Mor-
mon cashier and director at the bank, decided that Ander-
son Brothers should establish friendly ties with the BGSC. In 
response, the FTC asserted, Heber J. Grant called Steele on a 
church mission to California, forcing Steele to relocate. This, 
Steele claimed, cleared the way for the scuttling of the loan, 
and the bank subsequently denied the BGSC’s application.48
Utah-Idaho offi cers stubbornly disputed these claims. For 
one thing, “it was the general practice of banks to protect 
their customers, and . . . it was good banking business to do 
so.”49 Since Utah-Idaho Sugar had patronized the Anderson 
Brothers Bank in previous years, it was only natural for the 
sugar fi rm to make its wishes known to the bank. Moreover, 
the company’s lawyers claimed that Steele received his mis-
sion call only after he had already resigned from the bank 
because of health and personal reasons. Thus, they asserted, 
the claim that Grant called Steele to California to ensure the 
denial of the BGSC’s loan was “utterly baseless.”50
Rigby was not the only location where, according to the 
FTC, the LDS church used its infl uence to prevent the estab-
46. Merrill Nibley to Anderson Bros. Bank, March 10, 1917, Docketed Case Files, 
1915–43, Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II; Brief of Claimant, 130.
47. Anderson Bros. Bank to Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, March 15, 1917,
Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
48. Brief of Claimant, 134–36.
49. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 74.
50. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 75. Although the BGSC continued 
operating independently, it was severely hurt by the 1920–1921 downturn in 
sugar prices. In 1924, the corporation declared bankruptcy and Utah-Idaho 
Sugar subsequently purchased it. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 195–96.
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lishment of independent beet sugar concerns. The FTC 
believed that Utah-Idaho operated in a similar manner in 
Gunnison, Utah, located in central Utah, in relation to the 
Gunnison Valley Sugar Company (GVSC). Prior to the 1910s,
Utah-Idaho Sugar did not operate any factories in Utah south 
of Lehi. Although some farmers in Sevier County, located in 
central Utah, grew beets and shipped them to Lehi, Utah-
Idaho Sugar believed that it could not afford to build a fac-
tory in Sevier County or nearby Sanpete County until the 
region produced more beets. After agriculturists “started a 
campaign of instruction and teaching and induced farmers 
. . . to grow beets,” Utah-Idaho directors built a factory at 
Elsinore, Utah, in 1911, and it used beets grown in Sevier 
County and Sanpete County, where Gunnison was located, 
for this fabrication.51
Elsinore, however, was about forty miles south of Gunnison, 
making it diffi cult for farmers there to transport beets to the 
factory. Capitalizing on this situation in the winter of 1917,
James Sprunt, the BGSC promoter, decided to form a sugar 
company and build a factory in Gunnison. “Farmers were 
solicited by Sprunt,” attorneys for Utah-Idaho Sugar stated, 
“and contracts obtained from them regardless of whether 
their lands were suitable or not for the successful growing 
of sugar beets.” With these contracts, Sprunt, together with 
fi ve other individuals, formed the GVSC in late 1917, and 
obtained the necessary equipment from an old beet sugar 
factory in Waverly, Washington. The Gunnison factory could 
not be completed in time to process the 1918 crop, so its con-
tracted beets were sold to Utah-Idaho Sugar in 1918 and sent 
to the Elsinore factory. Attorneys for Utah-Idaho insisted that 
once the Gunnison factory was fi nished in 1919, Utah-Idaho 
Sugar “ceased to solicit acreage and contracts from farmers” 
in the area.52
The GVSC and the FTC disputed this claim. According to 
the FTC, Utah-Idaho Sugar “engaged in a steady and unceas-
ing effort to prevent the selling of stock and thereby cut 
51. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 41.
52. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 41–43.
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off the fi nances” of the GVSC, and Utah-Idaho employees 
“endeavored to induce farmers to break” their contracts with 
the GVSC. In order to accomplish its plan, the FTC declared, 
Utah-Idaho Sugar used its Mormon connections to portray 
the situation as a battle between saints and sinners.53
The FTC based its allegations on the testimony of Harvey 
Ross, an early stockholder in the GVSC who became presi-
dent of the corporation in 1920. Ross stated that in April 
1918, Robert D. Young, a fi eld man for Utah-Idaho Sugar and 
a stake president in the LDS church, told Ross, himself a Lat-
ter-day Saint, that the founders of the GVSC were “apostate 
Mormons and Mormon eaters” who did not deserve Ross’s 
support.54 Young also informed him “that the [Gunnison] 
factory was a pile of junk, the machinery corroded and that it 
would not make sugar.” When Ross tried to persuade Young 
The Gunnison Valley Sugar Company factory
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
53. Brief of Claimant, 193–206.
54. Transcript of Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 12, 1920, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 1154, Docketed Case Files, 1915–
43, Docket 303, box 144, FTC, RG 122, NARA II; “Gunnison Sugar Head 
Testifi es,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 13, 1920.
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to purchase some stock in the enterprise, Young retorted 
“that the stock was not worth fi fty cents on the dollar.”55 In 
early 1919, Young reiterated his displeasure with the direc-
tors of the GVSC, especially O. B. Berglund, a non-Mormon 
who also served as president of the State Bank in Gunnison. 
On one occasion, Young claimed, Berglund, showing a lack 
of respect, had referred to Charles Nibley as “Chuck,” and 
to Joseph F. Smith as “Joe.” Ross dismissed these claims by 
informing Young that the GVSC was a “sugar business,” not a 
“church organization.”56
According to the FTC, Young presented his critical remarks 
to a wider audience than just Ross. He also approached 
George A. Christianson, a Mormon fi eld man for the GVSC 
who had previously grown beets for Utah-Idaho Sugar, and 
warned him that if he worked for the GVSC, he was “failing 
to support our church institution.”57 Christianson ignored 
Young’s words, but the stake president’s attacks on the fi rm 
prompted Ross to ask Heber J. Grant to intervene. Grant told 
Ross that he would send Mark Austin from Idaho to talk to 
Young, but Ross discounted this action because Austin was 
known to oppose independent sugar enterprises, as his work 
in Idaho had shown. There is no record of whether Austin 
ever contacted Young, but, getting no relief from LDS lead-
ership, Ross fi nally confronted the stake president himself. 
After denouncing Young’s slanderous claims against the 
GVSC, Ross told him that “with your great infl uence, among 
the people, you have done more against us than any other one 
individual.” If the GVSC failed, Ross continued, the responsi-
55. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 44.
56. Transcript of Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 12, 1920, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 1154, 1158, Docketed Case 
Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 144, FTC, RG 122, NARA II; Transcript of 
Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 4, 1920, Federal Trade Commission 
v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 11710–13, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43,
Docket 303, box 152, Records of the Federal Trade Commission, RG 122,
NARA II; Brief of Claimant, 206.
57. Transcript of Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 12, 1920, 1342; “Gunnison 
Sugar Head Testifi es,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 13, 1920.
58. Transcript of Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 12, 1920, 1166, 1180–81;
“Gunnison Sugar Head Testifi es,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 13, 1920.
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bility would lay at Young’s feet. Refusing to be cowed, Young 
continued to speak out against the GVSC.58
By smearing the independent company as a corporation 
of anti-Mormons, Young was touching a raw nerve with many 
Mormons. Because of the tradition of persecution against 
church members since its founding, Latter-day Saints fre-
quently closed ranks against their detractors. If men who 
disparaged Joseph F. Smith, Nibley, and the Mormon faith 
truly operated the GVSC, how could an LDS farmer in good 
conscience support the enterprise? Although many Gunni-
son agriculturists saw through Young’s ruse, there were cer-
tainly some who were scared off by his words, as well as by the 
claims that the GVSC would never produce sugar because its 
directors had no knowledge of the sugar industry.
As with other FTC charges, Utah-Idaho Sugar did not 
directly deny the accusations, but stated that Young and 
other employees acted independently and not under orders 
from the board of directors. “It is manifest that the acts and 
statements of Young,” the corporation’s attorneys argued, 
“as well as those of other fi eldmen, were not in law or fact 
the acts and statements of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
but merely of the individuals making them.” In an effort to 
distract the FTC from the real issue of LDS infl uence, Utah-
Idaho attorneys claimed that Young never actively sought 
to dissuade farmers from growing beets for the GVSC. He 
merely offered his opinions of the company whenever they 
were solicited. Most of what Young said was true, the law-
yers continued. The corporation’s equipment was old, as 
the Waverly factory had been built in the early 1900s, and 
its directors did have little experience in the sugar business. 
Sprunt, for example, was a former railroad conductor with 
no agricultural background. Therefore, the FTC could not 
charge Young with spreading falsehoods. In fact, despite the 
efforts of Young, the GVSC “operated on a small but success-
59. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 194. In 1920, the GVSC’s factory was sold 
to the William Wrigley, Jr. Company, the famous chewing gum producers in 
Chicago, which then used it to supply Wrigley factories producing spearmint 
chewing gum. Utah-Idaho Sugar ultimately gained control of the factory in 
1940, however, when it purchased it from the Wrigley corporation.
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ful basis for many years.”59 How could Utah-Idaho Sugar be 
charged with illegalities when no harm had been done and 
when the chief rumormonger was not acting in an offi cial 
capacity?60
But, as with the BGSC charges, Utah-Idaho’s leaders were 
missing the larger point. If the company truly was using its 
LDS connections to advance its business—and the evidence 
seemed irrefutable that it was—it indicated that, despite lead-
ers’ claims to the contrary, the Mormon church still exer-
cised considerable economic power in Utah as late as 1920.
Although high-ranking church leaders appeared to have not 
made declarations against the GVSC, local authorities, who, 
in some ways, exercised more infl uence than high leaders 
because of the close, day-to-day contact with church mem-
bers, were not as reluctant. Moreover, high-ranking church 
authorities made no attempts to stop local leaders from mak-
ing such statements, nor did they refute their allegations. This 
was really no different, then, from Wilford Woodruff, George 
Q. Cannon, or Joseph F. Smith declaring from the pulpit in 
Salt Lake City that good Latter-day Saints would support the 
Utah Sugar Company—it had merely taken another form.
In another area of the American West —Oregon—high-
ranking church leaders did take a prominent role in elimi-
nating a sugar concern on behalf of the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company. The player in this case was Charles Nibley, presiding 
bishop of the church, largest stockholder in Utah-Idaho 
Sugar, and soon-to-be general manager of the company. Yet in 
this instance, Nibley did not necessarily exercise ecclesiastical 
infl uence. Instead, according to the FTC, he used his power 
and authority to front an independent concern to see whether 
or not the sugar beet was a viable crop in southern Oregon. 
When he discovered it was, he ruthlessly ousted his business 
partner and allowed Utah-Idaho Sugar to assume control.
The FTC claimed that in 1914, Nibley, who was already 
active in Oregon business through his participation in the 
Oregon Lumber Company, explored the possibility of build-
ing a sugar factory in the Rogue River Valley in southern Ore-
60. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 42, 49.
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gon, an area Mormons were slowly populating. Nibley had 
his son Alexander, together with Frank S. Bramwell, a former 
employee of the Amalgamated Sugar Company and an LDS 
leader in Oregon, investigate the region. After their favorable 
reports, Nibley and Joseph F. Smith examined the valley and, 
in the words of the FTC, declared it to be “a most remarkable 
region for the sugar business.”61
Alexander asked his father to help fi nance the factory, and 
Charles agreed, but only if Alexander could raise part of the 
necessary capital from Oregon residents. In his search for 
money, Alexander contacted George Sanders, a Mormon busi-
nessman and promoter residing in Grants Pass. Sanders told 
Alexander and Charles that he could raise as much money as 
they wanted without any problems, in part because he had a 
power and irrigation company that would provide fi nancing. 
After meeting with Sanders, the two Nibleys agreed to form 
a sugar fi rm with him, and on September 24, 1915, the Ore-
gon-Utah Sugar Company (OUSC) was incorporated with a 
capital stock of $100,000. Sanders prepared the articles of 
incorporation and purchased 447 shares of stock, an amount 
that Alexander matched. Charles was appointed president of 
the company, Sanders, vice president and general manager, 
and Alexander, secretary.62
In order to obtain more money for the corporation, Sand-
ers proposed that the Rogue River Public Service Company, 
his power and irrigation business, guarantee a $500,000
bond for the OUSC. The Nibleys agreed, and with this fund-
ing secured, Alexander began a campaign to solicit contracts 
from Oregon farmers to grow beets. He promised farmers 
in Medford and Grants Pass that the OUSC would construct 
its factory in the town that contracted for the most acreage. 
According to Utah-Idaho’s attorneys, however, Sanders was 
determined to locate the factory in Grants Pass because he 
was already interested in several companies in the area, lead-
ing Medford farmers to refuse to contract with the OUSC. 
Meanwhile, agriculturists in Grants Pass discovered that 
61. Brief of Claimant, 141.
62. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 85–87.
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their soil was not as suitable for beet production as they had 
believed. Charles Nibley then concluded that the Grants 
Pass factory, which had already started construction in Feb-
ruary 1916, would not have a suffi cient supply of beets for 
processing.63
Nibley met with Sanders in May 1916 and had a “stormy” 
conversation with him over conditions in the Rogue River 
Valley. Nibley declared that one of two things had to hap-
pen: either Sanders needed to buy out Nibley’s shares in the 
company or Nibley needed to purchase Sanders’s holdings. 
Nibley, who, according to Utah-Idaho Sugar, had become 
convinced that Sanders was not a good business partner, 
wanted either full control over OUSC or no participation at 
63. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 88–94; Transcript of Testimony, Med-
ford, Oregon, May 27, 1920, Federal Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany et al., 5781, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 148, FTC, RG 
122, NARA II.
Charles W. Nibley with his sons, including Alexander, second 
from the right in the middle row, ca. 1902
Special Collections and Archives,
Utah State University
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all. Since Sanders did not have the money to buy out Nibley, 
Nibley asked Sanders to sell his stock to him. Then, because 
“it would require much more money than was contemplated 
to put the factory in successful operation,” Nibley requested 
that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company take over the OUSC and 
conduct its business. The sale to Nibley and the transfer to 
Utah-Idaho was fi nalized on June 7, 1916, when Utah-Idaho 
Sugar absorbed the OUSC.64
Sanders disputed Nibley’s version of events, claiming 
that the Grants Pass factory had not been in danger of fail-
ing and that Nibley had treated him poorly. Sanders and the 
FTC insisted that Nibley had planned all along to turn the 
OUSC over to Utah-Idaho Sugar. “It was never the intention 
of Bishop Nibley to let anybody outside of the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company have sugar factories . . . in this territory,” 
the FTC charged. Instead, Nibley wanted Sanders to provide 
fi nancing for the factory and then, “after it became apparent 
that the factory was an assured success,” he forced Sanders 
out of the enterprise and gave the corporation to Utah-Idaho 
Sugar.65 Sanders insisted that the OUSC was fi nancially sound 
when Nibley decided to give control of it to Utah-Idaho Sugar. 
Until May 20, 1916, he argued, things were going well—sev-
eral farmers had entered into beet contracts, the corporation 
had a good supply of beet seed, and construction of the fac-
tory was progressing. When Nibley informed Sanders that 
he wanted out of the OUSC because of its poor prospects, 
Sanders was shocked. At the same time, William McCornick, a 
non-Mormon Salt Lake City banker who served on the board 
of Utah-Idaho Sugar, called in a $60,000 loan that he had 
given Sanders to fund an irrigation system. Sanders’s Ore-
gon-Utah stock had secured the loan, and because Sanders 
could not repay the debt, McCornick’s bank laid a claim on 
his sugar stock. Thus, Sanders alleged, he was virtually forced 
to give the OUSC to Nibley, and thereby to Utah-Idaho Sugar. 
Because Sanders had “neglected every other interest [he] 
had . . . to build this sugar factory and made everything else 
64. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 95–99 (quotations on p. 97).
65. Brief of Claimant, 142.
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subservient to it,” the transfer of the OUSC to Utah-Idaho 
Sugar left his business affairs in a “terrible condition.” In his 
mind, the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, through the actions 
of Charles Nibley, had destroyed his career.66
Utah-Idaho attorneys painted an entirely different picture. 
Alexander Nibley insisted that Sanders had embezzled OUSC 
funds for his other enterprises and that this, coupled with 
the poor prospects of the Grants Pass area, led to the sev-
erance of ties. He claimed to have found a telegram from 
Sanders instructing an employee to use sugar money for an 
Oregon-Utah Realty Company transaction, another corpo-
ration in which Sanders had an interest. After Alexander’s 
discovery, he examined the books of the OUSC and found 
additional transfers of money to Sanders’s other fi rms. He 
then informed his father of the situation. Charles met with 
Sanders and asked him about the allegations. When Sanders 
admitted his misdeeds, Charles told him that he could no 
longer do business with him.67
Moreover, Frank Bramwell testifi ed that in addition to his 
alleged embezzlement, Sanders was a poor businessman. 
He supposedly planted beets in lands unsuitable for cultiva-
tion and located the Grants Pass factory in an unsatisfactory 
area. Because he had no experience in raising beets, Sanders 
ordered the wrong beet cultivators for the farmers, leaving 
Bramwell to straighten out the mess. Bramwell also charged 
that Sanders’s incompetence extended to his other businesses. 
The Southern Oregon Construction Company, Bramwell 
claimed, had diffi culty meeting its fi nancial obligations. 
Because Sanders had a reputation as a bungling businessman, 
Bramwell continued, his connection with the OUSC impaired 
the corporation’s chances for success.68 Meanwhile, a May 
1916 Salt Lake Herald-Republican (a Republican newspaper 
66. Transcript of Testimony, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 23, 1920, April 27, 1920,
Federal Trade Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 3123, 3127, 3137,
3316–20 (quotations on pp. 3331–32), Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 
303, box 146, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
67. Transcript of Testimony, Medford, Oregon, October 1, 1920, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company et al., 9301–4, Docketed Case Files, 
1915–43, Docket 303, box 150, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
68. Transcript of Testimony, Medford, Oregon, May 27, 1920, 5713, 5783–91.
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that had strong ties to the Republican Nibley) article stated 
that Nibley was dissatisfi ed with Sanders because Sanders 
had promised farmers two more factories in Oregon without 
consulting Nibley. “Until the result of the fi rst year’s run is 
known,” Nibley was quoted as saying, “it would be injudicious 
to launch other enterprises.” Sanders’s promise annoyed 
Nibley, and the presiding bishop, realizing that Sanders’s 
business acumen was slim, decided to cut all ties with him.69
Utah-Idaho’s attorneys extended the arguments about 
Sanders’s incompetence even further, charging that the 
Grants Pass area consisted of “sand hills, covered with shrub-
bery and small pines” with only “small tracts of suitable land 
for agricultural purposes.” The attorneys argued that the 
Medford area was “more suitable” for beet cultivation, but 
Sanders still insisted on locating the factory at Grants Pass 
because of his existing business interests. In addition, the 
lawyers claimed that these other corporations, such as the 
Southern Oregon Construction Company and the Oregon-
Utah Realty Company, which Sanders had represented to 
the Nibleys as prosperous fi rms, had “no assets whatever” 
and were defaulting on their debts. It was only after Charles 
realized the shoddy state of Sanders’s fi nancial affairs that he 
insisted on removing Sanders from the company.70
Besides, the company’s attorneys claimed, Charles Nibley was 
not acting as an offi cial of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in 
his Oregon dealings. The commission and its witnesses “mere-
ly assumed that the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company was interested 
in the enterprise because C. W. Nibley was interested in it,” 
they argued. Nibley participated in this enterprise without any 
authorization from Utah-Idaho Sugar, and, therefore, the FTC 
could not charge the corporation itself with unfair actions.
In some ways, the attorneys had an arguable point. Nibley 
began his association with Sanders solely on his own initiative, and 
Utah-Idaho’s board of directors never discussed taking over the 
Oregon-Utah Sugar Company until Nibley sent them a letter on 
May 23, 1916, offering to transfer the corporation to Utah-Idaho 
69. “Bishop Nibley to Quit Sugar Company,” Salt Lake Herald-Republican, May 21,
1916.
70. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 95.
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Sugar. In addition, when the fi nal agreement between the two 
companies was made, it stated that if Utah-Idaho wanted to get 
out of Oregon after two years, Nibley himself would buy out the 
corporation. Yet there was one gaping hole in this argument. At 
the time that Nibley engaged in business with Sanders, Nibley 
was the largest stockholder in Utah-Idaho Sugar, and, ultimately, 
could use that status to infl uence Utah-Idaho decisions. Besides, 
why would a man with a stake in one company form a compet-
ing concern unless his ultimate objective was to place the new 
business in subservience to the old?71
In the end, it was essentially Nibley’s word against Sand-
ers’s. Documents presented before the FTC, however, helped 
to illuminate what happened in Oregon, and they showed 
that there was some truth to the accusations on both sides. 
First, specifi c letters indicated that the Grants Pass area had 
more sugar beet potential than the Nibleys and Bramwell 
admitted to the FTC. In October 1915, Bramwell boasted in 
a letter to Nibley that “with the class or quality of land signed 
up hitherto failure is simply out of the question unless some 
unforeseen calamity develops.” Bramwell insisted that even 
though some farmers were unenthusiastic about growing 
beets, the land in Grants Pass was “of the very best quality to 
be found anywhere in the world[,] the Nile not excluded.”72
Likewise, in February 1916, an associate named R. L. Flynn 
sent Sanders a letter stating that Bramwell had inspected 
some beet acreage in an area close by Grants Pass. “He was 
very much pleased,” Flynn reported. “It was a great deal more 
than he expected from what had been said about it.”73 In May, 
Bramwell himself telegrammed Sanders, stating that “all land 
71. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company, May 23, 1916,” Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 156,
FTC, RG 122, NARA II; “Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, May 29, 1916,” ibid; “Minutes of the Meeting 
of the Board of Directors of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, June 14, 1916,”
ibid.
72. F. S. Bramwell to Bishop Charles W. Nibley, October 30, 1915, Docketed Case 
Files, 1915–43, Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II (emphasis in the 
original).
73. R. L. Flynn to George Sanders, February 2, 1916, Docketed Case Files, 1915–
43, Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
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planted and yet to be planted good. . . . Beets in excellent 
condition.”74 Perhaps most signifi cant, however, was that 
Utah-Idaho Sugar even agreed to buy the Grants Pass factory. 
Why, one might ask, would the corporation purchase it if it 
did not believe that it had at least some potential? It seems 
that the claims that Grants Pass was unsuitable for sugar beets 
were overstated, indicating that reports of Sanders’s lack of 
knowledge about sugar beets were exaggerated as well.
Other documents supported Nibley’s claims that Sanders 
had embezzled money. In 1915, Josephine County, Oregon, 
indicted Sanders for embezzlement, charging that Sanders 
had withdrawn $2281 from the Rogue River Public Ser-
vice Corporation and used it for his personal needs.75 Two 
years after his trouble with the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
A fi eld of sugar beets in Oregon
Leonard J. Arrington Papers, Special Collections 
and Archives, Utah State University
74. F. S. Bramwell to Sanders, May 22, 1916, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 
303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
75. “The State of Oregon vs. George E. Sanders, Indictment,” Docketed Case Files, 
1915–43, Docket 303, box 156, FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
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Sanders’s new employer, the Utah National Underwriters 
Corporation, accused him of writing company checks for 
personal expenses, prompting the corporation to remove 
him from its board of directors.76 Finally, before Nibley met 
with Sanders in May, Sanders himself admitted in a letter to 
Nibley that “circumstances have arisen in connection with my 
personal affairs” to cause the selling of his interests in the 
OUSC.77 Sanders’s business conduct was certainly not above 
reproach; they led Nibley to refer to him as a “notorious 
crook” as late as December 1920.78
Regardless of what the ultimate truth was, the situation 
was yet another example of how LDS involvement in a 
business enterprise led to complications and embarrassing 
situations. Even if Nibley’s account of the matter was entirely 
correct—and the evidence suggests that this was not the 
case—his reputation still would have been soiled by Sanders’s 
allegations (which the FTC accepted as fact). The fact that 
Nibley served as presiding bishop of the church (a position 
responsible for the temporal welfare of the church and its 
members) at the time of these activities worsened the situa-
tion; his involvement in business transactions that left a mem-
ber of his fl ock unable to engage in business seemed at best 
disturbing and at worst immoral, as did his continued grudge 
against Sanders. Perhaps this is one reason why LDS offi cials 
would eventually decide to restrict the business activities of 
those serving in high-ranking church positions.
The ultimate question was why an offi cial in a religion that 
promoted honesty would resort to, at best, deceptive busi-
ness techniques. In Nibley’s case, the answer was convoluted, 
but it provides possible insights into why LDS leaders—of all 
ranks—worked to eliminate Utah-Idaho competitors. Born in 
1849 to parents who had converted to Mormonism fi ve years 
before his birth, Nibley had immigrated with his family to 
76. “Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Utah National 
Underwriters Corporation,” 6528–35, Transcript of Testimony, San Francisco, 
California, June 10, 1920.
77. Sanders to Nibley, April 28, 1916, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43, Docket 303,
box 156, Records of the FTC, RG 122, NARA II.
78. Nibley to Smoot, December 22, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1.
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Utah in 1860, settling in Cache Valley, where he soon became 
involved in the Mormon cooperatives that arose in the area 
in the 1870s. From 1879 to 1885, for example, he managed a 
lumber company organized as part of the community’s Unit-
ed Order. As he rose to prominent leadership positions in 
the church, he advocated the benefi ts of Mormon coopera-
tion. In a series of lectures given to Mormon congregations in 
1885 and 1886, he told his audience that the ideal society was 
one where property was held in common and people were 
given what they needed to live—the template for the LDS 
United Order. “Any system of political economy which allows 
the wealth of a country to be controlled and gathered in by 
a few,” he related, “and thereby gives them power to oppress 
their fellows, must be a wrong system.”79
As Nibley advanced in the business world, his actions belied 
these beliefs. In the late 1800s, he began the Oregon Lum-
ber Company with fellow Mormon David Eccles and made a 
considerable amount of money from this endeavor. As Nibley 
progressed in the lumber industry, and as he gained a foot-
hold in the sugar business (fi rst through means of the Lewis-
ton Sugar Company, which was absorbed by the Amalgamated 
Sugar Company), he began to use any method he could to gain 
money. Hugh Nibley, one of his grandsons, once related that 
Charles used various economic “tricks” in his dealings, includ-
ing manipulating the Homestead Act to acquire “vast stretches” 
of unsurveyed forests and then “paying off government agents 
who came from the East to ask what was going on.”80 One of 
the reasons for this may have been an insatiable desire for 
profi t fueled by a childhood spent in abject poverty; another 
could have been the infl uence of his mother, who, according 
to Charles, “was all energy and push and never seemed to tire 
of working and scheming to get on in the world.”81
Yet others had faced childhood poverty, had experienced 
79. Quotations in C. W. Nibley, “Political Economy,” in Logan Temple Lectures: A 
Series of Lectures Delivered Before the Temple School of Science During the Years 1885–86 
(Logan, Utah, 1886), 38, 50–51 (emphasis in the original); see also Nibley, 
Reminiscences, 61–64, 74–84.
80. Hugh Nibley, Approaching Zion (Provo, Ut., 1989), 469.
81. Charles W. Nibley, Reminiscences (Salt Lake City, 1934), 7.
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ambition and drive, and had channeled it in other direc-
tions. Louis Brandeis, for example, the champion of the 
FTC, was born to a family that both prospered in the grain-
merchandising business and suffered downtimes as well. In 
the 1870s, his parents were forced to move back to Germany, 
from where they had immigrated in the 1840s because of 
fi nancial setbacks. Unlike Nibley, however, the intellectually 
gifted Brandeis channeled his energies into law and became 
known as “the ‘people’s lawyer’ of the Progressive Era” for 
crusading against big business.82 What made the difference? 
Certainly, the personalities of Nibley and Brandeis had some 
infl uence, but perhaps there was truth to essayist Bernard 
DeVoto’s assessment that Mormons used their “religious 
energy for fi nancial ends.”83 By the early 1900s, many LDS 
leaders were promoting the value of wealth in society, declar-
ing that a man’s fi nancial condition indicated his spiritual 
obedience, as the accumulation of wealth was an indication 
of God’s favor.84 In essence, this was all the justifi cation Nibley 
needed. If God did not approve of his actions, He would not 
allow Nibley to profi t by them.
But Nibley had another rationalization that he could 
employ: loyalty to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, the organization in which he had served as presiding 
bishop since 1907. Nibley strongly believed that the interests 
of the church superseded all others. “Our duties to our God; 
to our Church; to our families; to our neighbors; these ought 
to be fi rst,” he once declared in an LDS general conference, 
“rather than prating so much about our rights.”85 Practic-
ing what he preached, he once told Smith that if Smith, “as 
president of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,” 
would counsel Nibley not to undertake an enterprise, Nibley 
82. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 82.
83. Bernard DeVoto, “The Centennial of Mormonism,” American Mercury 19
(January 1930): 11, 13.
84. Ethan R. Yorgason, Transformation of the Mormon Culture Region (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003), 90–91, 97.
85. Charles W. Nibley, “The Church and the Laws of the Land,” Improvement Era 26
(December 1922): 183.
86. Minutes of the Utah Sugar Company, July 10, 1903, Arrington Papers, box 10,
folder 1.
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would refuse.86
If he could make such sacrifi ces, Nibley might claim, others 
should as well, especially in situations where the church would 
benefi t. These ideas extended into Nibley’s thoughts on com-
petition in the sugar industry, where both he and the church 
had a considerable fi nancial interest because of their hold-
ings in the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. The best explication 
of Nibley’s economic beliefs regarding competition came in 
a 1916 essay in the Salt Lake Tribune entitled “Facts Are Given 
About the Sugar Industry.” Nibley began by explaining that 
independent concerns intruding on someone else’s territory 
were a community nuisance, causing “economic waste,” dilut-
ing the potential wealth of an enterprise, and squandering 
valuable building resources for no good reason:
If a man owns a little grocery store on the corner and 
he is quite able to do all the business of the vicin-
ity and even more, what must be thought of the man 
who goes and planks down another grocery store in 
the immediate vicinity when he knows it will not only 
injure his brother, but knows full well that there is 
hardly business enough for one?87
The situation might be different in other industries, but 
not in sugar where “the Utah-Idaho Sugar company stands 
ready to extend their business and build factories wherever 
suffi cient beets can be produced [sic].” Most of the territories 
where new enterprises arose could be adequately serviced by 
Utah-Idaho Sugar, Nibley declared, so outside organizations 
merely decreased the potential profi ts of all those involved.88
Moreover, Nibley considered it a high form of betrayal 
for Mormon farmers and consumers not to support Utah-
Idaho Sugar because of the church’s sacrifi ce in the corpo-
ration’s initial years. The monetary funds that church lead-
ers expended to keep the business afl oat, Nibley contin-
87. Nibley, “Facts are Given About the Sugar Industry,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25,
1916.
88. Nibley, “Facts are Given About the Sugar Industry,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25,
1916.
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ued, allowed beet sugar to become “one of the best lines of 
industry that . . . ever blessed” the region. Although other 
groups might offer “a higher price temporarily” to farmers 
for their beets, beet growers were better off staying with a 
corporation operated by “the wisdom and the foresight” of 
church leaders.89 Nibley was not alone in these beliefs; in 
the church’s October 1919 General Conference, President 
Heber J. Grant reminded members that without the church’s 
early support, no sugar business would exist in Utah or Idaho 
“that would amount to much.” But Wilford Woodruff and 
other church leaders did sacrifi ce, Grant declared, and thus 
the sugar industry had “made for our people and for the 
Church millions of dollars.”90
Although neither Nibley nor Grant came right out and 
said it, such declarations implied that only the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company, with its church infl uence, was a beet sugar 
enterprise worthy of Mormon support. If one extended that 
argument further, acting to put other endeavors out of busi-
ness was neither improper nor immoral; it was in the best inter-
est of the predominantly LDS communities in northern Utah 
and southeastern Idaho. Although not doing so consciously, 
such ideas drew on a tradition of thought prevalent in the 
business world during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that it was legal for parties to restrict competition 
among themselves as long as it did not restrain competition 
unreasonably or hurt the public interest.91 Andrew Carnegie, 
for example, claimed that his business methods and “superb 
industrial organization” were what allowed “the general 
public [to] obtain steel at an unbelievably low price,” and 
therefore should not be outlawed.92
But these ideas were grounded in the fundamentally con-
descending attitude that only business magnates—or LDS 
leaders—knew what was good for the general public. More-
89. Nibley, “Facts are Given About the Sugar Industry,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 25,
1916.
90. Eighty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Salt 
Lake City, 1919), 9.
91. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916, 100, 204–
205, 213.
92. Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie (New York, 1970), 637.
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over, it never gave farmers a chance to discover for them-
selves whether the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company really was 
the best enterprise for the community. If the BGSC or the 
GVSC had stayed in business for longer than a few years, 
perhaps farmers could have realized higher prices for their 
beets, in part by pitting one company against the other. 
Lacking this competition, Utah-Idaho Sugar did not have 
to worry about being outbid for beets. Perhaps Utah-Idaho 
still would have offered better rates, but Utah and Idaho 
residents would never know because of the corporation’s 
actions.
Still, Nibley refused to admit that Utah-Idaho Sugar had 
done anything wrong. Instead, he declared that the entire 
trial, including the FTC’s fi nal decision, was “the worst lot 
of bunk that has ever been gotten together.”93 Echoing his 
reaction to the U.S. Department of Justice’s profi teering 
investigation, Nibley claimed that the accusations of the FTC 
had been instigated by James H. Moyle, a prominent Utah 
Democrat, and William King, a Democratic senator from 
Utah, to prevent the reelection of Republican senator Reed 
Smoot and to undermine Nibley’s ability to contribute to the 
Republican party. Nibley believed that the discovery of a tele-
gram sent by George Sanders to Henry W. Beer, the pros-
ecuting attorney for the FTC, stating that if Beer could keep 
the trial going for two months, Smoot would lose the elec-
tion, corroborated this view.94 Smoot decried these actions 
on the fl oor of the Senate, but his indignation failed to stop 
the FTC’s investigation and it had little infl uence on the out-
come of the trial.95
Interestingly, although both Nibley and Smoot levied accu-
sations of dirty politics, neither of them (nor anyone else in 
the company) refuted any of the specifi c charges against Utah-
Idaho Sugar. Indeed, the brief submitted by the company 
during the trial relied mostly on whether or not the FTC had 
the authority to investigate Utah-Idaho Sugar, and whether a 
93. Nibley to Smoot, May 14, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1.
94. “Nibley Accused of Stealing Telegram,” Salt Lake Tribune, June 11, 1920.
95. Nibley to Smoot, May 15, 1920, Smoot Papers, box 42, folder 1; “Smoot Accuses 
Trade Commission,” New York Times, May 25, 1920.
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corporation could be charged for the unauthorized actions 
of individual employees.96 The FTC, however, declared that 
both Merrill Nibley, vice president of Utah-Idaho, and Charles 
had “taken a very active part in the management of the com-
pany” and must have known about the actions of their subor-
dinates.97 It is diffi cult to believe that Charles did not have at 
least some knowledge of the practices carried out in Utah and 
Idaho, especially since he was the largest stockholder, a direc-
tor, and eventually the general manager of the company.98
No matter how Nibley or other Utah-Idaho offi cials justi-
fi ed their conduct, Judge Dunham and the FTC concluded 
that Utah-Idaho Sugar had violated the law in its dealings 
with independent enterprises. On October 3, 1923, the com-
mission issued its decision, declaring that Utah-Idaho Sugar 
was guilty of unfair business practices. It denounced the ter-
ritorial divisions established by Utah-Idaho and Amalgam-
ated which gave them “a practical if not an entire monopoly 
of the beet sugar industry” in the Intermountain West, and 
it ordered Utah-Idaho and Amalgamated to “forever cease 
and desist from conspiring between and among themselves 
to maintain . . . the monopoly.” It also directed Utah-Idaho 
offi cials to stop working “to prevent the establishment of beet 
sugar enterprises and the building of sugar factories by per-
sons or interests” other than itself.99
Only three out of the fi ve commissioners, however, sup-
ported the decision, revealing the political partisanship of the 
FTC. Huston Thompson, the Democratic chairman, Victor 
Murdock, the former Progressive who was now affi liated with 
the Democrats, and John F. Nugent, another Democrat, all 
favored issuing the cease and desist order against Utah-Idaho 
Sugar, but Vernon W. Van Fleet and Nelson B. Gaskill, both 
Republicans, dissented. Throughout the 1910s, Democrats 
96. Brief of Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 71.
97. Brief of Claimant, 15.
98. Brief of Claimant, 141–69. Utah-Idaho Sugar had a point as well. No 
correspondence exists which specifi cally orders Jon Hart, the Austins, A. P. 
Cooper, E. F. Cullen, Ernest Woolley, or Robert Young to carry on their actions, 
and company minutes contain no smoking gun either.
99. Federal Trade Commission Decisions, 404, 417.
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had consistently sided with consumers against big business, 
while Republicans had generally supported the need to give 
large corporations leeway in their policies. The FTC trial was 
no different. Although Thompson, Murdock, and Nugent 
all believed that Utah-Idaho Sugar should be punished for 
its unfair practices, Van Fleet and Gaskill, drawing on the 
arguments of an 1895 Supreme Court decision in favor 
of the American Sugar Refi ning Company, insisted that 
the FTC had no jurisdiction over the corporation because 
the manufacturing of sugar did not constitute interstate 
commerce.100
Encouraged by Van Fleet, Gaskill, and the Supreme Court’s 
earlier decision, Utah-Idaho offi cials appealed the FTC’s 
fi ndings to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, located in St. 
Louis, Missouri, early in 1924.101 In accordance with the law, 
the FTC fi led a transcript of the trial with the court. Because 
of the length of the transcript, the court ordered Utah-Ida-
ho’s attorneys to submit a “condensed narrative” of the trial. 
This summary, containing 1,433 pages, was fi led in early 
1925. Subsequently, the court scheduled the case for Septem-
ber 14, 1925, but then continued it to the September 1926
term because neither the petitioners nor the respondents 
had fi led their briefs or made their arguments. Finally, in 
May 1927, the court, which convened in St. Paul, Minnesota, 
called the case again, and Utah-Idaho’s attorneys presented 
their reasoning as to why the fi ndings should be overturned. 
In the summer, the FTC fi led its response to Utah-Idaho’s 
appeal and offered its oral arguments.102
100. Federal Trade Commission Decisions, 420–21; Blaisdell, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 80, 91; Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 124–25.
101. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was organized in St. Louis, Missouri, in 
1891, and had jurisdiction over thirteen states, including Utah. It normally 
heard cases in three different cities: St. Louis, Denver, Colorado, and St. Paul, 
Minnesota. In 1929, the court was divided into two and Utah thus became part 
of the Tenth Circuit Court. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals <Library8@ca8.
uscourts.gov> to Matthew Godfrey <mgodfrey@wsunix.wsu.edu>, February 
23, 2001, email in possession of author.
102. Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1924 (Washington, D. C., 1924), 57–58; Annual Report of the Federal Trade 
Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1925, 46; Annual Report of the Federal 
Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1926 (Washington,
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In their appeal, Utah-Idaho’s lawyers admitted that the 
company sold its sugar in different states, which was, of 
course, interstate commerce. In order for the commission to 
have jurisdiction over the corporation, the appeal contended, 
the FTC had to demonstrate that the corporation’s illegal 
business practices specifi cally affected that commerce. Since 
all of the commission’s charges dealt with the manufacture 
of sugar and not its sale across state lines, the corporation 
argued, the FTC could not prosecute Utah-Idaho Sugar. The 
FTC responded that “it is not true that such unfair method 
must be used in the course of the actor’s interstate com-
merce.” Instead, “it is suffi cient if the commerce affected be 
not actually in existence but about to spring into being.”103
After deliberating the evidence, the court, on October 21,
1927, agreed with Utah-Idaho’s arguments, dismissed the 
FTC’s fi ndings, and stated that the manufacturing of sugar 
was not interstate commerce.104
The reasoning employed by the court in overturning the 
FTC’s decision was a familiar refrain in the United States 
by that time. The court’s argument that a business’s opera-
tions did not constitute interstate commerce had been used 
in several antimonopoly cases, including American Sugar 
Refi ning Company’s and a U.S. Department of Justice inves-
tigation of the California Associated Raisin Company in the 
aftermath of the First World War.105 Technically, this line of 
reasoning was accurate. Both the Sherman Antitrust Act and 
the Federal Trade Commission Act only gave jurisdiction to 
the federal government if the alleged monopolistic actions 
occurred across state lines. Otherwise, states would have to 
prosecute the endeavors. Yet, at least in Utah-Idaho Sugar’s 
D. C., 1926), 34; Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year 
Ended June 30, 1927 (Washington, D. C., 1927), 73.
103. In the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company et al., Petitioners v. Federal Trade Commission, Respondent, Brief for 
Respondent (Washington, D. C., 1927), 2.
104. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v Federal Trade Commission, 22 F2d 122 (8 Cir 1927);
Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1928 (Washington, D. C., 1928), 73; Smith, Thomas Robinson Cutler, 164.
105. See Victoria Saker Woeste, The Farmer’s Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural 
Cooperation in Industrial America, 1865–1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998),
138–56.
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case, the argument seems too narrow and constricting. The 
corporation operated in at least two different states and sold 
the sugar that it manufactured in several regions. The courts 
were unmoved, however, and, as with the profi teering case in 
1920, Utah-Idaho Sugar escaped relatively unscathed, despite 
the clear evidence against it.
The court of public opinion was a little less forgiving. Arti-
cle after article in the Salt Lake Tribune detailed the actions of 
Utah-Idaho Sugar and demonstrated that the LDS church, 
through both high-ranking church leaders and lay offi cials, 
still exercised a considerable amount of power in the eco-
nomic affairs of the Intermountain West. The public read 
about ecclesiastical offi cers counseling members under their 
supervision to conduct business only with Utah-Idaho, and 
disparaging non-LDS-sponsored enterprises as detrimental 
to the community. Perhaps more disturbing was the tendency 
of Utah-Idaho authorities to act in immoral and dishonest 
ways to eliminate competition, especially since these individ-
uals belonged to a church that valued honesty and integrity 
in human relationships. Leading the way in these endeavors 
was Charles Nibley, presiding bishop of the LDS church, who 
waged his own war against George Sanders to ensure that 
an Oregon enterprise was enfolded into Utah-Idaho Sugar. 
The reasoning behind Nibley’s actions (as well as other Utah-
Idaho offi cials) is diffi cult to unravel, but his justifi cations 
were essentially that the LDS church and its leaders had sac-
rifi ced for the sugar industry, so the interests of Utah-Idaho 
Sugar superseded any other concerns.
Seeing these things, Mormons and non-Mormons alike 
could perceive that the economic infl uence of the LDS 
church had really not come very far from the 1860s, 1870s,
and 1880s, times when the church applied “sanctions against 
members engaging in certain businesses in competition with 
LDS enterprises.”106 Yet at that time, the LDS church was the 
central operating authority in Utah’s economy, and it pro-
moted economic endeavors to increase self-suffi ciency in 
Utah Territory and to prevent the outfl ow of cash for import-
106. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition, 75.
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ed goods. Now, the methods were used to line the pockets of 
LDS leaders who held an interest in Utah-Idaho Sugar, a very 
different situation. Thus, it was not surprising to hear denun-
ciations of the corporation and its leaders in the aftermath of 
the FTC trial, even by church members. “When Presidents of 
Stakes, bishops, high councilmen and others approach you in 
the capacity of sugar company hired men,” Charles G. Patter-
son warned Latter-day Saints in 1922, “it will help some if you 
forget everything about them except that they are hired by 
the sugar company to boost for it.”107 Keeping that in mind, 
Patterson hoped, would allow members to separate ecclesias-
tical doctrine and authority from moneymaking policies.
107. C. G. Patterson, Cracking Nuts in Utah: Little Essays on Tender Subjects (Salt Lake 
City: n.p., 1922), 11.
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Conclusion
When the Federal Trade Commission ceased taking testimony in its trial of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 
in February 1921, the corporation’s problems with govern-
ment investigations largely ended. The FTC issued its fi nd-
ings against the company in 1923, and in 1927, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the agency’s decision, 
but no other government inquiries followed the FTC’s trial. 
Instead, Utah-Idaho Sugar spent most of the 1920s working 
with the federal government in order to preserve the corpo-
ration’s economic solvency.
In 1921, federal loans helped revive the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company from the worldwide crash in sugar prices. Nonethe-
less, the corporation faced continued fi nancial diffi culties for 
much of the next decade. In 1924, curly top, a beet-withering 
disease spread by the white fl y, created serious problems for 
farmers throughout Utah, Idaho, and Washington. That year, 
agriculturists planted over eighty-three thousand acres of beets 
for Utah-Idaho Sugar, but the white fl y affected so many dif-
ferent areas that only sixty-four thousand acres were harvested 
and only four hundred twenty-four thousand tons of sugar were 
produced, a decline of almost one million bags. Because of the 
extent of the disease, Utah-Idaho was forced to close down pro-
cessing plants in Lehi and Delta, Utah; Rigby, Idaho; and Top-
penish, Washington. The next few years brought more curly 
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top problems, and by 1929, three more factories in Elsinore, 
Payson, and Moroni, Utah, closed, as well. Although Utah-
Idaho Sugar relocated many of these plants to other areas, it 
lost hundreds of thousands of dollars from idle factories.1
The continued instability in sugar production and pric-
es throughout the 1920s compounded these losses. Prices 
rebounded in 1922 and 1923, but they fell to 2.5 cents per 
pound in 1924 and 1925. The main reason for this decrease 
was overproduction. Cane growers in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
the Philippines increased their total output in the 1920s, as 
did Hawaii and Europe. Because of the unusually large sup-
ply of sugar, the commodity dropped to two cents per pound 
in 1929, and after the onset of the Great Depression, it fell 
to one cent. Facing substantial losses, Utah-Idaho Sugar took 
out loans from bankers in Salt Lake City and New York City 
and enacted strict fi scal policies that reduced costs of produc-
tion and postponed dividend payments.2
At the same time, Utah-Idaho offi cials worked closely with 
the federal government to mitigate the fi nancial destruction 
and the disease problems. The U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture labored throughout the 1920s to fi nd a solution to curly 
top, which by 1926 had forced twenty-two beet sugar factories 
in the American West to shut down. Researchers investigated 
the possibility of developing a breed of sugar beets that could 
resist the disease, and the government appointed Dr. George 
H. Coons, a specialist in beet diseases at Michigan Agricultural 
College in Lansing, Michigan, to work on the problem. Con-
gress appropriated $400,000 to support his efforts in 1928,
and shortly thereafter Coons and his researchers produced 
the fi rst strain of curly-top resistant beets. By the mid-1930s,
the newly developed seed, known as “U.S. No. 1,” had signifi -
cantly benefi ted Utah-Idaho Sugar by helping to increase the 
beet production of its farmers.3
The government also addressed the problem of low prices 
by passing the Sugar Act of 1934. This law established a quota 
1. Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West: A History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany, 1891–1966 (Seattle, 1966), 101–6.
2. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 123–24.
3. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 110–18.
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system for American sugar and divided the country’s market 
between beets, domestic cane production, and sugar from 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba. If manufactur-
ers met specifi c qualifi cations, such as planting a certain amount 
of acreage and providing good wages to their employees, com-
panies became eligible for a federal cash benefi t payment of 
$2.60 per ton of beets. This act, coupled with the Department 
of Agriculture’s work to produce curly-top-resistant beets, had 
provided increased security and stability to the sugar industry 
by the mid-1930s. In addition, when the United States became 
involved in the Second World War in 1941, prices rose and 
sugar producers prospered once again. The government regu-
lated the production and sale of sugar during the war, and, as 
with the First World War, many sugar companies readily sub-
mitted to increased government control.4
One of the biggest factors in Utah-Idaho’s ability to ride 
out the economic storms of the 1920s and 1930s, however, 
was the continued involvement of the LDS church. Heber J. 
Grant remained president of the corporation, and, except for 
a two-year stint as vice president and chairman of the board, 
he labored in that position until his death in 1945. Mean-
while, after resigning as general manager, Charles Nibley was 
appointed vice president and worked in that capacity until 
he died in 1931. Other church authorities also held key posi-
tions: George Albert Smith, an apostle in the church, was vice 
president from 1922 to 1931 and then became president 
of the corporation when he was appointed head of the LDS 
church in 1945. In 1951, David O. McKay succeeded Smith 
as president of both the church and Utah-Idaho Sugar, while 
Senator Reed Smoot concluded a four-year term as vice presi-
dent from 1937 to 1941.5
The LDS church also maintained its fi nancial support of 
the company. After the stock market crash of 1929, the church 
loaned the corporation $750,000 and also underwrote bank 
loans. In October 1935, Utah-Idaho Sugar decided to exploit 
4. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 129–32; Fred G. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar: Being A 
Story of the Romance and Development of Beet Sugar in the Rocky Mountain West (Salt 
Lake City, 1944), 183–84.
5. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 178–79.
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low interest rates by issuing new bonds totaling $3.5 million, 
thereby fi nancing the payment of accumulated dividends on 
preferred stock. The church agreed to buy $2 million of the 
new bond release, and it also accepted $500,000 more in 
bonds as payment against the 1929 loan. The church’s hold-
ings in Utah-Idaho Sugar increased substantially, and the 
Mormon organization continued its fi nancial and adminis-
trative interest in the corporation until the 1980s.6
In many ways, the story of the early history of the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company is fascinating just because of the legal, 
political, and economic turmoil it faced. But this history also 
holds several layers of signifi cance for historians. For one 
thing, it illustrates how several regulatory mechanisms func-
tioned in the United States in the early twentieth century, 
such as the Federal Trade Commission. Although Woodrow 
Wilson and other reformers envisioned the FTC as restoring 
competition to American business, it had little power in its 
early years, especially because its decisions were subject to 
judicial review. In 1927, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
could overturn the FTC’s fi ndings that Utah-Idaho Sugar 
had used unfair business practices against its competitors by 
insisting that the manufacturing of sugar was not interstate 
commerce, thereby nullifying the agency’s jurisdiction over 
the case. Such overrulings were not confi ned to the FTC, 
however, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s dismissal of 
the Lever Act as unconstitutional, quashing the profi teering 
indictments against Utah-Idaho directors. In both instances, 
earnest efforts by government agencies to protect consumers 
and ensure competition in American business were destroyed 
by judicial decisions. Historians have acknowledged that fed-
eral courts were impediments to reform; the battles between 
Utah-Idaho Sugar and the government in 1920 and 1921
6. Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 124–27, 135. In 1979, Utah-Idaho Sugar 
decided to abandon the sugar business because “sugar prices had fallen, the 
company’s sugar operations were not profi table, and the future did not seem 
promising.” The corporation subsequently moved its headquarters to Kenne-
wick, Washington, where it focused on potato processing. In the mid-1980s,
the LDS church sold the company, and it was renamed AgraWest. Rowland M. 
Cannon to Matthew Godfrey, June 22, 1999, letter in possession of the author. 
Rowland Cannon was president of Utah-Idaho Sugar from 1969 to 1981.
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emphasize this point.7 Yet other agencies were more success-
ful in their endeavors. The Food Administration, for example, 
operated throughout the First World War to prevent shortag-
es and high prices in consumer goods, and the Sugar Equal-
ization Board had comparable success in the sugar arena.
Utah-Idaho Sugar’s history also indicates, somewhat sur-
prisingly, that congressional allies of big corporations some-
times tried to get their friends to toe the line. When Utah-
Idaho’s directors fi rst decided to raise sugar prices in 1920, for 
example, they contacted Smoot to see what the Department 
of Justice would think. Smoot presented Utah-Idaho’s case to 
the DOJ, but after it told him that a price hike would result 
in an investigation, the senator counseled Utah-Idaho Sugar 
to abide by the regulations and keep its rates low. Although 
Smoot believed that the Justice Department’s inquiry was 
ultimately based on political intrigue, he did not think that 
Utah-Idaho Sugar was justifi ed in raising its prices. In a similar 
way, Smoot acted as an emissary between the corporation and 
Herbert Hoover during the First World War. Smoot frequent-
ly presented Nibley’s proposals about sugar prices to Hoover, 
but when the food administrator rejected these suggestions, 
Smoot encouraged Nibley to trust Hoover’s decisions. Nibley 
and other Utah-Idaho directors did not always follow Smoot’s 
recommendations, but it is signifi cant that Smoot, perhaps 
sensing his duty to the government, advised the corporation 
from time to time to obey government regulations rather 
than reject them outright.
Neither Smoot nor any other member of Congress pre-
vented beet sugar from becoming politicized, in large part 
because of its importance to the economic well-being of the 
American West. For the fi rst half of the twentieth century, 
beet sugar production was vital to the agricultural econo-
mies of several states, including Utah, Idaho, Colorado, and 
California. At its height, as one publication attested, beet sugar 
was “an integral part of the economy of twenty-two states,” the 
vast majority of which were in the trans- Mississippi West. For 
7. See, for example, Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.
(New York, 1955), 309.
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farmers in these states, beet sugar served as “a major source of 
income and purchasing power” by providing them with a reli-
able cash crop.8 As one of the major players in the beet sugar 
industry, Utah-Idaho Sugar became embroiled in the politics 
that accompanied such power. Indeed, both Republicans and 
Democrats used the corporation’s troubles with the federal 
government to their benefi t: the Democrats to show the need 
for economic regulation in the state and the Republicans to 
charge Democrats with needlessly harassing a corporation 
for political gains. This same partisanship extended to the 
national arena, in large part because of the extent to which 
the beet sugar industry relied on the federal government. 
Many beet sugar companies argued that they could not sur-
vive without the tariff, while the federal government enabled 
corporations such as Utah-Idaho to continue operations in 
the agricultural depression of the early 1920s. In addition, 
through the farm bureau and county agent system of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, beet farmers were able to lobby 
Utah-Idaho Sugar for better prices. Federal entanglements, 
although benefi cial in several ways to beet sugar, furthered 
its politicization.
Along with federal efforts, the most signifi cant force sup-
porting the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, as explained above, 
continued to be the LDS church. This brings us back to the 
central questions of this book: why the LDS church became 
involved in sugar, why it maintained that involvement and 
even used it to its advantage, and what repercussions this 
had on both the church and the corporation. As this study 
has demonstrated, the answers are many and convoluted. 
Brigham Young and John Taylor originally attempted to pro-
duce sugar in Utah Territory so that Utahns would not have 
to pay exorbitant amounts to import the product from the 
East. Wilford Woodruff had similar ideas, but was also moti-
vated by his conviction that God wanted the beet sugar indus-
try established in Utah. He and other church leaders gave 
several reasons why the Lord might have such a desire, such 
8. United States Beet Sugar Association, The Beet Sugar Story, 3rd ed. (Washington, 
D.C., 1959), 18.
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as the hope that the sugar industry would create jobs in facto-
ries for recently arrived migrants who had no access to land 
or the provision of a dependable cash crop to farmers. Look-
ing out for the welfare of their members and drawing on a 
tradition of the LDS church as the central economic author-
ity in Utah, Woodruff and other church offi cials believed that 
these possibilities warranted extensive church involvement, 
both fi nancially and through the exertion of ecclesiastical 
infl uence on behalf of the company.
But Utah’s economy was changing, evolving into a more 
national and less regional force, and the church itself faced 
fi nancial diffi culties in the late 1800s and early 1900s that pre-
cluded extensive LDS aid. Thus, as the directors of the Utah 
Sugar Company eyed expansion, it had to turn to outside forc-
es, namely the American Sugar Refi ning Company, for fi nancial 
aid. The purchase of 50 percent of the Utah Sugar Company’s 
stock by Henry Havemeyer and American Sugar paved the 
way for Utah Sugar to extend into Idaho, but it also aligned 
the corporation with the Sugar Trust, a force that many Ameri-
cans regarded as a prime example of corporate malfeasance. 
Instead of refuting American Sugar’s practices of forcing com-
petitors out of business or absorbing them, Utah-Idaho leaders 
embraced such policies and used the infl uence of the church to 
Utah-Idaho’s advantage. Big business was just as much alive in 
the American West in the early 1900s as it was in the East.
Today, and even to many contemporary observers, the 
actions of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, well documented 
by the Hardwick Committee, the U.S. Department of Justice, 
and the Federal Trade Commission, seem puzzling, given the 
involvement of Mormon offi cials such as Joseph F. Smith, 
Heber J. Grant, and Charles W. Nibley in its affairs. Why did 
religious leaders permit such conduct to occur, and, in some 
instances, actively encourage it? Several reasons exist. For one 
thing, the national sugar market engulfed Utah-Idaho Sugar, 
making the company subject to its economic forces. This situ-
ation had two effects: fi rst, it meant that the corporation had 
little control over how sugar prices and beet rates were set. 
Generally, unless the company wanted to start a price war 
with other interests, it had to follow either market forces or, 
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during the First World War, the federal government in the 
setting of prices. Second, because it became more of a nation-
al player, Utah-Idaho had to look out for its own interests in 
the cutthroat world of sugar. High sugar prices caused by the 
outbreak of the First World War led to the rise of new beet 
sugar concerns, all anxious to take advantage of the situation. 
If Utah-Idaho wanted to survive in these conditions, it had to 
do whatever it took to maintain its hold in the Intermountain 
West. If that involved using the church’s infl uence to drive 
competitors out of business, so be it.
But these were conscious decisions that Utah-Idaho leaders 
made, and ones that seemed to fl y in the face of their respon-
sibilities to members of the LDS church. Why did they then 
make them? The easy answer, and one that many observers 
considered to be most obvious, was merely greed. The LDS 
church and several of its leaders held considerable amounts 
of stock in the company, and when it did well, they received 
dividends. Because of the policies of the corporation (cou-
pled with trends in the national market), Utah-Idaho Sugar 
made a considerable amount of money in the 1910s, and the 
church and its offi cials were rewarded accordingly (see Table 
2). In 1916, for example, the church reported that it had 
obtained “a net gain of $1,416,500 on its Utah-Idaho stock” 
just between 1914 and 1916.9
9. “Statement of Church Sugar Stock Purchases, July 1, 1916,” Scott G. Kenney 
Collection, MSS 587, box 12, folder 22, Special Collections and Archives, J. 
Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Year NetCompany Profi t
1912 1,727,031
1913 ------
1914 1,786,495
1915 2,323,495
1916 4,631,076
1917 10,031,859
1918 1,373,825
1919 1,052,985
1920 968,275
1921 1,064,463
Table 2: Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company Net Profi t, 1912–
1921. “Net Profi t Before 
Income,” Leonard J. Arrington 
Papers, Series 12, MSS 1,
box 10, folder 10, Special 
Collections and Archives, Utah 
State University.
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Yet greed was not the only motivation. As Nibley’s situation 
showed, unfl inching loyalty to the Mormon church played a 
role as well. The church had made a large sacrifi ce to support 
the Utah Sugar Company in the 1890s, as had many of its 
leaders. Was it not appropriate for those who had forfeited so 
much both in time and money to receive a reward, no matter 
how they obtained it? Should not good LDS members prove 
their loyalty to the church by supporting Utah-Idaho Sugar 
in every way, even if it meant sacrifi cing their own interests? 
Offi cials such as Nibley answered yes to both questions, even 
though it seemed to confi rm what many muckrakers, mem-
bers of Congress, and even LDS members such as Charles 
Patterson feared: that the LDS church’s requirement of strict 
loyalty to its leaders extended into temporal affairs. As Richard 
T. Ely, a social and economic observer in the Progressive Era, 
related, much of the church’s economic strength came from 
“the authority which percolates downward from the First 
President [sic] through the hierarchical priesthood.”10
Compounding this authority was the fact that many Mor-
mons in the 1910s had been raised on the economic prin-
ciple of cooperation, making LDS offi cials less reluctant to 
use ecclesiastical infl uence for a business’s benefi t and mak-
ing members more susceptible to that mode of persuasion. 
Church leaders might regard claims that the LDS church 
dominated Utah’s economy as nonsense, but there was at least 
a subtle and indirect infl uence that exerted itself in church-
supported enterprises. In the sugar industry, it was even more 
pronounced. In fact, as late as 1919, Grant reinforced the 
notion that good Latter-day Saints needed to support Utah-
Idaho Sugar. In the church’s general conference, he related 
once again to church members Woodruff’s declaration that 
God wanted the Utah Sugar Company established. “I can 
bear witness that Wilford Woodruff was in very deed . . . a 
true Prophet of God,” Grant proclaimed. “Under the inspira-
tion of the Lord, . . . he was blessed . . . with wisdom that was 
superior to all the wisdom of the bright fi nancial minds in 
10. Richard T. Ely, “Economic Aspects of Mormonism,” Harper’s Monthly Magazine
56 (April 1903): 667.
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the Church.”11 Coming on the eve of two investigations into 
Utah-Idaho’s business practices, these pronouncements had 
even more signifi cance for LDS followers.
Even though federal inquiries in the 1910s did not con-
vince Grant to end the church’s support of business, they 
did have some effect. For one thing, Grant began counseling 
Mormons to cease working against non-Mormon industries. 
As historian Thomas G. Alexander has shown, Grant and his 
fellow leaders “became so sensitive about potential competi-
tion with private business” in the 1920s and 1930s “that they 
adopted practices that hurt their own enterprises.”12 Certainly 
some of that reluctance stemmed from Utah-Idaho Sugar’s 
troubles.
A look into the early history of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany, then, indicates that, for Mormons in the early 1900s,
business and religion were not a good mix, a lesson that the 
church would not really grasp until the latter part of the 
twentieth century when it began to require its high-ranking 
offi cials to divest themselves of active business connections. 
Although the church was able to keep the beet sugar busi-
ness afl oat with its aid, the use of its infl uence led to fed-
eral investigations that ultimately resulted in embarrassment 
for the church and hard feelings among some of its mem-
bers. In many ways, church involvement in beet sugar meant 
that Utah-Idaho Sugar was an anomaly in the integration of 
American West enterprises into the national economy. Yet, at 
the same time, the corporation’s history, with or without the 
Mormons, still highlights the turbulence that followed such 
integration, while also indicating that even small western 
enterprises could enact business policies that seemed very 
similar to those of eastern big businesses such as Standard 
Oil and U.S. Steel.
In the end, the LDS infl uence in Utah’s sugar industry, 
drawing on the long past of church involvement in beet sugar, 
continued to be pronounced, although exerted in more 
11. Eighty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Salt 
Lake City, 1919), 8.
12. Thomas G. Alexander, Mormonism in Transition: A History of the Latter-day Saints, 
1890–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1986), 75.
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subtle ways. God wanted the beet sugar industry established, 
Wilford Woodruff had proclaimed in the 1890s, and Mor-
mon leadership was eager to carry out God’s will. Whether 
God also wanted his leaders to use their infl uence to drive 
competitors out of business, to compel members to support 
Utah-Idaho Sugar, and to plead the innocence of company 
offi cials indicted for profi teering and antitrust violations is 
unclear. But that was a major result of the LDS infl uence in 
beet sugar: it allowed the industry to fl ourish and dominate 
in the Intermountain West, while also bringing the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company into direct confl ict with the federal 
government. “We were put to endless trouble and expense 
and held up to ridicule and scorn for simply doing that which 
practically everybody else in the sugar business was doing,” 
Charles Nibley had protested in the aftermath of the com-
pany’s 1920 price hike, yet there were few other companies 
using the backing of a church that demanded unquestioning 
allegiance to further their pursuits.13 This was the real cause 
of the “endless trouble” that befell Utah-Idaho Sugar in the 
1910s. Ultimately, it was also the result of the path of LDS 
infl uence that Wilford Woodruff had blazed.
13. Charles Nibley, Reminiscences (Salt Lake City, 1934), 141–42.
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